Forum for Foreign Affairs

The Unrest in Côte d'Ivoire, and Why it Matters

2011-02-28T23:37:00.007-05:00

Last November, Côte d'Ivoire held its first presidential election in ten years. It was supposed to help unify a country that had suffered through more than a decade of unrest and civil war.

Instead, the election has done just the opposite. The current president, Laurent Gbagbo, nullified the victory – certified by independent international observers – of a longtime prominent opponent, Alassane Ouattara, and has vowed to stay in power by any means necessary, defying calls from the international community to step down. How the international community reacts to this flagrant abuse of power will have an impact throughout West Africa – a region only just beginning to emerge from civil war and political upheaval – and will speak volumes for how a rising Africa ranks as a global international issue in the 21st century.

With President Gbagbo still commanding the loyalty of the military and Mr. Ouattara backed by the rebellious Northern provinces and the leader of the rebel New Forces militia, Gulliame Soro, Côte d'Ivoire is on the brink of renewed civil war. Being one of the wealthier countries in West Africa and one of the largest sources of cocoa and coffee, an unstable Côte d'Ivoire would have negative repercussions throughout Africa and the world.

The situation has been deteriorating rapidly since the results were announced in December. Hundreds have died from clashes between President Gbagbo’s and Mr. Ouattara’s forces and between police and unarmed protestors. Thousands more have fled to neighboring countries, some of which, like Liberia and Sierra Leone, have only just recently emerged from their own civil wars and whose stability remains fragile at best. Moreover, the price of cocoa and other commodities have skyrocketed in light of the current unrest and the potential for future civil war.

Currently, President Gbagbo has the advantage on the ground, with thousands of Ivorian troops confining Mr. Ouattara and his rival government in a small section of Abidijan, the nation's largest city. Only an 1000 man contingent of UN peacekeepers stand in the way of Mr. Ouattara and several hundred of his trapped forces from being overwhelmed.

But despite having his opponent surrounded and outgunned, President Gbagbo’s hold on power is growing increasingly tenuous. The international community has universally recognized Mr. Ouattara as the new president and has strongly condemned President Gbagbo’s heavy-handed actions. The Central Bank of the West African Monetary Union has denied President Gbagbo access to Côte d'Ivoire’s state funds, and the World Bank has frozen $800 million in expected financing, both of which threaten to starve President Gbagbo of enough cash to pay the military and other loyal officials. UN forces refused to leave the country after being ordered to do so by President Gbagbo, and the UN continues to supply and reinforce its contingent protecting Mr. Ouattara’s position in Abidjan. Now, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional economic group with a military arm, is threatening to send an intervention force to remove President Gbagbo from power. Moreover, the New Forces remain at large and is poised to make a move should President Gbagbo escalate the situation further.

The international community likely hopes that, faced with dwindling cash reserves and the possibility of ECOWAS or rebel attack, the Ivorian army will abandon President Gbagbo, which would force him to step down. But this outcome is not so clear-cut. Past ECOWAS interventions in conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and elsewhere were never a decisive force on the ground. Nor did they bring about a quick victory, but rather got bogged down for years and caused significant collateral damage to property and civilians. Moreover, Nigeria, the most powerful member of ECOWAS, is nearing highly-charged elections of its own, and so may be reluctant to commit wholeheartedly to an intervention force.

An ineffectual ECOWAS intervention would produce a long, drawn-out stalemate at best and, if it doesn’t cause a full-fledged civil war, would exacerbate the divisions within Côte d'Ivoire that led to civil war in the first place.

The causes of Côte d'Ivoire’s troubles are rooted in the tensions between the rich, cocoa-growing, urban, Christian, and coastal southern regions and the poorer, Muslim, more rural, and more foreign northern regions. Throughout the late 1900s, Côte d'Ivoire experienced significant immigration, especially from neighboring West African countries, due to its economic prosperity from cocoa and coffee exports and the political stability imposed by longtime dictator Félix Houphouët-Boigny. The tensions between the “native” Ivorians and the immigrants (especially the Burkinabé from neighboring Burkina Faso) came to a head during the last elections, in 2000, when the very same Mr. Ouattara was barred from running due to suspicions of his nationality. President Gbagbo, following a chaotic disputed election, emerged as president. He did little to alleviate the ethnic tensions, which provoked a mutiny of hundreds of soldiers from the north across the country in 2002, leading to the formation of the New Forces and the beginning of civil war.

Whatever the outcome of the current standoff, such tensions have been stoked again. The situation is further exacerbated by the current economic woes the country is suffering as a result of the standoff, with movement in and out of the country hampered. The greatest fear of ECOWAS countries is for another civil war to break out, as that would mean reduced trade with and more refugees from Côte d'Ivoire. In addition, Liberia and Sierra Leone in particular are worried, rightfully so, that renewed civil war in Côte d'Ivoire could provide a haven for militants seeking to destabilize either country, both of which went through their own civil wars that only ended in the last decade.

For West Africa, then, the situation in Côte d'Ivoire is a looming disaster, but also an opportunity to demonstrate resolve and solidarity on the world stage. West Africa will need real leadership to transcend short-term considerations in order to collectively address a threat that will negatively impact all of the countries in the region. If it is able to make good on its word and send a sizeable, well-funded, and well-equipped ECOWAS force, it will be an impressive, even inspiring, culmination of a decade’s worth of progress in the region: to have gone from being awash in civil wars – with many countries even funding and arming rebels in neighboring countries – to being able to collectively police the region.

For the rest of the world, the situation in Côte d'Ivoire is an issue that must be addressed adequately to show that the international community, when acting collectively, still has the teeth to uphold its interests abroad. But if it wants to ensure success, the international community will have to take an additional sweeping measure: a boycott of Ivorian cocoa and possibly other exports. Taxing exports is how President Gbagbo is getting most of his revenue from at the moment. It would hurt world markets too, but it could prove the decisive blow to President Gbagbo’s finances. Perhaps then the threat of an ECOWAS invasion will be enough to dispel President Gbagbo of his remaining supporters and avert a full-fledged civil war.

Note: This article originally appeared in the January 2011 issue of American Foreign Policy, a Princeton monthly foreign policy publication.

Confronting Iran: An Intermediate Approach

2011-01-02T01:35:00.005-05:00

For the United States and Israel, Iran’s nuclear program is reaching an especially critical phase. Eight years after Iranian dissidents in London publicly revealed information detailing Iran’s covert nuclear program, the rogue state shows no signs of backing down on its nuclear activities. Indeed, this August, with Russian help, Iran’s first nuclear power plant, Bushehr, became operational. While Iran insists that the plant is only for generating electricity, the plant will also reportedly produce plutonium, which can be used in a nuclear warhead, as a byproduct. This new development comes even as Iran utilizes facilities at Natanz, Qum, and elsewhere to enrich uranium, inching ever closer towards nuclear breakout.

This past July, the United Nations passed the toughest round of sanctions yet against Iran, and the United States and the European Union added sanctions of their own. The UN sanctions focus on targeting financial institutions doing business related to Iran’s nuclear weapons program or with certain branches of the Iranian ruling elite, particularly the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the US and EU sanctions target additional areas, such as technological assistance.

Few expect the new sanctions to force change in Iran’s behavior, however. The UN sanctions, although stronger than previous ones, fall well short of being crippling, due to opposition from Russia and China, two of Iran’s main trading partners. US sanctions target shipments of gasoline – perhaps the commodity most vulnerable to sanctions due Iran’s extremely limited refining capacity. However, China and Russia have refused to take similar action, severely weakening any impact the US measures could have. Even many Obama administration officials are conceding that voiced pessimism; as CIA Director Leon Panetta remarked, “Will [the sanctions] deter them [Iran]from their ambitions with regards to nuclear capability? Probably not.”
As Iran’s nuclear program proceeds forward, the United States faces a set of difficult options. It could try to forcibly remove Iran’s nuclear program – both to ensure regional security and punish Iran for so long defying the international community – or work to contain Iran so as to counteract the additional regional leverage a nuclear weapons program would afford that nation. Neither is by any means a slam dunk, and both would fundamentally alter the Middle East. In addition, there is the very real prospect of Israel taking unilateral action against Iran – while a nuclear Iran would be problematic for the United States, for Israel it could be an existential threat – adding another dimension of complexity to this deepening crisis.

Large strategic decisions aside, however, the United States does have several intermediate options it can pursue to ratchet up pressure on Iran, particularly with regard to sanctions enforcement. While few disagree that past and current sanctions could and should have had more teeth, upon closer inspection, it is clear that enforcement of the sanctions has been lacking as well. The United States has taken surprisingly little action against violators of its sanctions, and it certainly could do more work searching for such violators. Part of this has to do with cost and bureaucratic inefficiency, but a lot also has to do with the inherent difficulties of enforcement. Nevertheless, the Obama administration could put more resources into enforcement as an intermediate way to ramp up pressure on Iran.

Doing so will not be easy: even the most stringent sanctions are hard to enforce. Penalizing offenders can be costly, especially as black markets for sanctioned goods often develop after bigger, legitimate offenders are punished. Moreover, even if a country like the United States were successfully to cripple trade of a certain good to another country, that country could still get that good from the United States through a middleman; for example, nuclear power plant material could leave a US port bound for a country in South Asia but, once in that country, could then be shipped to Iran. In the past, businesses evaded US and UN sanctions by doing business through Iran via businesses in nearby states, the UAE being a prominent example.

Tracking what businesses that receive initial shipments do with the material they receive is one of many challenges facing a host of export control agencies within the Defense, State, and Commerce Departments (among others). Certainly, beefing up these efforts would help strengthen the sanctions regime against Iran. Indeed, in recent months, the UAE and several other Arab nations have started cooperating more with the United States with export control efforts as the specter of a nuclear Iran grows more pronounced; Arab nations are threatened by a nuclear Iran too.

Should Iran, despite current efforts, reach breakout capacity, the United States has another card to play. The US could enact the ultimate enforcement mechanism: a naval blockade of Iran. Under such a blockade, the United States could forcibly stop ships and check cargo for sensitive material and barcodes or serial numbers that most companies put on their products to identify if such material was shipped from a US port. This would be necessary because, to enforce US sanctions, the United States can only stop US ships (though as a member of the UN Security Council, the United States could also enforce a blockade on behalf of the UN sanctions as well).

Such a blockade would be no easy feat. It would require a substantial number of ships and personnel to search every single commercial vessel going to Iran. Such an aggressive and debatably legal action might also provoke backlash from the international community, so the United States would do well to consult extensively with the Europeans, Russians, Chinese, and others before it undertakes such an action. Moreover, without cooperation from countries neighboring Iran, particularly Russia, there would be no way to enact a total blockade against Iran (though perhaps if President Obama’s “reset” diplomacy with Russia works as planned, the latter may be more willing to help with such an action). Nevertheless, if the United States were to undertake such a blockade, or simply threaten to do so, it would send a clear message to Iran that the United States would be willing to use force if necessary to thwart Iran’s nuclear program. Conveying this intention to Iran could cause it to rethink its options; faced with the likely prospect of U.S. military action, the Iranian government would be more likely to decide that abandoning its nuclear program to maintain its power would be better for it than trying to resist concerted U.S. military.

In this way, a US blockade would strengthen the sanctions regime against Iran while demonstrating that the United States would be willing to move beyond negotiations and diplomacy if necessary. A similar gambit worked against Cuba and may have prevented a Soviet-American WWIII; perhaps now such an intermediate move could resolve this current crisis.

Note: This article originally appeared in the October 2010 issue of American Foreign Policy, a Princeton monthly foreign policy publication.

Congo's Forgotten Crisis, and How the United States should Address it: Introduction

2010-08-23T16:05:00.006-04:00

Part 1 of a 7-part article about how the ongoing civil war in Congo is rooted in the poor state of the Congolese Army, why Congo matters to the United States, and what policies the United States should enact to address the situation.

Perhaps no modern nation has endured as much as Congo. Ever since there’s been a modern Congo, it has suffered, sometimes under ruthless authoritarian masters like King Leopold of Belgium and Mobutu Sese Seko, other times amidst periods of utter chaos, but always exploited and abused to the utmost.

The latest chapter in Congo’s tragic history – an ongoing 16-year civil war that continues to claim tens of thousands of lives each month (1) – may be its worst yet. Even still, the conflict has failed to attract significant outcry or even attention from the much of the world. In the United States in particular, the relentless violence in Congo is constantly overshadowed by headlines about Iraq, Afghanistan, and Israel, among other things.

This lack of popular attention is reflected at the policy level as well. Although U.S. agencies such as USAID have organized and sponsored numerous aid programs in Congo, such efforts have been consistently underfunded and understaffed. Despite the immense economic potential of Africa and the geopolitical importance of Congo in particular to Africa – it’s located right in the center of Africa, borders nine countries, is larger than Western Europe (2), and has bountiful natural resources – U.S. priorities in Europe and Asia have consistently redirected American resources and time away from more comprehensive attention and policies toward Africa, with Congo being no exception.

Moreover, the bulk of such efforts have focused on providing emergency relief and humanitarian assistance rather than on confronting the root causes of the instability plaguing Congo, the most immediate cause being the inability of the FARDC to exert undisputed control over the entire country. Numerous militias, both foreign and domestic, as well as bands of thugs have been able to operate in and even control much of the country, especially in the East. There are a number of factors that have enabled this, ranging from complicity and fear among the locals and the abundance of mineral deposits available for extortion, which need to be addressed.

Ultimately, though, it has been the FARDC’s ineffectiveness rather than the militias’ capabilities that has prevented it from imposing peace over the entire country. FARDC soldiers have performed extremely poorly in clashes with militias (3), often simply fleeing without giving a significant fight at all. Moreover, far from protecting civilians from violence and abuse, the FARDC has been one of the main perpetrators of such abuses: according to MONUC reports, the FARDC was responsible for 53% of reported human rights violations in the first half of 2006 (4) and 54% of reported sexual violence in the first half of 2007 (5). If Congo wants any chance at peace, it needs to confront these issues that have made the national army a part of the problem rather than a means of ending the ongoing violence.

This fact has not been lost on the DRC (6) government or the international community, and numerous SSR schemes have been attempted. Much of these efforts have focused on complex administrative issues, training programs, and integration of former militants into the armed forces. These initiatives have had mixed successes at best, due to widespread corruption within the government and officer corps and a general lack of funding.

Moreover, as independent research has shown, most of the DRC’s initiatives have not been directed at the underlying sources of the FARDC’s ineptitude and lack of discipline. Work done by Swedish professors Maria Eriksson Baaz, PhD, and Maria Stern, PhD, and activists from HRW, among others – all of who conducted many interviews with FARDC soldiers, locals, and independent observers that have witnessed or taken part in the violence and abuses over the past couple of years – have revealed startlingly straightforward reasons for the FARDC’s behavior. Most soldiers do not receive pay, food rations, lodgings, or necessary equipment from their superiors, and the majority of abuses against civilians goes unpunished. This negligence coupled with impunity sets up a situation where many soldiers prey off the Congolese population, not only out of anger or for potential pleasure but also simply for their basic needs.

Clearly, such basic supply and disciplinary problems need to be solved if the FARDC is ever to become a controllable fighting force, let alone an army capable of defeating numerous well-armed and well-financed militias that have caused internal turmoil in Congo for the past 16 years. In light of the DRC’s struggles in dealing with such problems, the United States should increase its aid commitment to the DRC, focusing on efforts to alleviate the logistical woes of the FARDC soldiers. Specifically, a program that could provide the salaries and basic equipment sorely lacking among FARDC soldiers while bypassing the corruption that has hindered previous such efforts – or threaten consequences, like a cut in such aid, if significant corruption is detected in its implementation – could help the FARDC take the necessary strides it needs to become a viable fighting force. As long as the FARDC is unable to defeat the militias, the violence will continue and Congo’s development will be further stunted. A peaceful, prosperous Congo would, due to the country’s geopolitical significance, benefit much of central Africa as well, which is in the strong interest of the United States.

(1) In 2008, the IRC estimated people were dying at a rate of 45,000 per month [“IRC Study Shows Congo's Neglected Crisis Leaves 5.4 Million Dead; Peace Deal in N. Kivu, Increased Aid Critical to Reducing Death Toll,” International Rescue Committee, January 22, 2008, http://www.theirc.org/news/irc-study-shows-congos-neglected-crisis-leaves-54-million-dead-peace-deal-n-kivu-increased-aid--4331.]
(2) If Western Europe is defined as Ireland, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Portugal, Andorra, Italy, Switzerland, San Marino, Luxembourg, Lichtenstein, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, then it has an area of 2,329,755 sq. km, whereas the DRC has an area of 2,344,858 sq. km, according to CIA’s The World Factbook.
(3) Perhaps none have been worse than the FARDC’s humiliating defeat at Mushake in December, 2007, in which around 4,000 CNDP militants under the command of the renegade General Laurent Nkunda defeated around 20,000 FARDC soldiers, forcing the DRC government to enter peace talks with Nkunda. [Joe Bavier, “Congo rebels retake ground, army offensive falters,” Reuters, December 11, 2007, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L11351715.htm.]
(4) MONUC Human Rights Division, The Human Rights Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo during the Period of January to June 2006 (New York: MONUC, 2006), 9.
(5) MONUC Human Rights Division, The Human Rights Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo during the Period of January to June 2007 (New York: MONUC, 2007), 18.
(6) From this point forward, I will use DRC and Congo interchangeably to refer to the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Congo's Forgotten Crisis, and How the United States should Address it: List of Acronyms

2010-08-23T16:00:00.003-04:00

AFRICOM: United States African Command

CNDP: Congrès National pour la Défense du People (National Congress for the Defence of the People)

DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

DDRRR: Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration

DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo

ESF: Economic Support Fund (part of the U.S. budget)

EU: European Union

FAC: Forces Armées Congolais

FARDC: Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo)

FDLR: Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda)

FMF: Foreign Military Financing (part of the U.S. budget)

FY: U.S. Government Fiscal Year (Begins on October 1st)

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

HRW: Human Rights Watch

IMET: International Military Education and Training (part of the U.S. budget)

IMF: International Monetary Fund

IRC: International Rescue Commission

LRA: Lord’s Resistance Army (Ugandan rebel group)

MONUC: Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo)

NADR: Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (part of the U.S. budget)

NGO: Non-Governmental Organization

PO: Peacekeeping Operations (part of the U.S. budget)

RCD-Goma: Rally for Congolese Democracy – Goma

RPF: Rwandan Patriotic Front

SSR: Security Sector Reform

UN: United Nations

UNITA: União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)

US: United States

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

Congo's Forgotten Crisis, and How the United States should Address it: A Snapshot of the Violence

2010-08-23T15:54:00.003-04:00

Part 2 of a 7-part article about how the ongoing civil war in Congo is rooted in the poor state of the Congolese Army, why Congo matters to the United States, and what policies the United States should enact to address the situation.

Congo at present is a far cry from peace and prosperity. Although the situation has improved from its all-time low from 1998-2003 – when the armies of Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Angola, Chad, Zambia, and even Zimbabwe fought it out on Congolese soil, in what was called in Second Congo War (1) – much of the country, particularly in the East, is still beset with violence, and the estimated death toll of 3 to 7.6 million people (2) continues to climb at an alarming rate, with tens of thousands of people dying each month from fighting, abuse, disease, and starvation.

The violence is as appalling as it is prolific. Massacres and rapes have become commonplace, with militants preying of off the local populations and often deliberately attacking them to try to further their authority in the area (3). According to the UN, thousands of women are raped each month (4), often brutally, with many reports of gang rape and war rape regularly taking place (5). It is likely that the number of rapes occurring greatly exceeds the number reported, since many victims simply do not report their cases (6). Thousands of children have been abducted, and child soldiers, known as kadogos(7), continue to fight on all sides (indeed, it was an army largely made up of kadogos that current put Laurent Kabila – the father of current DRC President Joseph Kabila – in power nearly 14 years ago)(8). Civilians continue to be killed and punished in almost unthinkable ways; there have been reports of people getting mutilated, sliced up with machetes (9), and even eaten throughout the conflict (10).

It is bad enough for Congo to have rebellious militias thrashing through much of its territory pillaging and abusing the population along the way, but to have the national army itself commit the largest number of such abuses has devastated hopes for peace in Congo. Understandably, such contemptible behavior has all but ruined the FARDC’s standing in the eyes of the people, making it even harder for the FARDC to fight the numerous armed groups roaming across Congo and damaging the credibility of President Kabila’s relatively new government (11).

Some have, understandably, demonized the FARDC (12) in light of the heinous crimes many of its soldiers have committed, but it is much more useful to try to understand why such people – assuming they are not bloodthirsty monsters bent on vengeful slaughter – would commit such horrendous acts of violence.

(1) Gregory Mthembu-Salter, Recent History (The Democratic Republic of the Congo), in Europa World online, London, Routledge. Princeton University. Retrieved 09 May 2010 from http://www.europaworld.com/entry/cd.hi.
(2) Peter James Spielmann, “Review of Congo war halves death toll,” Associated Press, Taiwan News, Janurary 20, 2010. http://www.etaiwannews.com/etn/news_content.php?id=1160780&lang=eng_news.
(3) Ida Sawyer and Anneke Van Woudenberg. “‘You Will Be Punished’: Attacks on Civilians in Eastern Congo.” Human Rights Watch Publications (2009), 10-11.
(4) U.S. Congressional Research Services, The Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and Current Developments (R40108; February 4, 2010), by Ted Dagne, 2.
(5) Ibid., 9.
(6) Juliane Kippenberg, “Soldiers Who Rape, Commanders Who Condone: Sexual Violence and Military Reform in the DR,.” Human Rights Watch Publications (2009): 14.
(7) Swahili for “little ones.”
(8) Seymour, Claudia, “Children Choosing Combat? Failures of children’s DDR in a context of chronic conflict,” (September 8, 2009), 1-2.
(9) Sawyer and Van Woudenberg, “‘You Will Be Punished,’” 12.
(10) Eddy Insango, “Cannibalism shock as Congo atrocities revealed,” Reuters, The Age, March 18, 2005. http://www.theage.com.au/news/World/Cannibalism-shock-as-Congo-atrocities-revealed/2005/03/17/1110913734387.html.
(11) President Kabila originally took power in 2001 following the assassination of his father, but the current administration assumed control of the government in 2006 following Kabila’s victory in a presidential election..[ Mthembu-Salter, Recent History (The Democratic Republic of the Congo)]
(12) Rowland Croucher, “Congo (DR): Church Suffering Intensely,” John Mark Ministries, February 5, 2003. http://jmm.aaa.net.au/articles/10649.htm, quoted in Baaz and Stern, “Making Sense of Violence in the Congo,” 58.

Congo's Forgotten Crisis, and How the United States should Address it: Stepping into the Shoes of a Congolese Soldier

2010-08-23T15:46:00.004-04:00

Part 3 of a 7-part article about how the ongoing civil war in Congo is rooted in the poor state of the Congolese Army, why Congo matters to the United States, and what policies the United States should enact to address the situation.

Dr. Baaz’s research provides important insights into this question. From October 2005 to November 2006, Dr. Baaz, who is fluent in Lingala, a local Congolese language, interviewed several hundred FARDC soldiers and junior officers, both male and female, who had seen active combat within a year of their interviews (1). The interviews lasted 2-3 hours, and those interviewed had no time beforehand to prepare for their interviews; indeed, most of those interviewed were ordered to report to the interview location by their superiors without warning on the day of the interview, having no idea why they were supposed to be there (2).

Dr. Baaz’s work was funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida-Sarec) as part of a larger research effort on gender discourses in the militaries of the DRC and Mozambique (3), and so much of her interviews focused on subjects such as masculinity, femininity, gender roles (4). However, she also asked a great deal of questions about notions of the ideal soldier – what qualities they should have, how they should act, how they should be treated, among others – and how it compared to their own experiences in the FARDC (5).

Most of those interviewed spoke not of strength, ability to kill, or courage, but rather of order and discipline as the qualities of the ideal soldier – the qualities that they strove toward (6). Many soldiers spoke of how it was the ability to strictly follow the Règlement Militaire(7) that distinguished one as a good soldier. Indeed, some thought themselves superior to civilians because of their acquired discipline and ability to follow orders. As one male corporal put it:

“The difference between a civilian and a soldier is that we follow orders/rules
[mibeko]. I get up at 5 in the morning, put on my uniform and go to work. I do
not go to work because they will give me 1,000 FC [US$2] at the end of the
day. I go with both my joys and my sorrows and I will sit on guard until 14:00
or until the superiors tell me it is enough, I can go back home. But a civilian
could not do that. If you tell a civilian to sit guard like we do he would start :
‘Ahh, I have to go to the market’ or ‘ I have to go to Kintambo [an area in
Kinshasa] to look for somebody.’ For me it is the orders [mibeko] that make
me sit there, the rules. The civilians do not know how to follow orders. We sit
as a result of the orders of the superiors. Civilians would not cope, in that case
you would have to hold him by force [kanga ye na makasi].”(8)

Given the lack of cohesiveness and discipline in the FARDC as a whole, it seems ironic that FARDC soldiers would pride themselves on discipline to the point of considering themselves better than civilians because of it. Indeed, most of the soldiers acknowledged a great disparity between their ideal perceptions of being a soldier in the army and their experiences in the FARDC.

Nearly all who were interviewed expressed frustration and anger over the deplorable state of the FARDC in general. As the corporal above alluded to in his testimony, much of the army does not get paid. This is not because of a lack of funding on the army’s part (although, if it had more money, perhaps the meager salary of US$20 a day (9) could be raised), but rather because officers at every step in the chain of command take their own “cut”(10) of the money and equipment that they are supposed to distribute to their unit; indeed, one male sergeant interviewed indignantly remarked that he had to buy his own uniform (11). Understandably, these conditions do not sit well with the FARDC soldiers, who expressed deep resentment at being betrayed and exploited by their superior officers. Take the experience of this former kadogo, who by the time of the interview was 21, for instance:

“As we said above, a good soldier is a soldier who follows Règlement Militaire,
who has discipline and obeys it. But how can we do a good job when we do not
have anything. Here [in Kinshasa] we are hungry and at the front we are hungry.
We don’t get anything. They cheat us. … According to the rules we are supposed
to get rations, food, medical care, but now there is nothing. I will tell you one
thing so that you understand, so that you understand our situation. A few months
ago I had to bury my son. Why did I have to do that ? Because they refused to give
me medicine. He had diarrhea and fever – many days. I kept going to my
superiors everyday to get the money [for medical care] which I am entitled to
according to the rules. But every day, they said, come back tomorrow. Then
he died. I had no money to bury him and that is also something the Army is
supposed to pay for. So we put him in the morgue. I asked again for money so
that we could bury [him], but only tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow.
Nothing. He was three weeks in the morgue, and I had no money to get him out
and bury him. Eventually I made an illegal/informal deal [nasalaki cop moko] with
some people – with guns. I got some money and the rest I borrowed. And I buried
my son. So tell me, how can we be disciplined? They all cheat us. Our superiors
cheat us. We die and our children die. They send their children to Europe, but
our children die.” (12)

Taking bitter, angry men (and women) with no food, pay, or shelter and deploying them, armed, near a village is a recipe for disaster for any military anywhere in the world. While no one can condone or excuse the appalling violence that such soldiers often commit in Congo, it is hard not to feel a bit of sympathy for these men (and women) that are pushed to the limits of existence and still expected to maintain orderly conduct, much less obey orders from officers they rightly suspect of cheating them.

Compounding the problem, there are rarely any negative consequences of rape, pillage, or murder for FARDC soldiers. Although it is against Congolese law for anyone, soldier or civilian, to commit such crimes (13), in practice such illegal actions are rarely punished. Indeed, many soldiers expressed the need to have more severe punishments for such crimes in order to deter wavering soldiers from committing such offenses. Take this example, in which two sergeants explained how they would punish wrongdoers:

Male sergeant A: “To diminish [rapes] you need punishments, it has to be severe
punishments … and public trials. If a soldier at Zeta [military camp in Kinshasa]
rapes a woman, he should be judged there. They should expel him from the army
there, take off his uniform, put him in the car [which transports him away] and
everybody should be there to watch.”
Male sergeant B: “That will give a lesson to all the people that are there to watch
him.”
Male sergeant A: “Yes, it has to be public trials : ‘today it is the trial of corporal X’
[they should say to him] ‘Do you know that you took somebody’s woman
with force [ozwaki mwasi ya batu na makasi] ? ’ ‘Yes, my commander, I know’
[he answers]. ‘Do you know that this is forbidden in the law? ’ ‘Yes, I know.’ ‘Ok,
we will give you the death penalty .’”
Maria: “But that is too much maybe?”
Male sergeant A: “[Laughing] It is just an example. Even 50 or 5 years. His wife will
start to cry, his children will start to cry : ‘ahh, Papa’. Then, the other people who
are watching will understand, they will start to be afraid : ‘ahh, so that is the way
it is ’.”
Male sergeant B: “But the punishment also has to be severe, even 20 years. Then
people will fear it.” (14)

Impunity is a huge problem in many spheres of Congolese life, and dealing with it in civilian, business, and other areas will require a significant amount of time and resources to address the other weak institutions that contribute to it. But having accountability in the military, at the very least, is essential. The consequences of continued impunity in the FARDC can be seen in the brutal abuses committed by soldiers every day against civilians, and if a country’s own army cannot control itself, how can a stable society be expected to function?

(1) Baaz and Stern, “Making Sense of Violence in the Congo,” 60-62.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid., 61 and 82.
(4) Ibid., 61.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Ibid., 70-73.
(7) French for military rules/ military code of conduct
(8) Ibid., 73.
(9) Dating back to 2006 [Ibid., 64.]
(10) Sébastien Melmot, “Candide in Congo: The Expected Failure of Security Sector Reform,” IFRI Focus Stratégique, n° 9 bis (2009): 11.
(11) Baaz and Stern, “Making Sense of Violence in the Congo,” 77.
(12) Ibid., 76.
(13) Kippenberg, “Soldiers Who Rape, Commanders Who Condone,” 18-19.
(14) Baaz and Stern, “Making Sense of Violence in the Congo,” 79.

Congo's Forgotten Crisis, and How the United States should Address it: From HRW, an Inside Look at a Congolese Brigade

2010-08-23T15:37:00.005-04:00

Part 4 of a 7-part article about how the ongoing civil war in Congo is rooted in the poor state of the Congolese Army, why Congo matters to the United States, and what policies the United States should enact to address the situation.

A recent report by HRW (1) comes to many of the same conclusions as Dr. Baaz does from her interviews. Like Dr. Baaz did for her article, Juliane Kippenberg and other HRW researchers interviewed FARDC personnel for much of their research, focusing on the FARDC’s 14th brigade. They investigate the actions of the 14th brigade from its creation in North Kivu Province in 2006 until early 2009 (2). Their findings indicate, among other things, that much of the problems with the FARDC that existed in 2006 while Dr. Baaz was conducting her interviews still persist today.

In addition, in describing the creation of the 14th brigade, the report highlights another challenge that the army has struggled to handle: the integration of former rebel fighters, and even officers, into the FARDC. The FARDC is essentially a collection of dozens of former armed groups, formed after the 2002 Global and All-inclusive Agreement that led to the withdrawal of foreign troops from Congo. The deal called for the creation of a new national army from the shell of the old army, the FAC, and from numerous militias, which were to form the new integrated armed forces: the FARDC (3). Militants had the option to join the new army or to undergo DDR or DDRRR and assimilate back into civilian life or repatriate to their homeland, respectively.

Intended to be finished before the 2006 national elections, the military integration process is still not complete and has been a challenge from the start (4). DDR, DDRRR, and military integration centers have been severely underfunded, making such options unattractive to militants; one observer went so far to state that “a human being cannot survive for a long time [in the centres] even if they are endowed with superhuman capacities for adaptation” (5). Even under the best circumstances, old loyalties die hard and hamper unity, especially when peoples of different language, ethnicity, or culture are integrated into mixed units (6). Alleged and real preferential treatment for certain ethnicities and the like continues to brood resentment and discord within the FARDC (7). This is apparent in the case of the 14th brigade, which was largely formed from the RCD-Goma – a Tutsi militia backed by Rwanda during the Second Congo War period – but also included some elements of the FAC and the Mai Mai (8). The majority of the brigade, including its commanding officer, Colonel David Rugayi, spoke Kinyarwanda – a language native to Hutus and Tutsis – but other soldiers spoke other Congolese languages, leading to confusion and resentment among some at the prevalence of Kinyarwanda-speaking officers in the brigade (9).

Such tensions would turn violent in an episode following the removal of Colonel Rugayi. After the 14th brigade participated in the FARDC’s humiliating defeat at Mushake (10), Kinshasa relieved Rugayi of his command, amidst allegations of battlefield incompetence and outright arms and information dealing with the CNDP (11). His replacement, Colonel John Tshibangu, did not speak Kinyarwanda, which caused resentment among the many Kinyarwanda-speaking soldiers of the brigade. The situation would come to a head on June 26, 2008, when scores of disgruntled soldiers refused a direct order from Colonel Tshibangu. Although the mutiny was put down by loyal troops, at least one brigade soldier died and several civilians were abused during the course of the fighting, and Colonel Rugayi was eventually reinstated to prevent future rebellion from the brigade (12).

Like the soldiers interviewed by Dr. Baaz, the members of the 14th brigade were also beset with severe shortages of food and basic supplies. As recently as March, 2009, one brigade soldier said this of the living conditions:

"We live like dogs. We live on civilians, asking them for their bananas. It’s
been three months without payment or something to eat.... Before, I got
37,000 FC a month [approximately US$44]. The commander would then take
2,000 or 5,000 FC from that. January was the last time we got rations. I got
beans and flour and maize. I have two children, but with a military salary it is
not enough to support them."(13)

In one particularly bad incident in January, 2008, the brigade was ordered to redeploy to the town of Kabare in South Kivu Province, near the Rwandan border but received no provisions, food, or shelter. The soldiers were left with little choice but to prey on the local populace. Foraging and looting in Kabare degenerated into what one officer interviewed described as “anarchy,” with soldiers destroying homes for materials and torturing, raping, and killing civilians at will (14). In all, HRW documented 23 cases of rape perpetrated by soldiers of the 14th brigade since they arrived in Kabare, and 26 cases during the research period, including several cases of gang rape (15). According to the report, only a handful of criminal charges were brought against members of the brigade, none of which involved high-ranking officers.

The report also found disturbing evidence of a breakdown in the higher chain of command with regard to the 14th brigade. When the brigade was first assembled in North Kivu, it fell within the boundaries of the 8th military region, but upon moving to South Kivu the brigade came within the 10th military region. Each region was under the control of a different general, and neither general would claim responsibility of the brigade after its rampage in Kabare (16), though in practice, the brigade seemed to respond to Kinshasa directly, as evidenced by Kinshasa’s removal and later reinstatement of Colonel Rugayi (17).

The case of the 14th brigade and its many problems does not seem to be an isolated example. The same HRW report mentions by name nine other FARDC brigades whose members had committed acts of sexual violence during the reporting period (18), and in 2008 the UN registered 7,703 cases of sexual violence in North and South Kivu alone (19). To combat these seemingly widespread occurrences, the report lays out a number of suggestions for the DRC government and the international community. Among other things, the report suggests that the Congolese government reform its chain of command, create a division of special prosecutors for sexual violence cases, and devise a mechanism to ensure that FARDC troops receive regular salaries and provisions, and it also urges the international community to provide funding and operational assistance for SSR (20).

(1) Entitled Soldiers Who Rape, Commanders Who Condone: Sexual Violence and Military Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
(2) Kippenberg, “Soldiers Who Rape, Commanders Who Condone,” 5.
(3) Baaz and Stern, “Making Sense of Violence in the Congo,” 63.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Ibid., 63-64.
(6) With over 200 ethnicities and languages in Congo, this problem is especially prominent.
(7) Ibid., 64.
(8) A term referring to a loose collection of community-based militias.
(9) Kippenberg, “Soldiers Who Rape, Commanders Who Condone,” 23.
(10) See note 1
(11) Ibid., 25.
(12) Ibid., 26.
(13) Ibid., 44.
(14) Ibid., 25.
(15) Ibid., 27.
(16) Ibid., 32-33.
(17) Ibid., 33.
(18) Ibid., 21.
(19) Ibid., 6.
(20) Ibid., 8-10.

Congo's Forgotten Crisis, and How the United States should Address it: Current DRC Policies and International Measures

2010-08-23T15:09:00.009-04:00

Part 5 of a 7-part article about how the ongoing civil war in Congo is rooted in the poor state of the Congolese Army, why Congo matters to the United States, and what policies the United States should enact to address the situation.

The importance of SSR as well as judicial reform has not been lost on the DRC government. President Kabila has emphasized in several interviews (1) that bringing peace and stability to Congo are his priorities, and he and his ministers have deliberated in great length with international donors on the subject (2). According to the UN Secretary-General’s December 2009 report on MONUC, DRC courts have begun to impose harsh punishments, including the death penalty, on soldiers who commit abuses against civilians, and, during the reporting period (3), five senior officers accused of sexual violence were removed from their posts (4). In addition, as recently as January, 2010, President Kabila has laid off masses of bureaucratic officials suspected of corruption (5). Furthermore, acutely aware of the coup attempt that killed his father (6), President Kabila has created a special elite unit of around 10,000 men called the Garde Républicaine that is separate from the FARDC and under his personal control, and he makes sure that they are paid regularly and have sufficient lodging and equipment (7).

These efforts and others have had only limited success at best, though. The various ministries of the DRC government have had contradictory SSR plans and conflicting policy spheres in which to work in, while the high-ranking officers in the military have resisted reform to the best of their abilities so as to retain their authority and “self-entailed privileges”(8). Several important security-related agencies, like intelligence and border control authorities, are not targeted by SSR efforts at all (9). Efforts to combat impunity, such as the “road map” – a six point plan to combat sexual violence (10) – have not been readily enforced; as a result, even members of the well-paid and well-equipped Garde Républicaine regularly beat, loot, rape, and kill civilians (11), particularly those who are deployed outside Kinshasa and are therefore far from the watchful eye of President Kabila.

Furthermore, the various international donors contributing to SSR – such as the UN, the EU, the Netherlands, Great Britain, South Africa, Japan, the United States, China, and various NGOs – have oftentimes competed with each other and worked at cross-purposes. The Netherlands, for instance, has primarily helped South Africa with its initiatives to improve the FARDC, while Great Britain has primarily supported South Africa’s efforts to improve the police, while Japan has financed projects to improve border control and existing MONUC humanitarian initiatives (12). The net effect is a huge slew of international initiatives, many of which conflict with each other and none of which are adequately funded (13).

The United States could help revitalize the DRC’s SSR efforts by making a more substantial financial commitment to Congo directed specifically at addressing the FARDC’s logistical and accountability problems. Currently, U.S. aid efforts toward Congo, like those of most of Congo’s international donors, are underfunded and misdirected. Over the past three years (14), the United States has devoted roughly $680 million to Congolese aid initiatives (15); although this is a fair amount of money, it pales in comparison to the aid that the United States provides to countries like Israel, Egypt, and South Africa. To put things into perspective, the United States has given roughly the same amount of foreign assistance money to Congo as it has to Liberia, a country that is roughly 20 times smaller – in terms of population and area (16) – than Congo (17,18). Furthermore, much of U.S. foreign assistance money to Congo goes to emergency and humanitarian needs (19), while a much smaller portion is directed towards military and security-related initiatives, which fall under FMF, IMET, NADR, and PO in Table 1.

Data obtained from Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, see Works Cited.

This is not to say that the United States has not understood the importance of a stable Congo and the role of the Congolese military in achieving this stability. The United States facilitated the peace process that culminated with the Global and All-inclusive Agreement in 2002 that lead to the eventual withdrawal of all foreign armies from Congo (20). More recently, the United States has contributed nearly $860 million over the past three years to MONUC (21) and, primarily through AFRICOM, has undertaken a number of its own initiatives designed to strengthen the FARDC. Through the FMF program, for instance, AFRICOM has provided the FARDC with weapons, while through the IMET program it has sent U.S. military personnel to train FARDC officers. In February, 2010, AFRICOM even began training an elite light infantry FARDC battalion that would be the nucleus of a “quick reaction force”(22) as part of its PO programs. In addition, AFRICOM has provided intelligence and assistance to several FARDC operations, including a recent joint Congolese-Ugandan operation (23) aimed at annihilating the LRA, which had taken refuge in northeastern Congo (24). Indeed, some critics worry that, far from being negligent, the United States is getting too involved in Congo’s military affairs and have expressed concern over what they argue is the militarization of Africa (25).

However, these measures, important though they are, have not contributed significantly to the fundamental logistical and disciplinary problems plaguing the FARDC. FMF provisions primarily deal with weapons and other combat equipment, not salaries and food rations (26), and although the United States has devoted time to human rights and international law as part of their IMET FARDC training curriculum (27) and has funded several ESF programs aimed to improve the DRC’s judiciary system (28), neither program has been sufficiently stressed or funded to give the United States real leverage in promoting such reform.

(1) Jeff Koinange, “Congo President on Military Rapes: ‘Unforgivable’,” CNN.com, June 1, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/africa/05/31/congo.rape/index.html.
(2) Melmot, “Candide in Congo,” 9-13.
(3) From 18 September 2009 until 25 November 2009
(4) UN Security Council, Thirtieth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2009/623), December 4, 2009, (Masthead). (2009 Readex microfiche): 14.
(5) “Kabila Dismisses Thousands for Corruption in DR. Congo,” Africa: the Good News, January 6, 2010, http://www.africagoodnews.com/leadership/kabila-dismisses-thousands-for-corruption-in-drcongo.html.
(6) “World Briefing | Africa: Congo: Death Sentences In Slaying Of President,” New York Times, January 8, 2003.
(7) “Democratic Republic of Congo: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Reform of the Army,” Amnesty International Publications (2007): 56-58.
(8) Melmot, “Candide in Congo,” 15-16.
(9) Ibid., 15.
(10) Kippenberg, “Soldiers Who Rape, Commanders Who Condone,” 36.
(11) “Democratic Republic of Congo: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR),” 56-60.
(12) Melmot, “Candide in Congo,” 16-17.
(13) Ibid., 17-19.
(14) FY 2008-2010.
(15) See Table 1 below.
(16) Data from CIA’s The World Factbook, see Works Cited.
(17) See Table 2 below.
(18) To be fair, Liberia has had its fair share of troubles as well; even still, the relative aid disparity is significant.
(19) Food Aid, Global Health and Child Survival: See Table 1.
(20) Exploring the U.S. Role in Consolidating Peace and Democracy in the Great Lakes Region, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (2007) (testimony of Jendayi Frazier).
(21) $270.721 million in 2008, $210 million in 2009, and an estimated $381 in 2010: see Congressional Budget Justifications.
(22) Nicole Dalrymple, “U.S. and DRC in Partnership to Train Model Congolese Battalion,” US AFRICOM Articles, February 18, 2010, http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=4032&lang=0.
(23) The operation did not succeed; the LRA escaped and massacred hundreds of people during its retreat; see note 78.
(24) Jeffrey Gettleman and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Aided a Failed Plan to Rout Ugandan Rebels,” New York Times, February 6, 2009.
(25) Daniel Volman, “Obama Expands Military Involvement in Africa,” Antiwar.com, April 3, 2010, http://original.antiwar.com/volman/2010/04/02/military-involvement-in-africa/.
(26) According to the 2011 State Department Congressional Budget Justification, FMF “furthers U.S. interests around the world by ensuring that coalition partners and friendly foreign governments are equipped and trained to work toward common security goals and share burdens in joint missions.”
(27) U.S. Department of State, Fiscal Year 2011 Congressional Budget Justification, Volume 2: Department of State Operations, (Washington DC: GPO 2010): 187.
(28) U.S. Department of State, Fiscal Year 2011 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations; Annex: Regional Perspectives, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010): 47.

Congo's Forgotten Crisis, and How the United States should Address it: Outlining a Reformed, More Substantial U.S. Policy toward Congo

2010-08-23T15:05:00.004-04:00

Part 6 of a 7-part article about how the ongoing civil war in Congo is rooted in the poor state of the Congolese Army, why Congo matters to the United States, and what policies the United States should enact to address the situation.

Until the United States makes a substantial financial commitment to the DRC – on the order of several billion dollars a year – and develops policies that tackle the core logistical and disciplinary problems that the FARDC faces, it should not expect to see its efforts yield significant progress in reforming FARDC. There are numerous ways in which the United States could increase its involvement. For example, the United States could offer to help develop a series of FARDC soldier bank accounts into which salaries can be directly deposited into, thus bypassing corrupt government officials and officers. It could also fund the creation of permanent barracks all across Congo to house soldiers on campaign and to serve as administrative outposts where FARDC soldiers could receive pay, rations, supplies, and medical treatment and where soldiers suspected of abuses against civilians could be tried. The United States could fund healthcare programs and pensions for FARDC troops.

To counter possible accusations of attempting to exercise undue influence over the FARDC, the United States could invite the UN, the EU, and other international donors to participate in its programs. In addition, to alleviate potential fears among President Kabila and other top DRC government officials about the U.S. aid making the FARDC too powerful, thereby increasing the likelihood of a coup, the United States could offer to set up special training programs or other initiatives directed toward the Garde Républicaine as a counterweight to its FARDC programs.

If its financial commitment to such programs is great enough, the United States can then use its funding as leverage to encourage the Congolese government to enact additional judicial and administrative reforms. The United States could set benchmarks for things like the passage of laws to enact harsher penalties for civilian and military rape, murder, and theft, as well as for officers who disobey orders and embezzle equipment and funds; the penalty for not meeting such benchmarks could be funding cuts. The United States could also threaten to cut funding if rampant impunity, embezzlement, and abuses against civilians persist. In addition to using the threat of funding cuts, the United States could also offer economic incentives, such as a preferential trade agreement of some sort, to further encourage the Congolese government to achieve specified objectives.

In addition to implementing significant efforts to deal with the logistical and disciplinary problems facing the FARDC and continuing or even expanding its efforts to train the FARDC, the United States should take more concrete action to weaken the rebellious militias opposing the FARDC. To do this, the United States should focus its efforts on reducing the fighting strength and income of such militias. First and foremost, the United States should work with the UN to more vigilantly enforce the current arms embargo on Congo, in accordance with State Department regulations (1) as well as through efforts to get countries bordering Congo to more readily police their borders for arms smuggling (as well as drug and mineral smuggling). The United States should also look to fund and improve upon existing military integration, DDR, and DDRRR efforts within the DRC; perhaps it could allocate funds to improve the quality of the DDR facilities that the observer interviewed in Dr. Baaz’s and Dr. Stern’s report spoke so cynically of (2). Furthermore, the Obama Administration should urge Congress to pass the Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009 (currently pending in the Senate Subcommittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs), which would be a good step toward cracking down on illegal mineral smuggling (3) that has funded militias throughout Congo’s 16 years of conflict; the small “Conflict Minerals” provision in the recently enacted financial reform law (4), which requires companies to disclose procedures for ensuring that minerals are obtained from legitimate sources, is a good first step, but more substantial reform is needed.

Undertaking such efforts would likely cost the United States several billion more dollars each year, which, while significant, still pales in comparison to the tens of billions of dollars spent on Iraq, Afghanistan, and economic recovery, among other things. Moreover, if such policies succeed in leading to a stable Congo, they would greatly further U.S. interests at a relatively inexpensive cost.

(1) John C. Rood, “Rules and Regulations,” Federal Register 72, no. 242 (December 18, 2007): 71575.
(2) Baaz and Stern, “Making Sense of Violence in the Congo,” 63.
(3) “S. 891: Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009,” GovTrack.us, Civic Impulse, LLC, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-891.
(4) Mary Beth Sheridan, “U.S. Financial Reform Bill Also Targets ‘Conflict Minerals’ from Congo,” Washington Post, July 21, 2010.

Congo's Forgotten Crisis, and How the United States should Address it: Conclusion

2010-08-23T14:58:00.005-04:00

Part 7 of a 7-part article about how the ongoing civil war in Congo is rooted in the poor state of the Congolese Army, why Congo matters to the United States, and what policies the United States should enact to address the situation.

The benefits of a stable Congo to the United States are considerable. Ending the conflict in Congo would contribute greatly to stability in central Africa, since many foreign rebel militias, like the FDLR – which is made up of Congolese and Rwandan Hutus as well as génocidaires (1) – the Angolan UNITA, and the Ugandan LRA have taken refuge in Congo at various times during the past 16 years, taking advantage of Congo’s chaos and ample mineral wealth to regroup and launch renewed attacks against their home countries. Should the FARDC manage to bring lasting peace to Congo, there would be no uncontrolled, lawless parts of Congo that foreign rebels could use as bases. As the United States has discovered all-too well in Afghanistan, countries awash in chaos can become fertile breeding ground for militias and extremist groups that can carry out illicit activities, such as drug smuggling, and network with other extremist organizations, like Al Qaeda, to share techniques and even cooperate on targets and strategic goals. Given the United States’ past and current troubles with such extremist groups, it is in its strong interest to do anything it can to promote stability in chaotic parts of the world. Given its geopolitical importance and connection to other conflicts in central Africa, achieving peace in Congo is clearly in the interest of the United States, since it would not only stabilize what has been one of the most chaotic places on Earth for the past 16 years but would also contribute to the stabilization of central Africa, which in turn could contribute to the stabilization of all of Africa, which has been the most chaotic continent throughout the past 50 years.

In addition to these security benefits, stability in Congo would also give sustainable economic development and growth and development to take root in Congo, which would also be of great benefit to the United States. Should this happen, the full potential of Congo’s vast resource wealth – which up until now has been extracted in very primitive and inefficient ways (2) and has often been embezzled and smuggled illegally for profit – could be realized, which would benefit the entire world economy. Moreover, should the United States play an integral role in the stabilization of Congo, it would avoid being outflanked by China, which has stepped up its involvement in Congo as of late, most recently signing a multi-billion dollar mining agreement with the DRC government (3).

While keeping the benefits of a stable Congo in mind, it is important for the United States to view aid programs designed to enable the FARDC to achieve peace in Congo not as ends in themselves but rather a part of a greater restructured U.S. strategy for dealing with Congo. In the first few years of such programs, priority will need to be given to physical construction of barracks and supply delivery systems, such as an electronic banking account system for salaries (indeed, given these initial start up costs, the first few years could some of the more expensive ones of such programs). As these new military structures get settled in and as the situation on the ground starts to improve, the United States should be ready to fully cooperate with the DRC government and cede funding responsibility to it – perhaps benchmarks that measure progress in eradicating corruption could be a good timetable to use for this – provided that the United States still retains enough leverage, through continued funding or by another means, to ensure it still is able to have a productive impact in DRC affairs. Should lasting peace begin to settle in, the United States should then begin to shift the focus of its efforts toward helping the DRC government deal with the tasks of resettling the millions of refugees and of and rebuilding communities damaged by 16 years of conflict. Once these immediate postwar tasks are addressed, then the United States should start shifting its focus toward helping the DRC government to improve the country’s political, financial, and judicial institutions, upon which long-term economic growth can take root.

In the course of implementing such a series of more involved policy toward Congo, the United States should be wary of exercising too much influence too bluntly to avoid alienating the DRC government. After 30 years of Leopold’s brutal personal reign, 52 years of Belgian colonial rule, 32 years of Mobutu’s U.S.-backed authoritarian regime, and 5 years of occupation by 7 foreign armies, Congo is understandably uncomfortable toward anything resembling foreign control or exploitation. As demonstrated by its recent mining deal, the DRC is not afraid to turn toward countries like China – who can offer just as much aid money as the United States or the IMF – if it feels too tightly bound or exploited by existing arrangements (4).

Despite all of Congo’s daunting challenges ahead, a number of things have gone its way in the last few years. All foreign armies have withdrawn from Congolese territory; the country has its first democratically-elected government since independence; and General Nkunda, perhaps the most fearsome rebel leader during the last few years of the conflict, has been apprehended (5). These favorable circumstances present Congo with its best chance in some time to attain lasting peace and, through such stability, to embark on long-term economic growth and give its fledgling democratic institutions time to develop and take root. The time seems ripe, then, for the United States to devote significant time and money toward developing and implementing the needed policies that will help Congo take advantage of its precious opportunity to achieve lasting peace.

(1) Perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide. Most fled to Congo along with millions of Hutu refugees fearing reprisals from the RPF; indeed, it was this influx of refugees and militants that destabilized Congo 16 years ago and initiated the current civil war.
(2) “Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining, DRC,” CommDev, http://commdev.org/section/projects/asm_drc.
(3) Peter Lee, “China has a Congo copper headache,” Asia Times Online, March 11, 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/LC11Cb02.html.
(4) Lee, “China has a Congo copper headache.”
(5) Jeffrey Gettleman, “A Congolese Rebel Leader Who Once Seemed Untouchable is Caught,” New York Times, January 23, 2009.

Congo's Forgotten Crisis, and How the United States should Address it: Works Cited

2010-08-23T11:14:00.008-04:00

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Baaz, Maria Eriksson, and Maria Stern. “Making sense of violence: voices of soldiers in the Congo (DRC).” The Journal of Modern African Studies 46, no. 1 (2008): 57-86.

Bavier, Joe. “Congo rebels retake ground, army offensive falters.” Reuters, December 11, 2007. http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L11351715.htm.

Dalrymple, Nicole. “U.S. and DRC in Partnership to Train Model Congolese Battalion.” U.S. AFRICOM Articles, February 18, 2010. http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=4032&lang=0.

“Democratic Republic of Congo: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Reform of the Army.” Amnesty International Publications (2007).

Exploring the U.S. Role in Consolidating Peace and Democracy in the Great Lakes Region. 110th Cong. 1st Sess. 6-7 (2007) (testimony of Jendayi Frazier).

Gettleman, Jeffrey. “A Congolese Rebel Leader Who Once Seemed Untouchable is Caught.” New York Times, January 23, 2009.

Gettleman, Jeffrey, and Eric Schmitt. “U.S. Aided a Failed Plan to Rout Ugandan Rebels.” New York Times, February 6, 2009.

Insango, Eddy. “Cannibalism shock as Congo atrocities revealed.” Reuters, The Age, March 18, 2005. http://www.theage.com.au/news/World/Cannibalism-shock-as-Congo-atrocities-revealed/2005/03/17/1110913734387.html.

“IRC Study Shows Congo's Neglected Crisis Leaves 5.4 Million Dead; Peace Deal in N. Kivu, Increased Aid Critical to Reducing Death Toll.” International Rescue Committee, January 22, 2008. http://www.theirc.org/news/irc-study-shows-congos-neglected-crisis-leaves-54-million-dead-peace-deal-n-kivu-increased-aid--4331.

“Kabila Dismisses Thousands for Corruption in DR. Congo.” Africa: the Good News, January 6, 2010. http://www.africagoodnews.com/leadership/kabila-dismisses-thousands-for-corruption-in-drcongo.htmls.

Kippenberg, Juliane. “Soldiers Who Rape, Commanders Who Condone: Sexual Violence and Military Reform in the DRC.” Human Rights Watch Publications (2009).

Koinange, Jeff. “Congo President on Military Rapes: ‘Unforgivable’.” CNN.com, June1 , 2006. http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/africa/05/31/congo.rape/index.html.
Lee, Peter. “China has a Congo copper headache.” Asia Times Online, March 11, 2010. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/LC11Cb02.html.

Mthembu-Salter, Gregory. Recent History (The Democratic Republic of the Congo), in Europa World online. London, Routledge. Princeton University. Retrieved 09 May 2010 from http://www.europaworld.com/entry/cd.hi.

Melmot, Sébastien. “Candide in Congo: The Expected Failure of Security Sector Reform.” IFRI Focus Stratégique. n° 9 bis (2009).

MONUC Human Rights Division. The Human Rights Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo during the Period of January to June 2006. New York: MONUC, 2006.

MONUC Human Rights Division. The Human Rights Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo during the Period of January to June 2007. New York: MONUC, 2007.

Rood, John C. “Rules and Regulations.” Federal Register 72, no. 242 (December 18, 2007): 71575.

“S. 891: Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009.” GovTrack.us. Civic Impulse, LLC. http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-891.

Sawyer, Ida, and Anneke Van Woudenberg. “‘You Will Be Punished’: Attacks on Civilians in Eastern Congo.” Human Rights Watch Publications (2009).

Seymour, Claudia. “Children Choosing Combat? Failures of children’s DDR in a context of chronic conflict.” September 8, 2009.

Sheridan, Mary Beth. “U.S. Financial Reform Bill Also Targets ‘Conflict Minerals’ from Congo.” Washington Post. July 21, 2010.

Spielmann, Peter James. “Review of Congo war halves death toll.” Associated Press, Taiwan News, January 20, 2010. http://www.etaiwannews.com/etn/news_content.php?id=1160780&lang=eng_news.

The World Factbook. “Congo, Democratic Republic of the.” Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html.

The World Factbook. “Liberia.” Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html.

UN Security Council. Thirtieth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2009/623). December 4, 2009. (Masthead). (2009 Readex microfiche).

U.S. Congressional Research Services. The Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and Current Developments (R40108; February 4, 2010), by Ted Dagne. Text in: LexisNexis® Congressional Research Digital Collection; Accessed: April 20, 2010.

U.S. Department of State. Fiscal Year 2010 Congressional Budget Justification. Washington, DC: GPO, 2009.

U.S. Department of State. Fiscal Year 2010 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Book II. Washington, DC: GPO, 2009.

U.S. Department of State. Fiscal Year 2011 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations; Annex: Regional Perspectives. Washington, DC: GPO, 2010.

U.S. Department of State. Fiscal Year 2011 Congressional Budget Justification, Volume 2: Department of State Operations, Washington DC: GPO, 2010.

Volman, Daniel. “Obama Expands Military Involvement in Africa.” Antiwar.com, April 3, 2010. http://original.antiwar.com/volman/2010/04/02/military-involvement-in-africa/.

“World Briefing | Africa: Congo: Death Sentences In Slaying Of President.” New York Times, January 8, 2003.

Sri Lanka's Opportunity of a Generation: A Rare Advent of Peace

2010-07-22T22:23:00.003-04:00

Part 1 of a 5-part article about what the Sri Lankan government should do to rebuild its country after nearly 30 years of civil war, and why the rest of the world has a stake in Sri Lanka's success.

Five years before Hezbollah, ten years before Al Qaeda and Hamas, and 15 years before the Taliban, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was founded in the northern tip of Sri Lanka in 1976.

Although never garnering the same level of international publicity as the various Islamic extremist groups, the LTTE was arguably one of the most ruthless terrorist organizations in the world during its nearly 30-year-long conflict with the Sri Lankan government. Indeed, the LTTE pioneered tactics that have since been adopted by the Taliban and Al Qaeda, such as equipping suicide bombers with concealed vests filled with explosives (now a favorite of the Taliban and Al Qaeda) and using speedboats full of explosives for suicide attacks against naval targets (the technique that Al Qaeda used to bomb the U.S.S. Cole in 2000)(1).

The LTTE began as one of many militias fighting for Tamil independence from the predominantly Sinhalese Sri Lanka. Over the course of the next three decades, the LTTE forcibly eliminated or absorbed all of the other Tamil separatist groups and consolidated its hold over the Tamil areas of the island, all the while waging an all-out civil war against the Sri Lankan government(2). Throughout the war, the LTTE employed ever more brutal tactics to fight against Sri Lankan forces and to preserve its power; these included the use of child soldiers, ethnic cleansing of Sinhalese and Muslim communities, killing of civilians (including Tamils), assassinations, and various forms of extortion and smuggling to raise funds(3).

To contemporary observers, it must have seemed like the conflict would never end. The civil war had all too many disturbing parallels with the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the ongoing land dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the endless struggles plaguing many countries in Africa. Most of these conflicts are rooted in ethnic tensions, have involved state and non-state actors that manipulate and distort such sentiments – some of which, like the LTTE, have an active interest in prolonging the conflict – and have alternated between periods of all-out war and periods of ceasefire and regrouping. This vicious cycle, so prevalent in today’s “modern” world, seemed doomed to permanently engulf Sri Lanka.

Then, fourteen months ago, the unthinkable happened: the LTTE was completely defeated and the 30-year-long civil war came to an end. In a remarkable, albeit ruthless three-year push, the Sri Lankan military overran the LTTE-controlled eastern coast(4) and then turned north, captured Kilinochchi(5), the LTTE’s administrative capital, and eventually trapped the LTTE in a tiny strip of land in the north of the island. As brutal as ever, the LTTE held hundreds of thousands of Tamils hostage in its miniscule enclave, using them as human shields against the advancing Sri Lankan Army and trying to use their suffering as leverage to pressure the Sri Lankan government to declare some sort of ceasefire. In one of the most moving episodes of the entire war, over 100,000 civilians flooded out of the LTTE-controlled zone through a breach created by the Sri Lankan Army in a section of the LTTE’s fortifications(6).

Such desperate, despicable methods would be to no avail. By May 2009, the LTTE’s territory had been reduced to the size of Central Park, and its remaining soldiers and core leadership were dying fast(7). Finally, in mid-May, the LTTE’s leader and founder, Velupillai Prabhakaran, was killed, and the last remnants of the LTTE were subdued, with some of the more radical fighters preferring suicide attacks to surrender(8).

For the first time in nearly 30 years, Sri Lankan forces control the entire island and face no armed resistance from any militant groups. This advent of stability has provided the current Sri Lankan government, under President Mahinda Rajapaksa, with the opportunity of a generation: a chance to permanently turn the page on this violent chapter of Sri Lankan history and lay the foundation for lasting peace in Sri Lanka. Countries like Congo and Lebanon, which have been mired in civil wars for most of their existence, can only dream of a similar opportunity.

Note: A shorter version of this piece appeared in the May 2010 issue of American Foreign Policy, a Princeton monthly foreign policy publication.

(1) http://www.defence.lk/pps/LTTEinbrief.pdf
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid.
(4) http://www.economist.com/node/13527366
(5) http://www.economist.com/node/12896734
(6) http://www.economist.com/node/13527366
(7) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8045970.stm#story
(8) http://www.economist.com/node/13684069

Sri Lanka's Opportunity of a Generation: Challenges Loom, but the Biggest Obstacle is Gone

2010-07-22T22:19:00.002-04:00

Part 2 of a 5-part article about what the Sri Lankan government should do to rebuild its country after nearly 30 years of civil war, and why the rest of the world has a stake in Sri Lanka's success.

Tensions between the Sinhalese and the Tamils have existed for several centuries, but they became especially heightened after Sri Lanka’s independence from Great Britain in 1948. In the next decade, acts passed by the Sinhalese-controlled Sri Lankan parliament denied citizenship and suffrage to the minority Tamils(1) and made Sinhalese the sole official language(2) of Sri Lanka. State-sponsored Sinhalese settlement of Tamil areas further worsened tensions between the two ethnicities(3). The dissatisfaction of the marginalized Tamils naturally provided fertile breeding ground for Tamil militant nationalist groups, like the LTTE, in the 1970s.

However, by 2003 the Tamils and their language had been legally incorporated into Sri Lanka, and Sinhalese settlement of Tamil areas had slowed(4). It then fell to the LTTE – the self-proclaimed defender of the Tamils and their rights – to facilitate reconciliation between the two ethnic groups and work with the government toward a permanent political settlement.

Instead, the LTTE disrupted attempts at lasting peace and actively worked to prolong the civil war. It assassinated scores of Tamil politicians and undermined any Tamil political party that was attempting to steer a course separate from LTTE aims(5). Ceasefires with the government were agreed upon out of convenience rather than a genuine desire to resolve the conflict. The LTTE used such ceasefires to rearm and regroup and would break them at opportune moments; in 2006, for example, the LTTE’s attempt to stop the flow of water out of a major reservoir that supplied government-controlled villages(6) ended the 2002 Norwegian-brokered peace accords(7), which were perhaps the closest the conflict ever came to a peaceful resolution.

Ultimately, the LTTE became a parasite of the civil war, making it an obstacle rather than a potential means to a peaceful settlement. With the military capability of the LTTE destroyed, this obstacle has been removed, providing an opportunity for a lasting resolution to the conflict.

For the Sri Lankan government, the task ahead will not be easy. Hundreds of thousands of civilians, mainly Tamils, remain displaced and need to be resettled. Much of the north remains damaged from the closing offensive of the war and needs to be repaired and rebuilt(8). Moreover, the Tamils are still uncertain of their place in a country controlled by a Sinhalese majority, and their concerns will need to be addressed to ensure that the recently-ended civil war will be Sri Lanka’s last. But while the current challenges are tough, they will only get harder with time, and they are certainly easier now than they were when the LTTE was still at large.

Note: A shorter version of this piece appeared in the May 2010 issue of American Foreign Policy, a Princeton monthly foreign policy publication.

(1) http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=79&artid=10064
(2) http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-13257.html
(3) Ibid.
(4) http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=79&artid=10064
(5) http://www.defence.lk/pps/LTTEinbrief.pdf
(6) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5249884.stm
(7) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1835737.stm
(8) http://www.economist.com/node/15819464?story_id=15819464

Sri Lanka's Opportunity of a Generation: Letting the Opportunity Slip Away

2010-07-22T22:16:00.003-04:00

Part 3 of a 5-part article about what the Sri Lankan government should do to rebuild its country after nearly 30 years of civil war, and why the rest of the world has a stake in Sri Lanka's success.

Unfortunately for Sri Lanka, the government has acted aggressively in the months since the LTTE’s defeat and has made little progress on resolving postwar issues that could fester into renewed violence if not dealt with relatively soon.

President Rajapaksa in particular has sought to use Sri Lanka’s victory to his own personal advantage rather than to benefit the country as a whole. He held the presidential election a year earlier than scheduled in January, 2010 in order to capitalize from the end of the civil war. He won but then proceeded to arrest General Sarath Fonseka – who oversaw the Sri Lankan Army’s victory over the LTTE and then ran in the presidential election – and at least 20 of his supporters in the military for allegedly plotting a coup against him: quite a heavy-handed move considering he won the election by 17 percentage points(1).

All the while, President Rajapaksa has continued the government’s strict control over the media – with the president himself recently taking control of the Ministry of Mass Media and Information from his own minister – and its restrictions on civil liberties. Such measures may have been partly justified during the civil war, particularly given the LTTE’s ruthlessness and skill in espionage, but with the LTTE defeated and no strong political opponents, keeping such measures in place seems excessive and will likely damage Sri Lanka’s democratic institutions(2).

Most troubling of all, the government has made little progress in resettling the nearly 260,000 Tamil refugees. Instead, they have been left to languish in crowded, unsanitary, hastily-constructed camps that are both expensive to maintain and a growing source of resentment for those trapped inside(3). Perhaps during the war such mass internments were partly unavoidable and partly justified and may have very well led to the arrests of LTTE members that could have tried to infiltrate the populace and launch a guerilla campaign against the government. But now there is no excuse. The sooner the government can empty the camps the better, as it will rid them of a logistical and a political nightmare.

Further compounding the problem, the government has allowed Sinhalese families who had been evicted by the LTTE during the civil war to reclaim their land(4). Even if intended for all the right reasons, this action could antagonize the Tamil refugees, who could view it as an example of state-sponsored Sinhalese settlement in Tamil areas and of neglect and discrimination of Tamil refugees.

Such aggressive and short-sighted policies, if continued, will likely harm the current government in the short run and the country as a whole in the long run. With overwhelming support for President Rajapaksa and his Sri Lanka Freedom party across the country since the defeat of the LTTE – having won eight provincial elections last year and 142 out of 255 seats in parliamentary elections last April(5) in addition to President Rajapaksa’s resounding re-election – there was no need to arrest General Fonseka and to keep heavy-handed wartime measures in place. With the LTTE thoroughly decimated, there is no need to keep hundreds of thousands of Tamils detained in temporary camps. Any short-term political benefits any of these things could possibly yield would be superfluous at this point, and in the long run they risk sowing the seeds of future unrest and possibly civil war.

Note: A shorter version of this piece appeared in the May 2010 issue of American Foreign Policy, a Princeton monthly foreign policy publication.

(1) http://www.economist.com/node/15452859?story_id=15452859
(2) http://www.economist.com/node/16167748?story_id=16167748
(3) http://www.economist.com/node/14564948
(4) http://www.zeenews.com/news625632.html
(5) http://www.economist.com/node/15900204?story_id=15900204

Sri Lanka's Opportunity of a Generation: Why the Rest of the World Should Care

2010-07-22T22:12:00.004-04:00

Part 4 of a 5-part article about what the Sri Lankan government should do to rebuild its country after nearly 30 years of civil war, and why the rest of the world has a stake in Sri Lanka's success.

A renewed outbreak of civil strife would not only be tragic for Sri Lanka but also undesirable for the rest of the world. India in particular has a vested interest in a stable Sri Lanka, as there are over 60.8 million Tamils residing in India(1), for which the civil war had been a very heated issue. Furthermore, India’s three-year long peacekeeping tenure in northern Sri Lanka, in which it faced stout opposition from the LTTE and lost over 1500 men(2), is something India would like to forget, much less repeat.

In addition to India, other countries, like the United States, China and the European nations, would be worse off in the event of another Sri Lankan civil war. Such renewed chaos would hamper trade with Sri Lanka and, due to Sri Lanka’s strategic position along the Indian Ocean trading routes, could even disrupt economic activity throughout South and Southeast Asia at a time when the climb out of global recession is still precarious at best.

Moreover, renewed conflict would also likely breed other Tamil militant groups, and if any such groups were to become even half as ruthless as the LTTE was, it would present a significant problem not only for Sri Lanka but for the rest of the world as well. In its day, the LTTE was notorious for arms and drug smuggling. Furthermore, the LTTE had long been suspected of having contacts with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Al Qaeda, and potentially other ruthless terrorist organizations, and, indeed, such organizations adopted several techniques developed by the LTTE(3). The last thing that the rest of the world wants to see is the creation of another extremist group in the vein of the LTTE that would carry out such illicit activities and cooperate with other terrorist organizations, groups that have given the United States, Russia, Europe, and China a particularly hard time this past decade.

Given the potential negative effects of another outbreak of violence in Sri Lanka, it would seem that it is in the international community’s interest to influence the resettlement and reconciliation process in Sri Lanka. The United States or the European Union (EU), or an organization like the IMF or the World Bank, could encourage the Sri Lankan government to resettle the Tamils from the camps by offering to fund such an action, with the release of funds contingent on the Sri Lankan government having a viable plan to resettle the refugees and having the ability to monitor the use of such funds and the progress of the operations, so as to ensure maximum efficiency of the aid. The government could hire Tamils from the camps to help with the resettlement process, as well as with the rebuilding and repair of areas damaged by the civil war. The United States and the EU could also help pay for the rebuilding of the northern areas, again making sure that they only agree to give funds if the Sri Lankan government presents a well-constructed plan to them and that the donors have some way of receiving feedback on the progress of their funds and of the operations they are funding.

Another course available to the United States, the EU, and other countries is to offer general economic incentives or threaten economic consequences if Sri Lanka does not begin resettlement or rebuilding in earnest or if it does not provide suitable rights or autonomy to Tamil areas. These could be in the form of trade agreements or sanctions. The EU in particular has an effective and easy-to-wield economic lever: access to the GSP plus, a preferential trade arrangement which allows increased access to EU markets through a reduction in tariffs. Just a couple of months ago, the EU revoked Sri Lanka’s GSP plus status in response to the Sri Lankan government’s questionable conduct toward human rights during the final phases of the civil war(4). The EU could easily offer to resume this arrangement with Sri Lanka if it notices progress toward resettlement or political autonomy for the Tamil areas.

Indeed, the United States and Europe in particular would do well to try to do more to influence the recovery of Sri Lanka – rather than focus on condemning the Sri Lankan government for its handling of the war – so as to avoid being outflanked by China, who has filled the void left by the West in the past few years and now provides the bulk of financial aid and foreign investment to Sri Lanka(5). In addition to the Chinese, Sri Lanka has accepted aid from Pakistan, Libya, and even Iran in order to fuel its war and help its economy(6), much to the discomfort of the United States. For its part, though, China should recognize that aid with no conditions is not the most effective way to ensure that a stable, prosperous Sri Lanka emerges from the ashes of war, and it should realize that, given the huge sums of aid it is giving, it can afford to attach some guidelines with such aid. While the Sri Lankan government may grumble at first, in the long term such a course would be more beneficial for China, Sri Lanka, and the rest of the world.

Note: A shorter version of this piece appeared in the May 2010 issue of American Foreign Policy, a Princeton monthly foreign policy publication.

(1) http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/Census_Data_Online/Language/Statement1.htm
(2) http://www.mongabay.com/history/india/india-peacekeeping_operations.html
(3) http://www.defence.lk/pps/LTTEinbrief.pdf
(4) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/07/business/global/07trade.html?src=busln
(5) http://www.economist.com/node/16542629?story_id=16542629
(6) http://www.economist.com/node/13527366

Sri Lanka's Opportunity of a Generation: The Lessons of the Sri Lankan Civil War

2010-07-22T21:17:00.008-04:00

Part 5 of a 5-part article about what the Sri Lankan government should do to rebuild its country after nearly 30 years of civil war, and why the rest of the world has a stake in Sri Lanka's success.

In addition to the practical concerns of the rest of the world, it is important to make sure that Sri Lanka handles its resettlement and reconciliation challenges effectively in order to ensure that one of Asia’s oldest and most brutal conflicts is buried into history. So far, Sri Lanka has provided an interesting case for how today’s seemingly perpetual conflicts around the world might be solved. Years of foreign mediation, from India’s uninspiring peacekeeping effort in the late 1980s to Norway’s well-intentioned but unsuccessful brokering of a peace agreement in 2002, proved ineffective in its attempts to end the conflict. Ultimately, it took a sweeping effort on the part of the Sri Lankan government to eradicate the LTTE and end the civil war. In many respects, the government’s handling of the last phases of the conflict was heavy-handed, but it did prove to be effective.

Sri Lanka’s example poses interesting questions about today’s international peacekeeping and peace-brokering efforts around the world. While some sort of international involvement is ideal so as to prevent mass atrocities, like the ongoing tragedies in Darfur and Congo, perhaps it is possible for there to be too much international involvement, to the point where the conflict that the international community is trying to resolve only ends up getting prolonged and extra diplomatic or military involvement is rendered ineffective, as has been the case with Lebanon for nearly 30 years.

Finding the right balance is always tricky, and there is undoubtedly no general formula for every conflict, but it is important to recognize that more international aid, scrutiny, or involvement of some sort will not always help lead to conflict resolution. Recognizing the realities of the situation, particularly the motives of the people and organizations involved, is essential in determining how much involvement, if any, is appropriate. With regard to the civil war in Sri Lanka, the LTTE had an interest in prolonging the conflict, as the nature of the conflict attracted members and money to its organization, and the prospect of transitioning to a legitimate, internationally recognized political entity was incompatible with its methods of raising money and maintaining order. It was for good reason that the majority of the international community refused to recognize the Taliban’s government in Afghanistan – it had draconian measures in its law code and derived most of its income from illicit opium trade – and the LTTE would have been no exception. Given these realities, perhaps it is not so surprising that the civil war was impossible to end until the LTTE had been eliminated. In this case, then, perhaps the most effective method for the international community to end the conflict was for it to stay uninvolved enough so that the Sri Lankan government would have enough leeway to eliminate the LTTE, which it had a definite interest, and, ultimately, the capability to do.

It is true that the end of the civil war was fairly heavy-handed as a result; indeed, perhaps the international community should have insisted that the Sri Lankan government accept help from the Red Cross with the wounded and from other organizations with building the temporary camps. But at least the fighting is over and lasting peace is possible. Perhaps the international community should adopt this approach more often: relaxing involvement to let a war finish with minimal casualties and damage and then focusing the bulk of its efforts on helping (or encouraging) those involved to move toward permanent resolution and normalization, whether that entails resettlement, repair, or something else.

Hence, it is time for the international community to help Sri Lanka with this last phase, not only for the benefit of itself and Sri Lanka, but for the possible application in other conflicts as well.

Note: A shorter version of this piece appeared in the May 2010 issue of American Foreign Policy, a Princeton monthly foreign policy publication.

Crisis in Pakistan: Introduction

2009-06-09T08:25:00.009-04:00

Part 1 of a 6 part essay on the growing threat of the Taliban in Pakistan and how to combat it

Ever since the shocking, saddening events of September 11, 2001, U.S. policy has been dominated by an array of initiatives known collectively as the “war on terror.” Though enacted with good intentions, the “war on terror” has generated more controversy than it has palpable results. It has embroiled the United States in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and has left it increasingly isolated in international affairs.[1] It has undermined the foundations not only of American ideals but of American law as well.[2] All the while, Islamic extremism has arguably gained in popularity, and the very groups that are responsible for the September 11th terrorist attacks – Al Qaeda and the Taliban – have eluded destruction and are more powerful than ever.

How ironic it would be if the most direct consequence of the “war on terror” was the overthrow of a government by Muslim extremists and the destabilization of a nuclear-armed country. With the Taliban gaining full control of the Swat Valley in Pakistan last February[3] and advancing to within 60 miles of Islamabad just a few months ago[4] – moving much faster and over a wider area than in any of their previous incursions – such a catastrophe seems to be looming just over the horizon.

Pakistan has long been the geopolitical thorn in the side of the “war on terror.” The South Asian Muslim nation had been the Taliban’s most valuable supporter[5] prior to the September 11th attacks, and after the NATO invasion of Afghanistan, the remnants of the Taliban were able to avoid total destruction by migrating across the porous Afghan-Pakistani border and finding refuge in the mountainous, loosely governed regions of Pakistan’s northwest.[6] Although the United States was able to coax an ambivalent Pakistan into supporting its “war on terror,” the Pakistani Army was unwilling and unable to launch a concerted offensive to eradicate the Taliban once and for all.[7] As a result, Taliban militants were able to regroup and begin their expansion inside Pakistan that now has brought them within 60 miles of Pakistan’s capital.

[1] http://www.icosgroup.net/modules/reports/chronic_failures_war_terror/exec_summary
[2] http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/26684res20060906.html
[3] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/16/AR2009021601063.html
[4] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/22/AR2009042200863.html
[5] http://www.cfr.org/publication/10551/
[6] http://www.cfr.org/publication/14905/troubled_afghanpakistani_border.html
[7] http://www.cfr.org/publication/14905/troubled_afghanpakistani_border.html

Crisis in Pakistan: The Rise of the Taliban

2009-06-09T08:21:00.012-04:00

Part 2 of a 6 part essay on the growing threat of the Taliban in Pakistan and how to combat it

Although the Taliban had no presence in Pakistan before 2001, the radical Muslim Pashtun group did have several advantages upon arriving in Pakistan that would make it easier for the group to reorganize and spread within the country. It had a much better knowledge of the mountainous terrain than did NATO forces or Pakistani forces and officials, most of who came from Punjab or Sindh, far from the northwest. It also had the support of local Pashtuns, who lived on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border. Such knowledge and support was crucial in enabling the Taliban to escape into Pakistan and find relative security and support upon arriving.[1]

After settling down and regrouping, the Taliban set about expanding ever deeper into Pakistan. With over a decade of experience in building grassroots support and in governing gained through their rise and time in power in Afghanistan and with nearly two decades of experience in guerilla warfare gained fighting the Soviets and other Afghans during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the Afghan Civil War, respectively, Taliban militants were skilled at taking over a country from the bottom up.[2]

In addition to using their stringent religious doctrine to appeal to die-hard Muslims, members of the Taliban have been able to prey off growing popular dissatisfaction with the corruption and incompetence of local and national Pakistani officials, the inefficiency of domestic institutions like the judicial system, and the gap between the rich and the poor, among other things, by offering themselves and their law as suitable alternatives to the current structure of Pakistani government and society.

Although the Taliban’s rule seems iron-fisted and strict, it at least seems efficient and consistent with some sort of doctrine (albeit a radical one). By contrast, the Pakistani government seems inefficient and corrupt, and its primary purpose seems to be to serve the interests of those in power; the two most powerful politicians in Pakistan, President Asif Ali Zardari and Nawaz Sharif, as well as Zardari’s famous widow (and claim to fame) Benazir Bhutto, were all indicted on corruption charges at some point in their lives.[3] Considering that the two most powerful parties in Pakistan – the PPP and the PML-N – have been headed since their inception by the Bhuttos (from Sindh) and the Sharifs (from Punjab),[4] respectively, Pakistani elections seem more like instruments of dynastic rivalry than a mechanism of popular sovereignty.

The inefficient and biased local and national judiciary systems are just a couple of examples of Pakistan’s domestic institutions being hampered and distorted by the rampant favoritism and corruption in the Pakistani government. Indeed, most proponents of a Sharia Law system are not in favor of the Taliban’s extreme interpretation of Islam but rather view such Islam-based courts as a practical alternative to the current judicial mess.[5]

The same families that control the political parties control most of the wealth and land of Pakistan as well.[6] The Sharifs, for instance, were some of the first and are now some of the richest industrial magnates in Pakistan, owning the large Ittefaq conglomerate based in Lahore.[7] Most of the other Pakistanis live in poverty in the poor rural areas or the slums. The corrupt political system seems to perpetuate the dominance and wealth of the semi-aristocratic families at the expense of everyone else.[8]

The great many poor and dissatisfied people in Pakistan have provided fertile ground for Taliban recruitment and expansion for the past seven years, to the point that the Taliban now poses a serious challenge to the existence of the Pakistani state. The degree of Pakistani discontent and the ruthlessness with which the Taliban has exploited such dissatisfaction have been matched by Pakistan’s inability to definitively roll back or crush the Taliban at any stage of its expansion. The Pakistani Army, more concerned with India and unwilling to commit troops to a thorough counterinsurgency campaign, has only sporadically fought the Taliban.[9] Left with little muscle to resist the Taliban, local and national officials have had to resort to making truces with the Taliban in order avoid total capitulation.[10]

Such a cyclical process of Taliban aggression, brief Pakistani retaliation, and truce has been immensely frustrating for the United States, as it has undermined the true front line of the U.S. “war on terror.” Out of each cycle, the Taliban has emerged stronger, with more land, more recruits, and more confidence.

[1] http://www.cfr.org/publication/14905/troubled_afghanpakistani_border.html
[2] http://www.cfr.org/publication/10551/
[3] http://www.newstatesman.com/200206030017
[4] http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/05/magazine/05zardari-t.html?_r=1&ref=magazine
[5] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/09/AR2009050902518.html
[6] http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/world/asia/17pstan.html?pagewanted=1
[7] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/sharif.htm
[8] http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/world/asia/17pstan.html?pagewanted=1
[9] http://spectator.org/archives/2009/05/12/the-pakistan-army-reluctant-wa
[10] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/16/AR2009021601063.html

Crisis in Pakistan: Limitations of the United States in Pakistan and of the Pakistani Government

2009-06-09T08:16:00.011-04:00

Part 3 of a 6 part essay on the growing threat of the Taliban in Pakistan and how to combat it

The events of the first half of 2009 seem to follow the pattern of the Taliban expansion cycle, with the Taliban transgression into Swat, the truce, and the subsequent Taliban incursion into Buner. But the swiftness and forcefulness of this latest Taliban offensive, as well as its proximity to the Pakistani capital, are troubling even by Pakistani standards. President Obama, to his credit, has acknowledged the gravity of the worsening situation in Pakistan and has realized that someone somewhere must do something to stop the advance of Taliban militants, lest they reach Islamabad by year’s end.

However, President Obama is also beginning to realize that the United States has very limited options with which to influence the situation in Pakistan, none of which have worked well lately. U.S. drone aircraft strikes in Northwestern Pakistan and NATO raids across the Afghan border – either of which could be considered an overstepping of U.S. authority and a violation of Pakistan’s territorial integrity – have done little more than anger the locals and encourage the Taliban to advance into the heart of Pakistan.[1] There has been almost no way for the United States to monitor or control billions of dollars in aid it has sent to Pakistan,[2] and neither money nor harsh words have been able to compel the Pakistani government into sustained or predictable action.

The lack of cohesion between the different wings of Pakistani authority has made it very difficult for Pakistan to carry out any such sustained or predictable action against the Taliban. The Pakistani government, headed by President Zardari, would very much like to prevent the Taliban from reaching the seat of government in Islamabad. However, unlike General Musharraf’s previous administration, the current government does not have the unquestioned loyalty of the Pakistani Army,[3] which makes it very difficult for the government to force the army to take action against the Taliban. Unfortunately for the government, the Pakistani Army would rather not launch operations against the Taliban, being more concerned with India to the east, particularly in light of heightened tensions with India after the terrorist attacks on Mumbai in November 2008. Indeed, it seems unclear if the army would defend the current government if it came close to being overthrown as long as the likely successor was not pro-Indian.[4]

In addition to the government and the army, the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) (incidentally the agency which originally supported the Taliban)[5] has its own agenda, specifically concentrating on undermining the Indian-ruled portion of Kashmir.[6] To this end, the ISI has covertly supported militant Punjabi groups operating in Kashmir. Such groups have been hard to control, though. The group responsible for the Mumbai attacks, Lashkar-e-Taiba, was one such group.[7] Others are suspected to have links to the Taliban.[8]

With so many different branches of government working at cross-purposes, it is no wonder that the money and rhetoric of the United States have had little success in compelling Pakistan to counter the Taliban.

As grim and as frustrating the situation is, there have been some encouraging signs as of late. The Taliban seems to have moved too fast and too forcefully in its latest push, as it has generated a lot of public backlash recently. A video of a woman getting publicly flogged for a minor crime has sparked particular anger among Pakistanis this past year.[9] In addition, the Pakistani government, alarmed at the proximity of the Taliban to the capital and embarrassed by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s assertion that it was “basically abdicating to the Taliban,”[10] has gone off on every limb available to get the army to retaliate against the Taliban. For the moment, whatever the government did seems to be working: for nearly a month the Pakistani Army has carried out operations in the Swat Valley against the Taliban, including in Mingora,[11] Swat’s largest city.

It is unclear how long the current Pakistani counteroffensive will last, though, as the Pakistani Army has never sustained a campaign against the Taliban for more than a few months. Indeed, much of the fighting has been done by Pakistani paramilitary forces, which is a sign that the Pakistani Army may not be ready or willing to commit to a long fight. Moreover, the fighting in Swat has caused over 2 million people to become refugees,[12] and if the government does not adequately accommodate such people, then they could become the Taliban’s newest recruitment pool.

It is critical, then, for the United States to try to compel Pakistan to not let this window of opportunity close as previous ones have but rather to take advantage of such opportunity to turn the tide against the Taliban.

[1] http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_TNVGGJDT
[2] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/27/pakistan.usa
[3] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/army.htm
[4] http://spectator.org/archives/2009/05/12/the-pakistan-army-reluctant-wa
[5] http://www.cfr.org/publication/10551/
[6] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/kashmir.htm
[7]http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/08/world/asia/08terror.html
[8] http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/14/world/asia/14punjab.html?pagewanted=all
[9] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/02/taliban-pakistan-justice-women-flogging
[10]http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/23/us/politics/23clinton.html
[11] http://www.rfi.fr/actuen/articles/113/article_3894.asp
[12] http://www.rfi.fr/actuen/articles/113/article_3894.asp

Crisis in Pakistan: A Marshall Plan for Pakistan?

2009-06-09T08:15:00.007-04:00

Part 4 of a 6 part essay on the growing threat of the Taliban in Pakistan and how to combat it

In order to begin to permanently roll back the Taliban, the Pakistani government must give the Pakistani people confidence that it can effectively provide for them and can rule fairly and efficiently.

The capitalist governments of Western Europe faced similar challenges after WWII, when Communist parties were growing in appeal among disillusioned Europeans in the wake of the war’s utter devastation. At this critical juncture in history, the United States undertook a massive aid operation known as the Marshall Plan in which it funded reconstruction programs designed by individual Western countries. In this fashion, the United States helped Britain, France, Italy, and most other European countries to rebuild their infrastructure and lay the foundations for future prosperity. In enacting such recovery plans, the Western European governments regained the confidence of their citizens and halted the spread of Communism.

President Zardari has requested on occasion for Pakistan to receive a Marshall Plan of its own.[1] But what President Zardari envisions is largely an extension of the existing aid sent to Pakistan – aid that disappears off the radar once in Pakistan. What distinguished the original Marshall Plan from subsequent aid programs – and which has also made it by far the most successful of such programs – is that it required each European government to come up with its own specific recovery plan and means of implementing such a plan.[2]

A true replica of the Marshall Plan – in which the Pakistani government would design its own specific development program and detail exactly where and when money would be spent before receiving U.S. funding – may be exactly what Pakistan needs. The responsibility of having to come up with and execute plans for reform and development could compel the Pakistani government to root out corruption and increase efficiency. Holding the Pakistani government to a specific, detailed spending program, perhaps with inspections or Congressional benchmarks, would allow the United States to ensure that its aid was being put to its intended uses.

If designed and implemented correctly, this new Marshall Plan would not only help develop and reform Pakistan but would also help alleviate the discontent among the Pakistani public that the Taliban has been able to benefit so greatly from. The sight of the Pakistani government actively developing and reforming its country would greatly improve its standing among its people, who are unaccustomed to such action from its government. If the government became less corrupt and more efficient in the process of designing and executing such development and reform programs, it would also improve its standing among Pakistanis, who have grown cynical in the wake of past and ongoing government corruption. The positive economic impact such programs would have and the influx of jobs they would likely provide would also ease the discontent of the Pakistani public and may make them have more faith in the current system and be less enthusiastic of looking for a new system, which the Taliban has been offering.

Such a plan, provided it is done right, would be in the interest of many powerful figures and institutions in Pakistan. President Zardari should be very receptive to such a plan, as it would allow him to regain credibility with the public that he has all but lost in the wake of the episode with Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry and Nawaz Sharif last March.[3] The Pakistani Army should also support such a plan, as it would increase the legitimacy and popularity of the government, which would lessen the chance of insurrection; as non-chalant as its attitude toward the government is, the last thing the Pakistani Army wants to deal with is a full-blown rebellion or civil war. Moreover, if the Taliban attacked government workers trying to work on development projects, it would greatly harm the Taliban’s reputation among the Pakistani people and would provide easy justification for further retaliation against the Taliban.

Getting powerful regional leaders, particularly Nawaz Sharif – the “Lion of Punjab”[4] and President Zardari’s chief political rival – to approve of a Marshall Plan for Pakistan would be more difficult, as President Zardari would likely want to use his own people to execute the programs he designs so as to undercut his regional rivals. When reviewing such programs, then, the United States should insist on having some regional authorities carry out such programs as a condition for providing funding.

There is no better way of undermining the Taliban in the long term than to alleviate the discontent of the Pakistani public. A true Marshall Plan for Pakistan would do just that.

[1] http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/World/Pakistan/Zardari-seeks-aid-like-Marshall-Plan-for-Pakistan/articleshow/4412121.cms
[2] http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2008/May/20080522120728WRybakcuH0.1443598.html
[3] http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/05/magazine/05zardari-t.html?_r=1&ref=magazine
[4] http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/05/magazine/05zardari-t.html?_r=1&ref=magazine

Crisis in Pakistan: Working with China and Russia

2009-06-09T08:08:00.006-04:00

Part 5 of a 6 part essay on the growing threat of the Taliban in Pakistan and how to combat it

In addition to trying to set up a Marshall Plan for Pakistan, the United States should also strive to work together with other regional powers, such as China and Russia, to put more forceful pressure on Pakistan and to jointly try to counter the Taliban. It is in interest of all three countries to prevent the Taliban from toppling the Pakistani government. A major Taliban victory in Pakistan may spur on Muslim extremist groups in China, who are mainly Uyghurs fighting for an independent nation in Xinjiang,[1] a region that has been independent from China for most of history and has been part of modern China for barely 60 years.[2] To this point, Muslim extremism in China has been relatively low-key, serving more as an excuse for Chinese crackdowns in the region than as a legitimate threat to Chinese security.[3] However, a major Taliban victory could provide momentum and encouragement to Uyghur Muslim extremists, and should Taliban militants manage to take control of the Chinese border with Pakistan, they could send support through to Xinjiang – the part of China that borders Pakistan – and could help the Uyghur Muslim extremists become a formidable force. In addition, a civil war in Pakistan could lead to refugees pouring into China from Pakistan. China does not even want to entertain such possibilities, and so should be willing to work with the United States to stop the Taliban. As Pakistan’s steady ally since the Cold War, China should have a fair ability to compel Pakistan to counter the Taliban.

Although perhaps it should not be as worried as China, Russia should nevertheless be concerned about the growth of the Taliban and the possibility of the collapse of the Pakistani government. Muslim extremists in Chechnya and other Russian-controlled Caucasian regions could be encouraged by a major Taliban victory. In addition, the destabilization of Pakistan by the Taliban could lead to a further destabilization of Afghanistan by Afghani Taliban, which could cause refugee flows and headaches for the neighboring Central Asian states, which Russia would like to retain as its sphere of influence. Indeed, Russian troops stationed on the Tajikistan border could get caught up in a mess in neighboring Afghanistan.

The United States should reach out to China and Russia on the basis of having a common interest in defeating the Taliban and try to facilitate cooperation and joint action in the region to stop the Taliban. For starters, the United States, China, and Russia should put pressure on India to ease tensions with Pakistan that have been especially high since the Mumbai attacks. As India’s steady ally since the Cold War, Russia should have a fair amount of influence over India, and surely the last thing India wants is for a radical Muslim group to take over Pakistan and its nuclear weapons. Getting India to do as little as tone down its rhetoric and assure Pakistan it has no intentions of war and wants friendship and cooperation could help diffuse tensions. Getting India to restart talks on Kashmir would have an even greater effect at lowering tensions. If tensions between India and Pakistan could be reduced, then the Pakistani Army would feel more comfortable about moving troops away from the Indian border (where most of them are now stationed) to Pakistan’s northwest to fight the Taliban.

The United States should also try to get an alternate supply route to Afghanistan through Russia and the Central Asian states. The United States could make the point to Russia that the more powerful the Taliban is in Afghanistan, the more powerful it will be in Pakistan. With the Taliban now in control of most of Northwestern Pakistan, it is able to threaten the current supply routes into Afghanistan, which pass through Pakistan. With the help of Russia, who has considerable influence over the Central Asian states, the United States would probably be able to get a new supply route through Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan into Afghanistan, or perhaps through some other route in the same general region.

The United States should also try to get China and Russia to apply joint diplomatic, rhetorical, and possibly economic pressure on Pakistan. The combined weight of these three powers may be more effective than unilateral U.S. pressure in compelling Pakistan into action against the Taliban. China and the United States in particular could orchestrate joint economic sanctions or incentives to try to put more pressure on the Pakistani government.

Most importantly, the United States, China, and Russia, along with India, should go about sharing intelligence to try to pinpoint the location and status of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the four should also consider devising a coordinated strategy to eliminate such weapons or confront a new Pakistani regime if the worst should befall the current Pakistani government. The last things any of these countries want are more unaccounted-for nuclear weapons, particularly when they or their allies could be potential targets.

[1] http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/directive-08142008114700.html
[2] http://muslimvillage.com/story.php?id=2713
[3] http://www.atimes.com/china/CK15Ad01.html

Crisis in Pakistan: Conclusion

2009-06-09T08:05:00.008-04:00

Part 6 of a 6 part essay on the growing threat of the Taliban in Pakistan and how to combat it

There are some who believe that the Taliban has no chance of toppling the Pakistani government. There are others who believe that it is only a matter of time before Taliban militants follow in the footsteps of the other great revolutionaries of history and take over all of Pakistan. Both views are inaccurate, and resigning to either is a disservice to the victims of the September 11th attacks and the thousands of others who have died trying to prevent Muslim extremists from ever threatening the United States again. The reality is that, over the course of the past decade, the Taliban has grown stronger and stronger in Pakistan to the point that, despite still controlling a minority of Pakistan, the Taliban now poses a serious threat to the existence of Pakistan. It is also true that the Pakistani government, for a variety of reasons, has been unable to effectively counter the rise of the Taliban up to this point.

The United States must realize that, in the next few years, there is a realistic chance that the Taliban could destabilize or even take over Pakistan. It must recognize the international repercussions of either event, particularly the possibility of unaccounted-for nuclear weapons, and must begin to think about how to react to either event. However, President Obama and the United States must also continue to recognize that a Taliban takeover is not imminent, nor is it certain, and the United States must also realize that, while its influence is not as great in Pakistan as it is in other countries, it is not non-existent either. President Obama must exhaust every reasonable, feasible option to prevent the Taliban from going the extra 60 miles to Islamabad. He must be tenacious and resourceful, yet smart; he must be wary of damaging long-term relations and should not address this problem unilaterally, as did his predecessor. He must act within U.S. limitations, but he must act now; the window of opportunity provided by the Pakistani Army may not last long, and given how far the Taliban has come, it may be the last one.

A Tale of Economic Hardship: Human Rights First and the Madoff Fallout

2009-03-10T22:49:00.002-04:00

I know I do not need to remind anyone of the bleak state of the economy: the impact of the current global economic downturn has been hard-felt and all-encompassing. Indeed, not too long ago, someone in my immediate family lost her job, victimized not by any fault of her own – in fact, she is the most capable and hardworking person I know – but by number-crunching and panicking management, the most potent foes in this deepening recession.

Needless to say, non-profit organizations and foreign policy interest groups have been hit hard by the current downturn; failed investments and less willing donors have damaged their budgets at a time when people are less willing than ever to donate money to fight for issues that do not directly concern them.

Among all these groups, one particular victim stood out to me recently.

Given the current policymaking environment, one would think that Human Rights First (HRF) and other human rights groups would be greatly encouraged. In some of his first executive orders, President Obama ordered the closing of Guantanamo Bay within a year, granted enemy combatants the protections listed in the Geneva Conventions, and required those interrogating enemy combatants to follow the Army Field Manual interrogation guidelines.[1] Such a dramatic reversal in policy is unprecedented in the human rights movement, and for human rights activists it is not only a victory to be celebrated but also an invaluable opportunity to ensure the success of and the prolonging of such policy.

In normal economic times, HRF would be in a great position to encourage and build on such policy. But HRF has not seen normal economic times for a while now; last December, HRF was met with a nasty surprise when it learned that two of its most generous donors, the JEHT Foundation and the Picower Foundation,[2] had their funds managed by Bernard Madoff, who had recently admitted that his firm and the $50 billion it managed was a giant Ponzi scheme.[3] As a result, both foundations were forced to dissolve and had to rescind their annual contributions to HRF.[4][5]

The loss of this funding has left HRF with a $1 million budget deficit for this year, about 10% of its annual budget. Worse yet, HRF was also granted additional funds from the now defunct JEHT foundation for 2010 and 2011, and the Picower Foundation was a regular annual donor, so these losses leave HRF with a $3 million shortfall over the next three years.[6]

HRF’s Refugee Protection Program will likely take one of the biggest blows, as it expected to receive $250,000 from the Picower Foundation this year.[7] It will be a shame if this program needs to be trimmed; the program has been a tremendous help for refugees seeking asylum in the United States, providing them not only with legal representation but also with useful information about the communities they hope to move into, such as the location and contact numbers of public places. This program is one of the largest of its kind in the United States and perhaps does the most practical good out of all of HRF’s initiatives.[8]

HRF is not the only advocacy group experiencing financial trouble in these tough economic times; indeed, the JEHT Foundation, in addition to its grants to HRF, also provided funding to Human Rights Watch (HRW), the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and numerous other advocacy groups.[9] With such advocacy groups struggling in this downturn, it will be interesting to see just how the political climate in Washington will be affected, in particular how much such groups will be able to monitor President Obama’s agenda of change, both here and abroad.

If you would like to help out HRF and make a donation, click here.

[1] http://www.whitehouse.gov/executive-orders-to-date/
[2] http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/georgepacker/2009/01/from-all-iraqi.html
[3] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/12/business/12scheme.html?_r=1
[4] http://www.jehtfoundation.org/news/
[5] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/20/business/20foundation.html?ref=business
[6] http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/georgepacker/2009/01/from-all-iraqi.html
[7] http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/georgepacker/2009/01/from-all-iraqi.html
[8] http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/asylum.htm
[9] http://www.discoverthenetworks.org/funderprofile.asp?fndid=5267&category=79

What it Takes to be an Island: The Ukrainian-Romanian Dispute Over the Status of Snake Island

2009-02-11T23:14:00.003-05:00

The following is the second of two potentially groundbreaking cases concerning maritime delimitation and island sovereignty that were pending in the International Court of Justice in 2008.

Dictionary.com defines an island as “a tract of land completely surrounded by water, and not large enough to be called a continent.”[1] The international community, by contrast, has had a hard time finding and agreeing upon a definition as straightforward or as universal.

In this era of fixed national boundaries, bountiful maritime resources, and global naval trade, adequately defining an island and distinguishing between an island and, say, a pile of rocks are more important than ever, with the extent of a nation’s maritime boundaries – and, by extension, its exclusive economic zones – hanging in the balance: Article 121, Section 3 of the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 (LOSC) – the most recent attempt to establish an international consensus on the definition of an island and other naval guidelines – states that, “Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.”[2]

This clause was the centerpiece of a long-standing dispute between Romania and Ukraine over the status of Snake Island, which was recently resolved in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Snake Island, if it can be called an island, is a small, X-shaped landmass made of limestone in the middle of the Black Sea, right near the maritime border between Romania and Ukraine. Around 100 people[3] live on the landmass in a town called Bile Village,[4] and Odessa National University has a permanent scientific expedition on the landmass. In addition, Snake Island has a helicopter platform, radio and cell-phone towers, a lighthouse, a bank, and a post office, among other things.[5]

In ancient times, the landmass was best known as the final resting place of the Greek heroes Achilles and Patroclus. In modern times, it has become an important and controversial piece of the ever-changing Black Sea maritime boundaries. For nearly 150 years, Snake Island alternated between Russian and Ottoman rule, as it was located near the maritime border between the two empires; indeed, it was even the site of a naval battle between the two – the Battle of Fidonisi. In 1878, the landmass became part of a new, independent, Romanian state in the aftermath of another clash between the Russians and the Ottomans. Snake Island remained part of Romania until after WWII, when the Soviets, after having occupied it during the war, compelled Communist Romania to cede it to the Soviet Union. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, custody of Snake Island fell to Ukraine.[6]

As it became clear that Snake Island itself would not be in its possession again, Romania began to argue, first with the Soviet Union, then with Ukraine, about how the landmass affected maritime boundaries. As tensions on the issue began to heat up in the mid 1990s, Romania and Ukraine agreed to take the case to the ICJ if they had not reached a separate agreement in 2 years; Romania would finally file the case in 2004. With the discovery of oil and natural gas in the seabed around the island – albeit only 2-3 years worth – the stakes are now arguably higher than ever.[7]

Throughout the case, Ukraine maintained that Snake Island was, in fact, an island, arguing that the small village and modern development of the landmass were indicators that the “human habitation” and “economic life” stipulated by Article 121 of the LOSC were taking place on the landmass, making it qualify as an island.[8]

Romania, by contrast, argued that Snake Island’s lack of fresh water and arable soil – it’s composed primarily of limestone – rendered it incapable of supporting “human habitation” on its own, which, therefore, made it a cliff, not an island. Furthermore, Romania accused Ukraine of building up and populating the landmass, thereby violating an earlier agreement with Romania where Ukraine would consider the landmass “uninhabited.”[9]

In reviewing this case, the ICJ had a chance to set a far-reaching precedent in international law about maritime delimitation. In interpreting Article 121 of the LOSC, the ICJ had a chance to establish the first clear international definition of an island.

The competing interpretations of Article 121 result in significantly different definitions of an island and would have very different implications for maritime delimitation. At first, Romania’s opinion may appear more reasonable: if a landmass cannot, by its own virtue, support human life, then it would seem illogical to consider it an island under the LOSC.

But, then again, even if Snake Island did have arable land and fresh water, would its size permit it to have enough of either to sustain human life on its own? Surely there are many tiny islands scattered across the globe that have vegetation and fresh water but still rely on outside aid to maintain its human population. By this logic, one could argue Ukraine is simply being practical by developing and supplying Snake Island from the mainland.

Ruling in favor of Ukraine would send a dangerous message to the rest of the world, as it would encourage other countries to populate and develop any of their remote landmasses in order to argue that it is sustaining human habitation and should therefore qualify as an island. In this fashion, countries could use the island status to claim a larger exclusive economic zone, potentially enabling them access to more resources and naval trade. Such a “development race” could play out on a grand scale in the Pacific Ocean, where numerous countries have claimed numerous stretches of ocean with many small landmasses that may or may not be already considered islands.

Yet ruling in favor of Romania could have an opposite but equally potent impact on maritime delimitation. Instead of building up islands to try to gain a larger portion of a sea or ocean, countries could instead question the validity of the status of numerous landmasses throughout the world’s oceans and seas, which could roll back the existing maritime boundaries of some countries to the benefit of others.

Rather than to set either of these precedents, the ICJ dodged the issue, making no ruling on the status of Snake Island but granting Romania 80% of the disputed Black Sea waters.[10] While this latest dispute seems to have been resolved, the controversy over the definition of an island and what having the status of an island means for maritime delimitation remains unresolved. With many more maritime disputes in other regions likely to come, the ICJ may not be able to dodge the island question forever. International lawmakers would do well to use this time to consider what the answer should be, for it will have implications on maritime boundaries for years to come.

[1] http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/island
[2] http://www.globelaw.com/LawSea/ls82_3.htm#article_121_regime_of_islands
[3] http://www.mlahanas.de/Greeks/Cities/SnakeIsland.html
[4] http://www.mfa.gov.ua/mfa/en/publication/content/8214.htm
[5] http://www.mlahanas.de/Greeks/Cities/SnakeIsland.html
[6] http://www.mlahanas.de/Greeks/Cities/SnakeIsland.html
[7] http://www.mlahanas.de/Greeks/Cities/SnakeIsland.html
[8] http://www.mfa.gov.ua/mfa/en/publication/content/8214.htm
[9] http://www.mlahanas.de/Greeks/Cities/SnakeIsland.html
[10] http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/romania-resolves-snake-island-conflict-ukraine/article-179141?Ref=RSS

The Latest Israel-Hamas Conflict and Where Israel Should Go From Here

2009-02-01T16:26:00.002-05:00

Last December, 2008, after a renewed rocket barrage from Hamas ended hopes of an extended ceasefire, Israel launched a large-scale retaliatory air and ground assault on the radical Muslim group in Gaza.

Three weeks, 1300 Palestinian deaths, and $2 billion worth of devastation later[1], not much seems to have changed, other than potential election gains for some.[2] Hamas may be weakened, but it is not broken, and its rocket attacks have not stopped.[3] Moreover, Hamas still has the support of the majority of Gazans.[4]

Indeed, if anything, the situation seems to have gotten worse for Israel, not better. Moderate Arab governments, particularly those of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are under more intense pressure than ever to defy Israel and support their Arab brothers in Gaza.[5] Support for Israel across the world has further plummeted as a result of the deadly scale of the operations in Gaza.[6] Worst of all, support amongst Palestinians for the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority, the government that Israel had hoped to bolster as a moderate alternative to Hamas, has all but evaporated, with Palestinians increasingly associating Fatah with Israel and thinking, perhaps rightly so, that Fatah does not have their best interests at heart.[7]

Although Israel demonstrated in the recent conflict that it can and will not hesitate to muster overwhelming military might, it has also shown that it can not achieve its goals through such force.

The fact that Israel had to intervene militarily in Gaza to try to fulfill its goals is indicative of the failure of its two-year-long attempt to isolate Hamas by blockading Gaza. In the short run, Israel had hoped that the blockade would cut off Hamas from its funding and weapons smugglers. In the long run, Israel had hoped that the blockade would make living conditions awful enough in Gaza for the Gazans to shift their support from Hamas to Fatah and maybe even to rebel against Hamas.

This complete blockade has not advanced either of Israel’s goals. It has not enabled short-term peace and has in fact worsened long-term prospects for peace: as the U.S.-Muslim Engagement Project stated in its recent publication, Changing Course: A New Direction for U.S. Relations with the Muslim World, “Israel’s… isolation of Gaza… undermine[s] security for all” and has ended up “encouraging extremism.”[8]

Israel should seek to change its current strategy rather than to continue to compensate for its failure by making more incursions into Gaza. Egypt, too, should strive for a more effective strategy, as it fears the growing influence and appeal of Hamas and its parent organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, amongst Egyptians. In the coming weeks and months, particularly after the new Israeli government takes over, Israel should work together with Egypt to jointly lift sanctions on purely economic products and activities that cross the Gaza border while intensifying crackdowns on weapons smuggling, especially the smuggling tunnels that bypass the Egypt-Gaza border. The Egyptians should improve their enforcement of their section of the Gaza border to ensure maximum efficiency, perhaps by raising the salaries of border guards, giving bonuses to guards for each tunnel they find and destroy, or through some other means. Perhaps an international peacekeeping force could help police the border as well. In addition, the Israeli and Egyptian navies might do well to enlist the help of other navies, perhaps the U.S. navy, to help make sure no weapons are smuggled into Gaza from the Mediterranean Sea.

Lifting some economic sanctions does not mean completely opening the border or leaving it unguarded. Indeed, Israel and Egypt should maintain all of the checkpoints that guard the Gaza border and should conduct thorough checks on anything and everything that passes through to ensure that no weapons get in or out. Nor should Israel and Egypt lift sanctions on absolutely everything; they should use export control models like those of the United States or some other country to determine whether a certain product or material could possibly be used in a weapon or have other military applications.

With these conditions in place, it would not seem so perilous for Israel and Egypt to allow economic activity into and out of Gaza. Such activity would have great long-term implications for Gaza and Israel, slowly, but surely lifting Gazans out of poverty and giving them some semblance of a normal life, which they would think twice about risking simply for the sake of radical, lofty goals of jihad and the overthrow of Israel. Moreover, if Israel were to allow economic activity into and out of Gaza and refrain from constantly invading it, Gazans would have a chance at prosperity and a better life, and perhaps then Gazans would not blame Israel and the West for whatever problems they might have and might develop a more favorable view of Israel.

Such a shift toward a prosperous, moderate Gaza would do more harm to Hamas than all of the bombs and troops Israel has ever sent its way. The bulk of Hamas’ support comes from Palestinians dissatisfied with their poverty and mistreatment by Israel but also with the corruption of past Palestinian governments; indeed, one of Hamas’ earliest functions was garbage collection, which had been largely neglected by the Palestinian Authority.[9] If Gazans were allowed a chance to prosper and were free from periodic devastation from Israel, they would probably be more hesitant to support a group whose stated goal is to wipe out the state of Israel, regardless of any other services it provides, for fear of losing their wealth and security.

When Gazans start to believe that they can obtain better lives through moderate means, then they will stop pursuing radical goals and supporting radical groups, like Hamas. If the Israeli government has the courage (in light of the view of much of the Israeli public) to encourage this idea, it will pay off in the long run. With a new American administration in place and a new Israeli one to come, and with Israeli operations finally at an end, for now, this may be as opportune a moment as ever for Israeli policy to shift toward this goal – and long-term peace.

[1]http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1057132.html
[2]http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1873084,00.html?iid=tsmodule
[3]http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1232100165159&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
[4]http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2009/01/23/ST2009012303518.html
[5]http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/10/world/middleeast/10cairo.html?fta=y
[6]http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/13/gaza-israel-war-crimes
[7]http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F0CEFDC1F3CF936A25752C0A96F9C8B63
[8]http://www.usmuslimengagement.org/storage/usme/documents/Changing_Course_-_A_New_Direction_for_US_Relations_with_the_Muslim_World.pdf (p. 41)
[9]http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/hamas-plays-on-its-welfare-credentials-in-historic-elections-488243.html

The Mumbai Attacks and the Future of Indian-Pakistani and U.S.-Pakistani Relations

2009-01-18T12:52:00.005-05:00

With tensions between India and Pakistan escalating in the wake of last November’s terrorist attacks in Mumbai, Barack Obama need not look any further as to where his first test as President will come.

Relations between the two South Asian nuclear powers have deteriorated to their worst level since the beginning of the decade – that time also a result of a terrorist attack in India – with enraged Indian officials and defensive Pakistani officials trading accusations and retorts and people in both countries protesting in the streets against their South Asian rival, and although both countries deny they want war, each seems to be moving closer toward it, the most ominous sign being Pakistan’s recent redeployment of troops from the Afghan border to the Indian border.[1]

Upon taking office, Mr. Obama should pressure Pakistan with all of the means at the United States’ disposal to withdraw its troops from the Indian border and to ensure that a credible investigation into the activities of Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Pakistani Muslim extremist group allegedly responsible for the attack,[2] particularly how the group was able to evade Pakistani authorities, goes to completion. Although it is important that India does not further agitate the situation, evidence of Pakistan’s negligence and even alleged support of Lashkar-e-Taiba, as well as Pakistan’s recent mobilization along the Indian border seem to point to Pakistan as the main instigator of the current crisis, so it seems that compelling Pakistan to back off is essential in diffusing the renewed tensions between the two South Asian rivals.

In being more forceful toward Pakistan in this situation, Mr. Obama should not only seek to repair relations between India and Pakistan, but should also use the opportunity to redefine U.S relations with Pakistan. Under the Bush Administration, the United States was far too lenient with regard to Pakistan, providing it with fairly unconditional support to fight the Taliban and Al Qaeda along Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan and to safeguard of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal from extremist groups. While these goals are important to pursue, the Obama Administration should make it very clear to Pakistan that it can not hope to receive the same amount of aid and favorable treatment from the United States that it has enjoyed for the past eight years if it does not adequately use them to fulfill the said goals and that the United States is willing, however reluctantly, to relinquish such aid and treatment if the job is not done adequately. In acting accordingly, Mr. Obama will be able to demonstrate that he truly does mean to be an agent of change, and internationally as well as domestically.

One of the best tools at Mr. Obama’s disposal for influencing Pakistan is the sheer weight of America’s annual Pakistani military aid package, which totaled $5.4 billion in February 2008.[3] As U.S President, Mr. Obama should explain to Pakistan that the United States will not continue to give the Pakistani military billions of dollars intended to help with the fight against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Waziristan only to have Pakistan station its troops along the Indian border, hundreds of miles away from the Islamic militants it is being subsidized to fight. Furthermore, Mr. Obama should expound on how the ability of an Islamic extremist group like Lashkar-e-Taiba to operate within Pakistan and from there strike abroad is an indication that the Pakistani military has not been able to effectively suppress the Islamic radicals within its country.

While Mr. Obama should not immediately halt aid to the Pakistani military, he should hint that he is not afraid to resort to such a measure, explaining how in these tough economic times, when the U.S. government is running a budget deficit of over $1 trillion,[4] the United States is looking to cut costs wherever money is not being well spent and that, given the circumstances in Pakistan, it appears that such money given to Pakistan has not been well spent.[5] In order to continue to receive aid then, he should continue, Pakistan should demonstrate that such money is being well spent. A good start would be to redeploy the troops stationed along the Indian border back to the northwestern provinces and to investigate how Lashkar-e-Taiba was able to operate within Pakistan and make adjustments accordingly.

Hopefully other methods will be able to convince Pakistan to stop mobilizing troops along the Indian border and to conduct a thorough investigation into Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Mumbai attacks, but should the United States resort to threatening to reduce or halt military aid to Pakistan, it is likely that not only the civilian government but also the Pakistani military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the two main beneficiaries of the U.S. aid,[6] would be in agreement to redeploy Pakistani troops away from the Indian border.

At any rate, under the Obama Administration the United States should develop an alternative strategy for being able to combat the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Pakistan as well as to prevent Pakistan’s nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of radicals that does not involve providing billions of dollars in aid to the Pakistani military. Such a contingency plan would make the United States more confident about threatening to cut off aid to Pakistan.

It is hard to say exactly what the best arrangement might be. Perhaps the best strategy would be fairly similar to the current one – in which Pakistan would support the United States in its conflict with the Taliban and Al Qaeda – but just with different mechanics. The current strategy is not built for long-term success: by giving money to the military, the United States is merely perpetuating the dominance of that institution over the civilian government that has existed throughout modern Pakistan’s history, as evidenced by the various civilian governments that have been overthrown by military dictators like Generals Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf.[7] Furthermore, it is almost impossible for the United States to control how the Pakistani military spends its funds, which is a recipe for waste and misuse.[8]

A strategy that dealt directly with the civilian government may be more efficient than the current one and might move Pakistan in a better direction for the long run. Perhaps a favorable trade arrangement with Pakistan in return for military action against the Taliban and Al Qaeda instead of direct military aid would at least be less of a waste of money and might even strengthen the Pakistani economy and, by extension, the civilian government.

Placing more emphasis on the civilian government has its own risks, though. Pakistani civilian government has been more known for corruption than efficiency or democracy: indeed, the last three prime ministers with effective control – Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif, and Yousaf Raza Gillani, currently in office – have been indicted on corruption charges at some point in their careers.[9] It would take a very dedicated, skillful, and accountable civilian administration indeed to rule effectively over the country and the military, and Pakistan may not have that for a while.

While Mr. Obama should keep these considerations for long-term U.S.-Pakistani in mind, for the moment he should confine them within the context for the current crisis; diffusing tensions and averting war between India and Pakistan should be the Mr. Obama’s immediate goal in the region, for a large-scale and potentially nuclear war that would destabilize the region is in no one’s interest.

[1]http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/29/world/asia/29india.html?_r=1&scp=7&sq=India+no+clear+diplomatic&st=nyt
[2]http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/29/world/asia/29intel.html?scp=1&sq=Lashkar+responsible+Mumbai&st=nyt
[3]http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/27/pakistan.usa
[4]http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/08/business/economy/08deficit.html?hp
[5]http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/27/pakistan.usa
[6]http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/27/pakistan.usa
[7]http://www.newstatesman.com/200206030017
[8]http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/27/pakistan.usa
[9]http://www.newstatesman.com/200206030017

The Georgia-Russia Conflict: Origins of the Conflict and Georgian and Russian Motives

2008-09-17T00:52:00.002-04:00

Part 1 of a 6 part essay on the recent conflict in Georgia, its causes, and its potential implications.

Russia’s retaliatory bombing and invasion of Georgia last month and the ongoing aftermath has developed into one of the most troubling international episodes of this decade. Russia’s belligerent response to Georgian operations in South Ossetia, a Georgian breakaway province, confirmed what had already been Russia’s scarcely hidden intention to dominate its neighbors, particularly those in the Caucasus and in Eastern Europe. The anemic Western response in the face of Russian aggression against one of its newest allies underscores the significant leverage Russia has attained this past decade over Europe and America, and such inaction bears disturbing similarity to the feeble Western response to Hitler’s aggression preceding WWII. In the following months, the United States and Europe would do well to punish Russia in a more meaningful manner than they have so far, or else resurgent Russia will be only further emboldened to bluntly wield its hard power over its weaker neighbors.

Of all of its comparatively weak Caucasus neighbors, perhaps none have been more of a thorn in Russia’s side lately than Georgia, particularly in the four years since the election of President Mikheil Saakashvili. Under President Saakashvili’s liberal economic reforms, the once poor Georgian economy is showing signs of life, experiencing 10% growth in 2007 (although unemployment and poverty could have been lower).[1] In addition, President Saakashvili rooted out much of the corruption that had existed within the government under its previous president – the former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.[2]

Worse yet for Russia, President Saakashvili has consistently taken a defiant stance towards its giant neighbor. From the very beginning of his Presidency, President Saakashvili has strived to reestablish Georgian control over the country’s several breakaway provinces: indeed, in the first months of his Presidency he succeeded in regaining control over the Southwestern breakaway province of Ajara.[3] In addition, President Saakashvili has reached out to the West, particularly the United States: Georgia had as many as 2,000 troops in Iraq as part of the coalition forces, and U.S. President George W. Bush received an exceptionally warm welcome from President Saakashvili and the rest of Tbilisi in 2005, among other things.[4]

Most critical of all, Georgia has increasingly sought membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a move that Russia has repeatedly stated it would not tolerate, and it is easy to see why: for a Russia that seeks to have a strong influence over its neighbors, the idea of a Western alliance being extended to include one of its bordering countries, particularly one in an area that Russia has long considered to be in its sphere of influence, is unacceptable.[5]

Conveniently for Russia, though, Georgia’s breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have presented a relatively easy opportunity for undermining the increasingly pesky Caucasus state. These two separatist regions won de facto independence in the first few years after the independence of Georgia itself after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Although no country recognizes either region’s statehood (except for Russia, which formally recognized the areas a few days ago), their autonomy has been preserved for over a decade, thanks in large part to significant Russian aid and a ceasefire arrangement monitored by Russian “peacekeepers.”[6]

The Georgians claim that both regions are integral parts of Georgia and that there would be a Georgian majority in both territories if it were not for the forced deportation of Georgian citizens, and so they have been outraged at the regions’ autonomy, viewing it as an unacceptable violation of Georgia’s territorial integrity, not only by the Abkhaz and Ossetian separatists, but also by the Russian “peacekeepers” that have been stationed in the regions. The Abkhaz and the Ossetians, meanwhile, argue that their distinct languages and cultures should give them the right to self-determination.[7]

Like other ethnic issues in the Caucasus, though, the question of the legitimacy of either of these claims has no easy answer. It is difficult even today for historians to agree on when exactly the Georgians, the Abkhaz, and the other numerous Caucasus tribes gained their present identity. It is true that for part of history, including during much of the Middle Ages, the Abkhaz and Ossetians were part of a Georgian kingdom, but this kingdom itself was a multiethnic entity consisting of various tribes; indeed, the very concept of a Georgian race takes into account several different tribes. Numerous migrations and resettlements of populations have also complicated each ethnicity’s historical ties to the areas each one claims.[8]

The Russians, though, have clearly not reached out towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia because of any sympathy for either region’s aspirations for statehood. Indeed, the Russians have played a complicated game of their own in bolstering these two Georgian breakaway regions, since Russia too rules over several Caucasus regions and peoples that also warm at the idea of statehood, particularly the Chechens. In supporting Abkhazia and South Ossetia, then, the Russians have in fact undermined their authority inside their own borders.[9]

Evidently, though, Russia does not seem to care about promoting such double standards as long as Georgia is weakened as a result; indeed, Russia has gone to great lengths to support the two breakaway territories at Georgia’s expense. In conjunction with imposing several rounds of sanctions on Georgia, Russia has not placed any sanctions on Abkhazia or South Ossetia, allowing movement of people and goods across its borders with the two areas. Russian financial aid helps to keep the regions’ economies and governments afloat, and Russia has even distributed Russian passports to much of the population in each region.[10]

Although Georgia technically initiated last month’s violence by sending troops into South Ossetia, such a conflict seems to compliment Russia’s interests and past support of South Ossetia and Abkhazia too well for one not to be suspicious of a possible Russian instigation of hostilities. The presence of Russian “peacekeepers” and passport holders gave Russia a possible excuse to justify a Russian intervention to the West in the event of Georgian operations. The speed at which the Russian military mobilized and invaded Georgia in response to Georgian military action in South Ossetia seems to suggest that Russia was too ready and prepared for retaliation for it not to have had a hand in the initiation of violence; indeed, with Russian “peacekeepers” already in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, egging on the separatist forces does not seem so hard for Russia. With West-backed Kosovo recently independent from Russian ally Serbia, Georgia up for potential NATO admission in a few months, and much of the world focused on the Beijing Olympics, the timing seemed all too perfect for Russia to strike a blow against its defiant neighbor and send a resounding message to its other neighbors and the West.

Perhaps President Saakashvili was met with a significant enough provocation from Ossetian separatists to justify sending Georgian troops to the region; perhaps he was bent on retaking South Ossetia while the rest of the world was distracted by the Olympics in order to cement his legacy. Whatever the reasoning, though, President Saakashvili should have known better. Instead, he played right into the bear’s hands.

[1] http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/04/europe/georgia.php
[2] http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22519891/
[3] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/weekinreview/10traub.html?pagewanted=1&sq=Taunting%20the%20Bear&st=cse&scp=1
[4] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/weekinreview/10traub.html?pagewanted=1&sq=Taunting%20the%20Bear&st=cse&scp=1
[5] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/weekinreview/10traub.html?pagewanted=1&sq=Taunting%20the%20Bear&st=cse&scp=1
[6] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/weekinreview/10traub.html?pagewanted=1&sq=Taunting%20the%20Bear&st=cse&scp=1
[7] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/weekinreview/10traub.html?pagewanted=1&sq=Taunting%20the%20Bear&st=cse&scp=1
[8] http://armenianhouse.org/villari/caucasus/caucasus-history.html
[9] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/weekinreview/10traub.html?pagewanted=1&sq=Taunting%20the%20Bear&st=cse&scp=1
[10] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/weekinreview/10traub.html?pagewanted=1&sq=Taunting%20the%20Bear&st=cse&scp=1

The Georgia-Russia Conflict: The Direct Impact on Georgia

2008-09-17T00:50:00.002-04:00

Part 2 of a 6 part essay on the recent conflict in Georgia, its causes, and its potential implications.

Now, Georgia and the rest of the world will have to deal with the consequences of Russia’s calculations and President Saakashvili’s miscalculation. For Georgia, the short war with Russia has been devastating: thousands of its people have died or have become refugees, and much of its civilian and military infrastructure has been damaged.[1] Worse yet, the status quo now enforced by the Russians, in which Abkhaz and Ossetian separatists control all of their respective regions and Russian “peacekeepers” even patrol a buffer zone a few miles within Georgia proper, is much worse than the one President Saakashvili tried to reverse with last month’s operations.[2]

In addition, the conflict has highlighted some glaring problems in the Georgian military, which seemed to be inadequately trained and was unable to effectively respond to Russian warplanes and tanks in the weeklong period of intense combat. These tactical failures greatly contributed to Georgia’s defeat in a conflict that has thoroughly underscored Georgia’s relative weakness compared to Russia.[3]

Such a sound defeat of Georgia has sent, as the Russians intended, a clear signal to the Caucasus and Eastern Europe that Russia has no qualms about enforcing its will and backing up its statements in stark contrast to the West, which has taken few practical measures to back up its statements and assurances of support. Russia’s neighbors, particularly Ukraine and Azerbaijan, neither of which have acted as much in accord with Russian interests as Russia would have liked, will likely wonder if they might soon face a similar fate as Georgia if they do not comply with Russian demands.

Indeed, Ukraine and Azerbaijan as well as Moldova also have unruly or disputed regions that have historically been backed by Russia, and one cannot help but wonder if Russia might in the future use such territories as windows for influence and intervention as they did with Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia.

[1] http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-08-27-Georgia-damage_N.htm
[2] http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2008/09/09/russian-troops.html?ref=rss
[3] http://www.redorbit.com/news/international/1525797/georgian_army_proves_to_be_no_match_for_the_russian/

The Georgia-Russia Conflict: Possible Implications for Ukraine and Crimea

2008-09-17T00:49:00.003-04:00

Part 3 of a 6 part essay on the recent conflict in Georgia, its causes, and its potential implications.

Ukraine’s control over the Crimean peninsula in the Post-Cold War era has been a particularly sore spot for the Russians. Crimea is considered by many to be an integral part of Russia and was under continuous Russian control for centuries.[1] Indeed, ethnic Russians make up a majority of Crimea’s population today (though only after decades of eviction of the Crimean Tatars and resettlement by the Russians).[2] After the creation of the Soviet Union, Crimea was part of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), but in 1954 it was given to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkSSR). At the time such an act had little practical significance, but when the former SSRs gained independence with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Crimea found itself as a part of Ukraine instead of Russia because of the earlier transfer.[3]

While Crimea’s historical ties to Russia and its allure as a tourist destination inevitably made the Russians unhappy with the loss, a more critical matter dominated tensions over Crimea: what to do with the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet anchored at the peninsula at Sevastopol.

Such tensions would be eased for the moment, though, with the Treaty of Friendship in 1997 between Ukraine and Russia, in which Russia essentially recognized Ukraine’s sovereignty over Crimea and, in return, Ukraine let Russia have most of the Black Sea Fleet as well as a long-term lease of a naval base in Sevastopol.[4] Many at the time hoped this agreement would spell the end of the dispute over Crimea and Sevastopol and might eventually pave the way for better relations between Ukraine and Russia. However, tensions have since flared up again between Ukraine and Russia, particularly in the years following the election of the pro-Western President Viktor Yushchenko (who, incidentally, was mysteriously poisoned while campaigning in 2004).[5] Ukraine’s ambition to join NATO, as with Georgia’s, has especially angered Russia. Now, in light of last months’ events in South Ossetia and Georgia, Ukraine can only help but wonder if it will pay the same price as Georgia for defying Russia and if such a price will be extracted through a renewal of the dispute over Crimea.

[1] http://8.12.42.31/1997/oct/05/news/mn-39673
[2] http://8.12.42.31/1997/oct/05/news/mn-39673
[3] http://8.12.42.31/1997/oct/05/news/mn-39673
[4] http://8.12.42.31/1997/oct/05/news/mn-39673
[5] http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1213/p01s02-woeu.html

The Georgia-Russia Conflict: Possible Implications for Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh

2008-09-17T00:47:00.004-04:00

Part 4 of a 6 part essay on the recent conflict in Georgia, its causes, and its potential implications.

Ukraine, though, should not be as worried about possible Russian involvement in Crimea as Azerbaijan should be about a possible Russian intervention in its breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh. This predominantly Armenian enclave within Azerbaijan was able to break away from Azerbaijani rule with the help of the military of the country of Armenia in the years following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In fact, by the time a ceasefire agreement was reached, Karabakh and Armenian troops were in control of all of Nagorno-Karabakh as well a significant amount of the surrounding territory, including some that bordered Armenia, which allowed for a direct overland connection between Armenia proper and Nagorno-Karabakh.[1]

The Azerbaijanis have naturally been unhappy with the autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian troops occupying much of its territory, but they have not had sufficient military might to challenge the status quo.[2] Still, tensions have remained high: skirmishes between Armenian and Azerbaijani troops continue to erupt sporadically, and Azerbaijan has steadily invested its new oil wealth into building up its military, seemingly with the goal of eventually being strong enough to retake the enclave by force.[3]

In taking action with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh, though, Azerbaijan must contend not only with Armenia, but also with Russia, which has been shipping arms and natural gas to Armenia and maintains a sizeable military base in the country. As with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia’s support of Nagorno-Karabakh through Armenia has nothing to do with any sympathy towards the Armenian enclave but rather is a means by which to weaken Azerbaijan.[4] Russia certainly has an interest in undermining Azerbaijan: in addition to being one of its bordering countries, Azerbaijan is also the origin of several East-West oil and natural gas pipelines (some of which run through Georgia) that bypass Russian soil, helping to loosen Russia’s hold on European energy markets. [5] In light of its successful, fairly unimpeded operations against Georgia through South Ossetia and Abkhazia last month, Russia may decide to reassert its dominance over Azerbaijan and, by extension, over energy markets by escalating the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.

[1] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/nagorno-karabakh.htm
[2] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/nagorno-karabakh.htm
[3] http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav070307.shtml#
[4] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/nagorno-karabakh.htm
[5] http://www.slate.com/id/2198292/

The Georgia-Russia Conflict: Possible Implications for Moldova and Transnistria

2008-09-17T00:45:00.004-04:00

Part 5 of a 6 part essay on the recent conflict in Georgia, its causes, and its potential implications.

Perhaps no breakaway region has been as strongly supported by (and, as a result, dependent on) Russia as tiny Moldova’s even tinier breakaway region of Transnistria has been. This miniscule Ukrainian and Russian enclave amidst a country of mostly Romanian-related Moldavians was able to achieve de facto independence in 1992, in no small part due to the support of the former Soviet 14th Army that was stationed there.[1]

Ever since gaining such autonomy, though, Transnistria has been in a rather precarious position. A sliver of land across from the Dniester River spanning only 1,607 square miles, Transnistria has little space for any sort of production (though it is fairly industrialized) and has virtually no cushion in the event of a serious attack. In addition, the small separatist region is landlocked in between Ukraine and Moldova proper, making any sort of trade tricky, since Ukraine does not recognize it and Moldova, of course, still claims it. Indeed, smuggling has been one of the primary sources not of only revenue, but also of goods for Transnistria, but even this option is growing less successful: in recent years Ukraine and Moldova have started to crack down more and more on such smuggling activity with the separatist region.[2]

Fortunately for Transnistria, though, Russia has long provided a good deal of support and aid to the breakaway region so that it has been able to maintain its autonomy from Moldova. From various routes, Russian aid and goods have reached Transnistria, helping it keep its economy afloat. As in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russian passports have been distributed to the people of Transnistria. Most critically of all, though, Russian troops remain in Transnistria, helping to ensure that the weak Moldovan military has little chance of retaking the enclave by force.[3]

Although Russia has been able to maintain a strong presence in Transnistria, it would be significantly more difficult for Russia to launch full-scale military operations against Moldova from the enclave than it was for Russia to do so against Georgia through Abkhazia and South Ossetia, mainly due to the fact that Transnistria does not border Russia, as Abkhazia and South Ossetia do, and also that, given the current tensions, there seems to be little to no chance that Ukraine would allow Russian troops to march through its territory to reach Transnistria. For the moment, though, Russia has no interest in such an operation, since Moldova has not been as troublesome as Ukraine and Azerbaijan, and indeed Russia already maintains a strong hold over Moldova because of its support of Transnistria. However, the possibility of such an operation is certainly on the table, particularly in light of the recent events in Georgia.

[1] http://www.american.edu/ted/ice/moldova.htm
[2] http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/28/world/europe/28ukraine.html?pagewanted=print
[3] http://www.american.edu/ted/ice/moldova.htm

The Georgia-Russia Conflict: Possible Responses and Long Term Impacts

2008-09-17T00:40:00.004-04:00

Part 6 of a 6 part essay on the recent conflict in Georgia, its causes, and its potential implications.

If the West and the rest of the world do not want to see further Russian incursions into countries in Eastern Europe or the Caucasus, they will need to punish Russia more effectively for last month’s incursion into Georgia than they have so far. Unfortunately, the West’s options are constrained by the significant leverage Russia has attained over it. In particular, Western Europe has come to rely heavily on Russian energy exports: the European Union (EU) currently imports nearly half of its natural gas and 30% of its oil.[1] Russia has demonstrated in the past that it is willing to use its energy exports as a political tool, and so European nations are rightfully worried that if they respond too harshly to Russian actions in Georgia – like by imposing sanctions, perhaps – Russia may very well retaliate by halting the exportation of oil and natural gas to the said countries or by raising the prices of such resources. Either move would have a devastating effect on the economies of Europe.

Even the United States has had to rely on Russia in recent years. Sufficient Russian diplomatic pressure could potentially tip the scales in favor of or against the United States with regard to Iran, Sudan, and North Korea. Such support from Russia could not really be counted on, though, if the United States responds too forcefully to last month’s invasion of Georgia.[2]

Despite the weight of Russia’s leverage, Western rhetoric has at least been critical of Russia’s aggression, with EU countries, particularly France, condemning Russian military operations and President Bush calling Russia’s actions “unacceptable in the 21st century.”[3]

China, meanwhile, has not overtly supported or condemned Russia: through a joint statement of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China officially supported “the active role of Russia in assisting peace and cooperation in the region” but at the same time expressed “deep concern over the recent tensions surrounding the South Ossetia question and calls for the sides to peacefully resolve existing problems through dialogue.”[4]

Still, the West can and should do more to express its discontent with Russia’s recent actions towards Georgia. Rhetoric may effectively convey opinions and stir emotion, but it has limited practical effect. The option of expelling Russia from the G8 also does not seem very pragmatic and indeed might weaken the legitimacy of the organization. With sanctions seeming too risky and double-edged and direct military intervention absurd, the West should instead focus on rebuilding Georgia, particularly its infrastructure and military, and it should also not put an end to Georgia’s as well as Ukraine’s hopes for joining NATO (though at the same time it should entreat Georgian and Ukrainian leaders not to act so rashly in the future so as to lessen the chances of a repeat of last month’s events in Georgia). In particular, the United States should continue to have military advisors train the Georgian military[5] and should start shipping more weapons to Georgia as well. Such actions would not directly punish Russia, but they would in effect undo some of the gains that Russia hoped to achieve by invading Georgia in the first place.

If nothing else, hopefully last month’s events will push the West to reduce its reliance on Russia in the long term. For Europe, this means lessening its dependence on Russian energy by continuing to pursue alternatives to fossil fuels as well as to keep looking for energy routes (such as the Caucasus pipelines) that bypass Russia. For America, this means moving away from the highly personal relationship with Russia that Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin had cultivated with U.S. Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. Instead, the United States should move back towards a stricter, more interest-based relationship with Russia.[6]

No matter what further action is taken, though, last month’s Georgia episode has clearly been one of the greatest strains on the current international system of checks and balances. At the moment, the long term lesson from this incident has been that, with enough hard power, a country can do what it pleases without consequence. Indeed, in a way the United States itself has reinforced this impression with its fairly unilateral invasion of Iraq and conduct in its “war on terror.”

Such an environment is eerily similar to that which existed in the years preceding WWII as the international community and the League of Nations did little to hinder the aggressive advances of Japan and Nazi Germany. This would eventually lead to the end of the set international order and of the League of Nations. Hopefully, a similar restructuring will not take place now.

With Russia, though, the rest of the world might get lucky. Russia’s resurgence has been no Renaissance: it has not invested its oil and natural gas wealth into long term economic stability, and so its influence will likely wane as oil and natural gas fall out of use and favor.

The rise of powers such as India and China, though, seem inevitable. Perhaps the most enduring effect of last month’s events in Georgia is what lessons these and other rising countries will take from them.

[1] http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/bg2083.cfm
[2] http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2008/08/why_we_need_to/
[3] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/12/world/europe/12diplo.html
[4] http://www.wsws.org/articles/2008/sep2008/sco-s03.shtml
[5] http://www.redorbit.com/news/international/1525797/georgian_army_proves_to_be_no_match_for_the_russian/
[6] http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/933

The Mongolian Economy: the True Cause of Mongolia's post-Election Violence

2008-08-15T23:18:00.006-04:00

In many ways, Mongolia seems like a country rooted in the past. Much of its people still herd animals astride their horses, living the same, nomadic lifestyle that their ancestors had lived for millennia.[1] Even the steppes over which they herd seem unchanged, with little infrastructure or development puncturing their vast reaches.[2] Any settlements are spread far apart from one another: it is no wonder, then, that Mongolia is the most sparsely populated country on Earth.[3]

Perhaps most telling of all, the ancient, 800 year-old persona of Genghis Khan remains the most prominent figure – and the biggest celebrity – in Mongolia: his image can be found on a host of products, and there are many monuments in his name. Even a side of a hill is adorned with his image. This larger than life figure, who began the conquest of what became the largest contiguous empire in history, embodies the proud past of the Mongol people; a time when they were the rulers of nearly all the known world; a time when nomads were still widespread across the earth, defying the steady advance of sedentary civilization.[4]

For the Mongols, this glorious past seems far better than the present reality they find themselves in, with their country being slow to develop and one of the poorest in Asia, not to mention being sandwiched between two, giant, powerful neighbors: Russia and China.

And yet, in the present global scene, Mongolia finds itself hailed as a hallmark for the future: the United States has referred to Mongolia’s peaceful transition from Communism to a relatively successful democracy as a model of what the post-Cold War era should look like. Even as many of the former Soviet bloc countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia have struggled to implement true democracy and are starting to flounder under renewed Russian influence and even as newly established democracies in Iraq and Gaza have struggled, Mongolia’s democracy has remained relatively fair and functioning, which has made Mongolia attract significant praise – and foreign aid – from the United States.

This past July, though, Mongolia’s acclaimed democracy showed perhaps its first sign of considerable strain when the Democratic Party accused the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) (the former Communist Party) of election fraud in the parliamentary elections that month that were won by the MPRP. These allegations prompted a protest in Ulaanbaatar, the Mongolian capital, which soon degenerated into an angry mob that began vandalizing and looting nearby buildings and even set several buildings on fire, including the headquarters of the MPRP. The Mongolian authorities responded in full force, declaring a state of emergency and deploying the police and the military to restore order in Ulaanbaatar.[5]

This post-election saga came as a surprise to many in Mongolia and abroad given the performance of Mongolia’s young democracy up to that point. Indeed, the Democratic Party’s accusations do not seem entirely substantiated: international election observers disagreed with any such allegations.[6]

It is likely that the main trigger of the violence was not anything to do with the election dispute but rather the poor economic condition of Mongolia, with the election dispute acting as the catalyst for unleashing such frustration. Given the state of Mongolia’s economy, it is easy to see where the frustration stems from. Less than 1% of Mongolia’s land is fit for farming,[7] most of it being barren steppe and desert, forcing its people to herd animals for food (which, indeed, has been going on ever since Mongolia has been inhabited by people). While deeply rooted in tradition, such a nomadic lifestyle is unforgiving, which has prompted many to move to the cities, particularly Ulaanbaatar. Often, though, they end up in shantytowns outside the city, having exchanged one life of poverty for another.[8]

The lack of infrastructure across the vast steppes and deserts has remained a hindrance to further economic development. Although the former Communist rulers sought to modernize Mongolia and did have some impact, there is still less than 2,000 km of paved roads in Mongolia, which has an area about the size of Alaska.[9]

Mongolia hopes that its saving grace can be its vast, largely untapped deposits of minerals such as copper, gold, and coal. Unfortunately, the government has had a hard time regulating its nascent mining industry, and foreign companies still see most of the profits. Only a few Mongols reap the benefits while much of the rest of the Mongols remain poor.[10]

Perhaps the most telling example of the public frustration over the mining industry and the government’s inability to effectively regulate such mining is a 2006 windfall tax passed by the Mongolian parliament that would tax gold and copper profits at up to 68%. The Mongolian parliament passed this sweeping law in response to popular dissatisfaction with the foreign mining companies culminating in the burning of an effigy of Robert Friedland, then the head of Ivanhoe Mines Ltd, during a popular protest. The Mongolian government hoped that the new tax would enable the Mongolian people to profit more off of the gold and copper mining that has been undertaken by foreign companies.[11]

Unfortunately, the move seems to have backfired, partly because of the poor timing and execution of the Mongolian parliament: the tax was proposed and then enacted so swiftly that the mining companies had virtually no time to adjust, which alienated many and drove them away from current and future investment in Mongolia’s mines. Those that did stay had to rework contracts and delay new investments so that they could compensate financially for the sudden taxing change. The drop in mining from the foreign companies ultimately offset the higher tax rate, causing Mongolia’s revenue to decrease.[12]

Although not very well received by the public, Mongolia has had to rely on such foreign investment for a long while given its barren soil, harsh climate, its lack of development, and other economic handicaps. Such foreign aid dates back to the days of the Cold War when the Communist government in Mongolia received aid from the Soviet Union: indeed in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War the Mongolian economy fell on hard times after the Soviet aid stopped flowing into the country.[13] In recent years, other foreign companies and governments, particularly those of the United States, Japan, and China, have filled the void left by the Soviets.

Indeed, China has become perhaps the most important trading partner of Mongolia in recent years. The raw resources of Mongolia have helped China sustain its surging economic growth, while Chinese manufacturing and agricultural products have found a needy market back in Mongolia.[14]

The continued hardships of Mongolia’s economy have yet to translate into a change from democracy to another political system. That does not mean that there have not been grumblings, though. Some people long for the sort of socialist welfare programs that existed in the Communist regime but have since fallen out of favor since the introduction of capitalism and democracy.[15] Last month’s violence in Ulaanbaatar was a troubling sign of such dissatisfaction that the Mongols have with their daily lives. If the lives of the Mongols do not start to show signs of improvement soon, it may lead to a desire to try another form of government. It is such popular dissatisfaction with their lives rather than corruption or allegations of election fraud that the United States and other proponents of democracy should be most worried about with regard to Mongolia.

It is in the hands of the Mongol leaders, then, to help improve the state of the Mongol people to ensure their own success – and the success of the political system they head. In turns of immediate action, instituting some of the welfare policies that Mongolia is lacking may not be such a bad idea if for no other purpose than to alleviate some of the poverty.

Economically, greater regulation of mining and other industries would be a good move for the government so as to instill confidence in investors and to maximize output in such industries. Too much foreign investment may be unpopular and harmful in the long run, but at the moment it may be a necessary evil for Mongolia so as to generate some sort of economic activity. In the meantime, the government should focus on building up the country’s infrastructure and education systems so as to create a solid foundation from which Mongolian society may one day be able to sustain itself more through its own businesses as opposed to foreign ones.

If the Mongolian government implements such measures and continues to uphold its democratic form, then perhaps the Mongols will not erupt into an angry mob at the slightest bit of strain. Perhaps the Mongols will have lasting faith in their government. Perhaps the Mongols will look forward to the future rather than to seek solace in the past.

With democracy and established democratic nations faltering somewhat worldwide, whether it be the chaos in Iraq or Russia’s sound defeat of Georgia, never more has the fate of Mongolia meant so much for the United States and for the spread of democracy in general.

[1] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6252741.stm
[2] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mg.html
[3] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mg.html
[4] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6252741.stm
[5] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/08/world/asia/08mongolia.html
[6] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/08/world/asia/08mongolia.html
[7] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mg.html
[8] http://www.amurtmongolia.org/
[9] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mg.html
[10] http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2008/07/200873104041725239.html
[11] http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2008/07/200873104041725239.html
[12] http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2008/07/200873104041725239.html
[13] http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2779.htm
[14] http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B02E1D8123BF93AA35754C0A9629C8B63&scp=3&sq=Mongolia&st=cse
[15] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6252741.stm

A Lengthy Analysis of China: Introduction

2008-08-01T18:54:00.002-04:00

Post 1 of an 11 part essay on how the recent unrest in Tibet is a barometer of the various internal issues and the international pressure that China is struggling to deal with.

The new reality over the past few decades has been the resurgence of China on the world stage. Spurred by rapid economic growth, China’s commercial and political actions have become some of the dominant factors shaping the world today, elevating China back towards the powerful, influential position it has been in for most of human history.

But even as China’s growing economic and political clout has enabled it to start to reemerge as a world power, several important domestic issues continue to deter and distort China’s development. The recent upheaval in Tibet is just the latest indicator of the internal challenges that China must face before it can complete its reemergence. In fact, the tumultuous situation in Tibet is an accumulation of a number of these internal problems, in particular China’s territorial and sovereignty disputes, the condescending attitude of the Han Chinese towards other ethnicities, the unregulated and imbalanced Chinese economy, and the Chinese government’s autocratic rule.

In addition, as China’s influence continues to grow, so will the various pressures it will face from the international community as it adjusts and reacts to the effects of not only China’s economic and political might, but also of its internal issues.

Truly, China has not fully reemerged quite yet. How China deals with the growing international scrutiny as well as with its internal issues, such as those that have antagonized the situation in Tibet, will determine just what kind of power China develops into.

A Lengthy Analysis of China: Origins and Early History of the Tibet and Xinjiang Disputes

2008-08-01T18:49:00.008-04:00

Post 2 of an 11 part essay on how the recent unrest in Tibet is a barometer of the various internal issues and the international pressure that China is struggling to deal with.

Fundamentally, the problematic situation in Tibet is a result of long-standing territorial disputes within China, particularly with regards to Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and Xinjiang. In these remote, non-Chinese regions, cultural and nationalist pride have presented significant challenges to a Chinese rule that in these areas remains distinctly foreign. Indeed, contrary to Chinese claims that these areas are “inseparable” parts of China, Tibet and East Turkistan, as the native Uyghurs call it, have been independent of Chinese rule for most of history and at times have even built empires that have rivaled China itself.

China’s first enduring control over these regions, and perhaps the true basis of present-day China’s claim to them, came as a result of the conquests of the last imperial dynasty of China, the Qing (who, incidentally, were of Manchu, and not Chinese, lineage, though by this time the Manchus were fairly sinified). At its height, after nearly a century of expansionism, the Qing ruled an empire encompassing not only traditional China, but also Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, Korea, and parts of present-day Russia as well as compelled tribute from neighboring Vietnam, Burma, and Nepal.[1]

Although the Chinese had made some past forays into parts of Central Asia and other non-Chinese areas, they never before had ruled over a multicultural empire of such huge size. Like the Russians, the Ottomans, and the rulers of other multinational empires, the Qing were faced with a critical decision in how to govern their foreign lands: whether to try to exercise direct control over them and risk breeding more determined resistance in such areas or to grant them a degree of autonomy and risk undermining central authority in general.

At the outset, the Qing rulers granted a great deal of autonomy to such areas, making Tibet[2] and Korea[3] protectorates but essentially letting them govern themselves and exercising only very loose control over Xinjiang[4] and Mongolia.[5] The Qing reasoned, wisely, that to risk antagonizing such areas by enforcing direct rule would be pointless and imprudent given how hard it already was for them to administer and police their vast empire and to establish their credibility in China itself (so that the Chinese would be content to be ruled by the foreign Manchus).

As the Qing Dynasty began to reel in its waning years under internal rebellions and European and Japanese imperialism, it started to exert greater control over Tibet, Xinjiang, and Mongolia for the first time. Only a few years after finally suppressing the long, bloody Muslim Rebellion in the west, Qing troops occupied Xinjiang in 1884 and put it under direct Chinese rule: in fact, it was then that the Qing named the region Xinjiang, meaning “new territory,” which implies that the Qing never before had considered the region a true part of China.[6] After a small British force invaded Tibet from India in 1904, the angry Qing government officially proclaimed to the British that China had sole sovereignty over Tibet, and in 1910 Qing troops enforced this statement by marching into Tibet and establishing direct Chinese rule.[7] Increasingly fearful of Russian influence in the north, particularly after the Russians occupied Manchuria during the Boxer Rebellion, the Qing drastically tightened their rule over Inner and Outer Mongolia and increasingly tried to sinify these areas.[8] Indeed, it is even possible that Korea might have also been subject to greater rule had it not come under the influence of and later the rule of Japan in 1895 and 1910, respectively.

The unprecedented Chinese control in these regions would prove short-lived, though, when just a few years later, in 1912, the Qing Dynasty was overthrown. The disintegration of the Qing government left the former empire without a strong central authority, and so central Chinese control in far-flung domains like Tibet, Xinjiang, and Mongolia virtually ended. Indeed, there was no central Chinese control in China itself, as regional warlords and factions fought each other for power and plunged China into chaos.

For the next 40 years, with China embroiled in civil war and ravaged by recurrent Japanese invasions, Tibet, Xinjiang, and Mongolia came to fend for and govern for themselves. In Tibet, the Dalai Lama and his administration would rule undisturbed for much of the period.[9] In Xinjiang, the Uyghurs resisted invasions by frontier warlords and twice established an independent East Turkistan Republic.[10] In Outer Mongolia, the Mongols, with Tsarist support, declared their independence in 1911 and later, with Soviet support, would repel invasions from both the White Russians and the Chinese.[11]

For Tibet and East Turkistan, though, this period of self-rule would also prove short-lived. In 1949, the Communists finally eliminated the last of their rivals, the Guomindang (Nationalists), and gained control of China proper. With traditional China finally reunified under their direction, the Communists set about retaking the lands of the former Qing Empire, and by the early 1950s Communist troops had occupied Tibet and East Turkistan to bring back Chinese rule for good. Only the strong presence of the Soviet Union kept Mongolia from a similar fate (although, far from complete self-rule, it was more or less a Soviet satellite state until the 1990s).

Once again ruling over many nationalities, China once again had to decide whether to directly rule Tibet and Xinjiang or grant them a degree of autonomy. At this critical juncture, the Chinese government picked up right where the late Qing left off and asserted itself in full force over these territories, crushing the various uprisings and incorporating these regions as “autonomous” provinces in which Chinese officials, not Tibetan or Uyghur, had ultimate power. Still consolidating its rule throughout all of China, the Communists likely felt that granting any sort of true autonomy at this time would have undercut its authority in other places.

[1] http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/110832/Qianlong/1318/Dynastic-achievements#ref=ref3567&tab=active~checked%2Citems~checked&title=Qianlong%20%3A%3A%20Dynastic%20achievements%20--%20Britannica%20Online%20Encyclopedia
[2] http://www.cwru.edu/affil/tibet/documents/DragonandSnowLion.pdf
[3] http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/693609/history-of-Korea#tab=active~checked%2Citems~checked&title=history%20of%20Korea%20--%20Britannica%20Online%20Encyclopedia
[4] http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/china0405/index.htm
[5] Kotkin, Stephen, and Bruce A. Elleman. Mongolia in the Twentieth Century. N.p.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999.
[6] http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/china0405/index.htm
[7] http://www.cwru.edu/affil/tibet/documents/DragonandSnowLion.pdf
[8] Kotkin, Stephen, and Bruce A. Elleman. Mongolia in the Twentieth Century. N.p.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999.
[9] http://www.cwru.edu/affil/tibet/documents/DragonandSnowLion.pdf
[10] http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/china401/facts.html
[11] Kotkin, Stephen, and Bruce A. Elleman. Mongolia in the Twentieth Century. N.p.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999.

A Lengthy Analysis of China: Tibet and Xinjiang under Communist Rule

2008-08-01T18:43:00.003-04:00

Post 3 of an 11 part essay on how the recent unrest in Tibet is a barometer of the various internal issues and the international pressure that China is struggling to deal with.

As time went on, successive uprisings, such as the latest riots in Tibet, have only led the government to tighten its grip on these so-called “autonomous” regions. Like elsewhere in China, the Communist government has consistently throughout its 60 year reign made heavy use of the military and the police (and little use of human rights) to forcibly suppress unrest and eliminate any sort of challenge to its rule. In addition, the government has made full use of its control over the media to carry out propaganda campaigns aimed at encouraging loyalty towards China and away from “separatists,” the collective term for any sort of opposition, violent or peaceful, to Chinese rule and policies in these areas.[1][2]

Over the years, China has also used some more unconventional methods to enforce order. In Xinjiang, for example, the Uyghurs allege that the Chinese have performed nuclear tests in Xinjiang and have forced Uyghur women to have abortions in an effort to reduce the Uyghur population,[3] and in the wake of 9/11, the Chinese government was even able to get the international community to brand Uyghur “separatists” as “terrorists” in an attempt to legitimize their crackdowns in the region.[4]

Not only has the Chinese government forcibly kept the Tibetans and Uyghurs in line, but it has also instituted policies aimed at assimilating them into Chinese culture at the expense of their traditional cultures in much the same way that the Qing incorporated Inner Mongolia a century earlier. In particular, the Chinese have striven to undermine one of the most critical aspects of Tibetan and Uyghur culture: religion. In Tibet, the Chinese government has arrested a significant number of Buddhist monks and has forced the monasteries to teach “patriotic education” classes to their monks.[5] In an even more blatant attempt at controlling Tibetan Buddhism, the Chinese recently handpicked the new Panchen Lama and arrested the boy who the Tibetan monks had determined to be the true Panchen Lama.[6] In Xinjiang, the Chinese government has targeted Islam, widely practiced by the Uyghurs, as a source of separatist sentiments. Using this as justification, the Chinese government has required imams to take patriotic strengthening classes similar to those imposed on Tibetan monks, and it has forbidden any expression of religion in Uyghur schools. The Chinese government has even gone so far as to dictate what version of the Koran may be used and where religious practices may be held.[7]

As they suppress religion and other aspects of indigenous culture, the Chinese government has encouraged Han Chinese migration to Tibet and Xinjiang in an effort to literally remake these areas into Chinese regions with Chinese culture. Spurred on by economic incentives offered by the Chinese government, growing Han immigration to these areas has significantly diluted the regional population: in 2005, for example, Han Chinese made up 41% of Xinjiang while Uyghurs made up 47% (by comparison, in 1949 a little under 5% of Xinjiang was Han Chinese while over 90% was Uyghur).[8] With this influx of Chinese comes an influx of Chinese culture, which is further eroding the traditional Tibetan and Uyghur cultures. Although, as the Chinese are quick to point out, such migration has also instigated economic activity in these regions, the Han have been the main beneficiaries of such commerce, which has only added to the resentment felt by the Tibetans and Uyghurs towards their Chinese overlords. As Han Chinese, Han prosperity, and Han culture continue to infiltrate Tibet and Xinjiang, the Han Chinese government has been able to argue on more and more grounds that these territories should indeed belong to China. Should these trends continue, and should aspects of Tibetan and Uyghur culture, such as religion, continue to weaken, these regions may indeed lose their ethnic and cultural identities, like Inner Mongolia largely did under the late Qing Dynasty, and then China’s arguments would indeed prove true.

As has happened in countless other multinational empires in history, though, China’s direct, authoritative rule over Tibet and Xinjiang has indeed caused more determined resistance in such areas. Although it has brought some economic activity and immediate order, China’s autocratic rule has ultimately strengthened the very separatist sentiments it has worked so painstakingly to suppress. Centuries of distinctness from Chinese sovereignty and culture laid a strong foundation for such sentiments to begin with in Tibet and Xinjiang, which the strong imposition of Chinese rule has only reinforced. In addition, the successful independence of Mongolia and the later independence of the other Central Asian states after the collapse of the Soviet Union have given even more momentum to calls for Tibetan and Uyghur independence.

More fundamentally, though, the controlling, intrusive style of Chinese rule has made many Tibetans and Uyghurs equate independence with preserving their ethnic identity and way of life. With Chinese actions encroaching into religion, education, and other aspects of daily life, clearly the current Chinese policies must be changed in order to preserve Tibetan and Uyghur culture. With no peaceful means of changing such policies and with no sign that the current Chinese government will relent, let alone grant true autonomy, independence increasingly seems the only practical solution for the Tibetans and Uyghurs.

This reality will inexorably continue to breed unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang, which will continue to destabilize these regions and hamper their ability to prosper, weakening China domestically. Furthermore, such upheaval will doubtlessly continue to sap the money and will of the Chinese government even as more pressing problems loom on the horizon.

Internationally, the Tibetans and the Uyghurs have and will continue to garner sympathy: in the wake of the recent Tibetan crackdown, for example, pro-Tibetan rallies sprung up throughout towns in India[9] and Nepal,[10] bringing the crushing weight of the Tibetan crisis on the villages they march in. In addition, China faces a stream of international scrutiny for their repressive crackdowns against the Tibetans and Uyghurs, not the least from pro-Tibetan and human rights groups that have harassed the Olympic torch on its journey to Beijing. Truly, China’s authoritative, controlling rule over the non-Chinese regions of Tibet and Xinjiang has been and will continue to be a great obstacle to China’s development, both internally and externally.

[1] http://www.cwru.edu/affil/tibet/documents/DragonandSnowLion.pdf
[2] http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/china0405/index.htm
[3] http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/archives/1999/10/14/0000006433
[4] http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/china0405/index.htm
[5] http://savetibet.org/tibet/index.php
[6] http://www.savetibet.org/campaigns/pl/index.php
[7] http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/china0405/index.htm
[8] http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/china401/facts.html
[9] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/18/world/asia/18exiles.html
[10]http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/asiapacific/features/article_1397349.php/In_photos_Nepal_Tibetan_Protests

A Lengthy Analysis of China: The Status of Taiwan Part 1

2008-08-01T18:40:00.006-04:00

Post 4 of an 11 part essay on how the recent unrest in Tibet is a barometer of the various internal issues and the international pressure that China is struggling to deal with.

In addition to Tibet and Xinjiang, another, somewhat more complicated territorial dispute involving sovereignty over Taiwan has been a tremendous burden for China, particularly internationally, where it has been one of the most sensitive global foreign policy issues of the last 60 years.

Like Tibet and Xinjiang and, for that matter, Outer Mongolia, Taiwan is a domain of the former Qing Empire that modern China sought to reestablish control over. Unlike with the others, though, Communist China sought Taiwan less out of a desire to reassert Chinese control over its former empire and more out of a desire to cement its own control in the Chinese heartlands: the last of its Guomindang (Nationalist) adversaries in the Chinese Civil War, led by Chiang Kai-Shek, fled to Taiwan with the remnants of the Republic of China (ROC) (the government that officially succeeded the Qing in 1912 and that had been dominated by the Guomindang since the 1930s) after losing control of mainland China. Thus, the new People’s Republic of China (PRC) (the government that the Communists established after the flight of the ROC) desired to conquer Taiwan and the ROC, which, despite its desperate situation, still claimed all of China as under their rule, in order to put a final end to the Chinese Civil War and eliminate all doubt as to who was the true master of China.

The international politics of the time, though, would prevent the PRC from bringing closure to the Chinese Civil War. Consistent with its newly established containment policy, the United States supported the Guomindang even before Chiang’s flight in order to deter the further spread of Communism. After Chiang’s retreat across the Taiwan straits, the United States continued to back Chiang and the ROC, refusing to recognize the PRC and providing military and economic aid to Taiwan so as to strengthen it in the event of a Communist invasion.

For the first few decades after Chiang’s retreat, such an invasion seemed imminent. Emboldened by the U.S. support, Chiang fortified Taiwan and other surrounding islands under ROC control, while the PRC, not yet relenting just because of the opposition of the United States, responded by bombarding Chiang’s fortifications, particularly those near mainland China’s coast. Several thousands of soldiers on each side died in these skirmishes, and indeed the Chinese Civil War seemed to have resumed.

Fearing what seemed like an inevitable Communist invasion of Taiwan, the United States took its commitment to the ROC to the next step, signing a mutual defense treaty with the ROC in which the United States pledged to come to Taiwan’s aid militarily in the event of a Communist invasion and threatening the PRC with a nuclear strike if it continued to shell ROC islands.

With the possibility of all-out, nuclear war with the United States looming, the PRC finally backed down, and by the 1960s it had ceased shelling ROC islands (aside from the propaganda leaflets that both sides continued to launch at each other throughout the 1960s and 1970s). For its part, the ROC, realizing that the United States would only commit troops to a defense of Taiwan and recognizing the growing military might of the PRC, would also eventually back down and abandon any serious plans to reconquer the Chinese mainland.

Although this reluctant, somewhat forced stalemate would end direct military confrontation between the two sides (as of now), it would not precipitate a resolution to the conflict. Rather, the dispute over Taiwan would evolve into its own little cold war within the Cold War. The PRC, while not invading Taiwan, still claimed the island, and the ROC would not formally renounce its claim over the entire Qing Empire. Both sides continued to build up their military, with the ROC even trying to build nuclear weapons to match those of the PRC.

Diplomatically, the PRC strived to gain more international recognition as the legitimate government of China, trying to discredit the ROC claim of China with the fact that, with the stalemate, Communist rule over China was a fait accomplit. All the while, the ROC tried to hold on to its international recognition by appealing to fears of Communism in the West.

In fact, the dispute over Taiwan would become so deeply woven into the fabric of international and regional relations that it gained a life of its own, outlasting both the Chinese Civil War and the Cold War, making every effort on the part of both sides to progress and move on trickier and harder.

The ROC, for instance, began to stop focusing on retaking the mainland in the wake of the stalemate, particularly after the death of Chiang, for whom the recapture of the mainland that he had once been the preeminent ruler of became something of a personal quest. The next generation of the ROC acknowledged that Taiwan would be the only permanent domain of the ROC, and so they began to focus on developing the island. These efforts helped Taiwan develop a dynamic, market economy as well as a more democratic political system: a much different path from mainland China, whose economic restraints have only recently been loosened and whose political system remains decisively authoritarian. It would not be unreasonable, then, to suggest, as many people have, that the ROC is in fact the ruler of an independent Taiwan that is separate from the mainland.

To say such things, though, is highly controversial, and to act on such words would likely provoke the PRC into invading Taiwan. Although Taiwan has been de facto independent for nearly 60 years, its official status is still consistent with the One-China policy, which states that there is one China, of which both the mainland and Taiwan are a part. This policy is essentially the preservation of the outdated status quo of the Chinese Civil War, since, under the wording, both the PRC and the ROC could claim to be the rulers of this “one China.”

A Lengthy Analysis of China: The Status of Taiwan Part 2

2008-08-01T18:31:00.002-04:00

Post 5 of an 11 part essay on how the recent unrest in Tibet is a barometer of the various internal issues and the international pressure that China is struggling to deal with.

The One-China policy became a mainstay of international diplomacy as recognition of the PRC increased. Even for those nations who did not have a strong position on the Taiwan dispute and simply thought it illogical to ignore a government that effectively ruled over more than 1 billion people, the PRC made acceptance of the One-China policy by other countries a condition for opening relations with the said countries, which in effect means renouncing ties with the ROC, since in recognizing the PRC a country affirms that the PRC, and not the ROC, is the legitimate government of the “one China” that includes Taiwan and the other islands ruled by the ROC.

As a result of being trapped by this rhetoric, Taiwan has no representation in the United Nations (it used to hold the China seat, but in 1971 the ROC representatives were expelled in favor of those of the PRC) and is no longer recognized by the majority of the world. This nominally illegitimate status makes dealing with Taiwan fairly difficult, as it cannot be party to any international treaties nor can it be directly negotiated with without alienating the PRC.

Even as it denies the legitimacy of the ROC, though, the PRC has established some informal ties with Taiwan, particularly on economic and travel matters. In addition, other surrounding countries, such as Japan, have unofficial relations with Taiwan due to the stake they have in Taiwan’s economy.[1] Indeed, although the United States officially renounced the ROC in 1979 in favor of the PRC and nullified the defense treaty, it still maintained close informal relations with Taiwan and continued to furnish it with high-tech weaponry and military funding in order to discourage the PRC from a potential invasion.

In a way, the PRC probably would not mind if the complexities of Taiwan’s status could just be swept away, allowing for Taiwan to officially become an independent state. The PRC’s informal contacts with the island demonstrate the PRC’s acknowledgement of the benefits of cooperation between the two, and indeed an independent Taiwan would still pale in comparison to the rising China and would probably loosen Chinese tensions with the United States.

The PRC, though, is compelled to continue to claim Taiwan and ensure that Taiwan does not declare independence in order to maintain the image of its strong authority, both domestically and internationally. The PRC has struggled throughout its reign to maintain its authoritarian hold over the Chinese people in general and in particular over the non-Chinese, dissatisfied regions of Tibet and Xinjiang. Any step viewed as letting Taiwan act more like an independent state will be duly noted by the Chinese as well as the Tibetans and the Uyghurs who will in turn likely push for similar treatment. In addition, the PRC fears, reasonably so, that its international clout would be weakened if it gave in to calls for Taiwanese independence.

As ridiculous as the Taiwan situation may seem and as outdated as it may be, it continues to have real implications for China and the rest of the world. The PRC has sought to influence Taiwanese politics, helping politicians that advocate adhering to the One-China policy.[2] Those that advocate otherwise are met with a weakening of informal ties and, in some cases, renewed invasion threats. In fact, in 2005, the PRC passed a law officially legalizing its right to invade Taiwan if it declared independence. Even before this law, fears of an invasion compelled Europe and the United States to ban the exportation of high-tech equipment and weaponry to China.

In another recent incident from 1995-1996, the PRC fired missiles close to Taiwan and practiced military operations for an assault on Taiwan after the United States granted a visa to the Taiwanese president at the time, Lee Teng-hui. In response, the United States deployed several aircraft carriers groups in the Taiwan Straits, a clear demonstration that U.S. military support for Taiwan in the event of a PRC invasion has not been ruled out. One can only hope that a devastating, nuclear war between the United States and China over Taiwan will not become the most far-reaching consequence of the dispute over Taiwan.

Truly, the controversial situation regarding Taiwan has become nothing but a nuisance and a hindrance for China, Taiwan, and the rest of the world. Unlike China’s other territorial disputes and, for that matter, its other lingering issues, this dispute, due to the potential implications it has for Tibet, Xinjiang, and, more critically, war with the United States, may never really be fully solved but rather continue to evolve and be a thorn in the side for China as it tries to develop into a superpower.

[1] http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35855.htm
[2] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/21/world/asia/21taiwan.html

A Lengthy Analysis of China: The Condescending Han Attitude Towards Other Ethnic Groups and its Effects

2008-08-01T18:27:00.009-04:00

Post 6 of an 11 part essay on how the recent unrest in Tibet is a barometer of the various internal issues and the international pressure that China is struggling to deal with.

On a certain level, the direct and far-reaching Chinese control over Tibet and Xinjiang has been driven not only by a desire to effectively rule such areas, but also by an underlying attitude of Han superiority over other ethnic groups – some would even call it racism – that, in its various forms, has stirred up ethnic tensions in Tibet and Xinjiang that have contributed to the tumult in such areas.

This condescending Chinese attitude is the culmination of centuries of historical dominance of Chinese civilization in East Asia. Being the first to become civilized in their part of Asia and developing in relative isolation from the other ancient forefather civilizations in India and the Middle East, the Chinese came to view themselves as the center of civilization – the Middle Kingdom – surrounded by a sea of uncivilized barbarians, which naturally made neighboring peoples inferior in Chinese eyes and also instilled the Chinese with the arrogant perception that they were the best in the world. Even now that classical Chinese civilization is no more and China itself is no longer the unquestioned superpower in East Asia, let alone the rest of the world, the Chinese still cling to their ancient pride and consequently look with contempt on neighboring peoples.

Given their stark cultural distinctness from China and the sensitivity of their political situation, the Tibetans and Uyghurs have become particular victims of this sinocentric attitude, and as more and more Han Chinese move into Tibet and Xinjiang, discrimination has become all the more commonplace, particularly in the economic environment. Since Han Chinese now own and operate most of the businesses in Tibet and Xinjiang, hiring and employment for high paying, management jobs have generally favored the Han at the expense of the Tibetans and Uyghurs, who have often had to settle for low income, labor-intensive jobs instead. This socioeconomic gap has consequently made it more difficult for Tibetans and Uyghurs to get access to high quality education, health care, and other services that are usually fairly expensive and are located in the cities as opposed to the countryside, where many Tibetans and Uyghurs live.[1][2] This gap has also made the Tibetans and Uyghurs as a whole seem poor and unskilled in Chinese eyes, only giving the Chinese another excuse to look down on them.

While such discrimination clearly happens in everyday interactions, the problem has most certainly been exacerbated by the actions of the Chinese government. Although it officially insists that ethnic discrimination exists “everywhere in the world except China,”[3] the Chinese government’s policies have in fact strengthened the very much existent ethnic tensions between the Han Chinese and the minority Tibetans and Uyghurs. Indeed, the element of Han supremacy seems to have greatly influenced the Han Chinese government’s policies towards Tibet and Xinjiang. The erosion of Tibetan and Uyghur culture, particularly religion, the widespread propaganda in the media and the schools, and the flood of Han Chinese people and customs[4] have done more than just enforce control, but have also worked to drown out Tibetan and Uyghur culture and supplant it with Chinese culture. This suggests that the Chinese government has a greater motive behind its policies than simply to control Tibet and Xinjiang, but to also impose on them what it views as the inherently superior Chinese way of life.

Some of its actions seem to show utter indifference to Tibetan or Uyghur well-being, such as the decision to conduct nuclear tests in Lop Nor in Xinjiang as opposed to a predominantly Han area, which seems eerily similar to the Soviet decision to conduct nuclear tests in the non-Russian region of Kazakhstan. Others, though, particularly those designed to assimilate the Tibetans and Uyghurs into Chinese culture, seem to reflect the idea that in a way, the Chinese government is helping these previously inferior areas by introducing them to Chinese culture. As Hu Jintao himself arrogantly remarked in 2001, “The peaceful liberation of Tibet... ushered in a new era in which Tibet would turn from darkness to light, from backwardness to progress, from poverty to affluence and from seclusion to openness.”[5] Indeed, there may be some truth behind this statement: for years, the now beloved lamas in Tibet wielded significant power in conjunction with local landholders over a mostly enserfed population.[6] But at least these leaders did not try to “liberate” the Tibetans from their cultural identity.

The various Tibetan and Uyghur uprisings, including the latest Tibetan riots, are surely in part a testament to the daily, de facto discrimination the Tibetans and Uyghurs face and the arrogant, sinocentric undercurrent that the Chinese governs them with. The Chinese government, though, clearly either does not understand this or does not care, as none of these uprisings have led them to root out feelings of Han superiority among everyday Chinese or among the Chinese government itself. In fact, during the latest Tibetan unrest, the Chinese government used the ethnic tensions to garner public support for the crackdown, using their control of China’s media outlets to constantly replay images and stories of Tibetan mobs killing, looting, and pillaging, and conveniently leaving out any mention of the harsh Chinese crackdown to follow.[7] What is truly discouraging, though, both for Tibet and for China, is that the propaganda seems to be working: many Chinese have cheered the crackdown and have posted anti-Tibetan remarks on Chinese internet forums.[8]

In choosing to promote such discrimination, China has only given the Tibetans and Uyghurs more of a reason to seek independence, since clearly under the current policies they will be looked down upon and disadvantaged and under the current political system they have no peaceful means of changing such policies. Putting down future uprisings will continue to be a challenging, costly enterprise for China and one which the rest of the world will likely frown upon as China resorts to more and more forceful methods to suppress them. In addition, such discrimination will divide the country and create social and economic turmoil that will hinder China’s ability to prosper. Truly, China’s prolonging of the discriminatory status quo will negatively affect its development, both internally and externally, towards becoming an accepted world power.

[1] http://chinaaid.org/2008/02/06/chinese-curbs-leave-uyghur-youth-in-crisis/
[2] http://www.savetibet.org/news/publications/jampa.php
[3] http://www.savetibet.org/news/publications/jampa.php
[4] See Tibet and Xinjiang under Communist Rule
[5] http://www.chinaembassycanada.org/eng/xwdt/t37288.htm
[6] www.michaelparenti.org/Tibet.html
[7]http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/20/world/asia/20tibet.html?_r=1&pagewanted=1&sq=China%20Tibet%20discrimination&st=nyt&scp=2&oref=slogin
[8] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/31/world/asia/31china.html

A Lengthy Analysis of China: China's Unrestricted Economic Growth and its Effects

2008-08-01T18:25:00.003-04:00

Post 7 of an 11 part essay on how the recent unrest in Tibet is a barometer of the various internal issues and the international pressure that China is struggling to deal with.

In addition to Tibet’s lack of autonomy and ethnic discrimination, the dissatisfaction of the Tibetans is also a result of the uneven economic growth that has been one of several unaccounted-for problems in China’s overall booming economy.

Even while mired in Mao Zedong’s backward Great Leap Forward – an agricultural and manufacturing collectivization plan – it should have been apparent that China and its more than 1 billion people were ripe to have a huge economic impact soon, comparable to the fundamental role it played in global trade throughout much of its pre-modern history. Doubtless, China has come a long way from Mao’s disastrous policies, and since pragmatists like Deng Xiaoping came to power, China has slowly, but surely, started to modernize and to loosen restraints on individual economic freedom, allowing the billions of Chinese to increase their entrepreneurial output and enter the modern economic fray.

Such economic activity has propelled the Chinese economy past even those of some of the long-standing industrial powerhouses, and, even as China’s full economic potential is yet to be realized, the world is already feeling the resounding effects of China’s resurgent economy. As more and more of the over 1 billion Chinese have started to enter modern economic life, they have consumed more and more needs like oil, natural gas, and electricity, which has further driven up the price and exhausted the supplies of such resources. These consumers have also become a new market for a variety of goods and services that foreign companies have been able to profit off of. Conversely, though, Chinese companies have become increasingly competitive with foreign companies in other countries with their ability to make mass amounts of cheap goods. With such investment abroad comes greater influence over client nations, particularly in many African countries, like Nigeria, that are becoming increasingly dominated by Chinese oil companies. The wealth generated by the increasingly dynamic economy has helped to swell the government’s coffers, enabling them to exercise new measures of power, such as loaning more and more money to the U.S. government.

As the recent Tibetan unrest has shown, though, not all of China has benefited from the economic boom. The rapid growth has largely been concentrated in China’s eastern seaboard in cities like Beijing and Shanghai. Much of inland China, like Tibet and Xinjiang, remains rural and poor. Bent on overall growth, the government has given inadequate attention to the growing differences in wealth between regions.

Moreover, the minimal attention it has given has mainly benefited the Han at the expense of minorities such as the Tibetans and Uyghurs: the mostly Han business owners typically hire more Han for the high paying, management jobs than minorities, perhaps for ethnic reasons, which forces most of the minorities to take up low income, laborious jobs instead. The difficulties faced by the Tibetans and Uyghurs due to this socioeconomic gap, particularly the trouble they have affording proper services, have only added to their resentment of the Chinese and their overall dissatisfaction.[1]

Although minorities have been hit the worst, even many Han have been victimized by the growing gap between the rich and the poor: more so than in other large economies, a great number of China’s employees work for modest pay at best doing labor intensive jobs while the business executives receive the bulk of the profits from the factories they run or the low-cost products they churn out (made possible by the cheap labor force).[2]

More ominous than the negligence of the economic imbalances has been the government’s negligence of the environment, which has not only damaged China’s environment, but has also contributed significantly to global warming. Unfiltered waste pours into China’s water bodies and is not always compensated by better filtration of potential drinking water. Carbon dioxide and other more harmful substances are emitted undeterred by Chinese factories, making the air intensely polluted and, in some cities, barely breathable.[3] Indeed, many are worried about the effect such air will have on the Olympic athletes that are set to compete in less than a week,[4] and some even blame the greenhouse gases for the increasing aridness of inland China.[5] Even as many criticize the United States for its lack of concern for global warming, the reality is that China’s deplorable environmental conditions more than offset any gains that United States initiative could bring about.

Like environmental standards, safety and quality product standards have been scarcely regulated, shunted aside by the desire for pure economic growth. Such poor quality is evident in recent scandals involving lead paint and chemical toxins present in children’s toys that were made in China.[6] The appalling quality of Chinese goods hurts its export economy, as countries like the United States have become increasingly cautious about purchasing such low-quality goods, despite their low price.

Ironically enough, the economic growth for which the Chinese have neglected to regulate and balance their economy is also proving more difficult to handle than perhaps previously thought: the steep increases in economic activity coupled with the economic slowdown in the United States and rising oil prices have caused sizeable inflation[7] in China that has begun to cause some concern.

Truly, even as China’s economic surge continues to have far-reaching effects, its deficiencies hamper China’s stability and development, as well as the entire environment.

[1] See Ethnic Discrimination
[2] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/21/AR2005092100727.html
[3] http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/world/asia/26china.html
[4] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/29/sports/olympics/29china.html?hp
[5] http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/world/asia/26china.html
[6] http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prhtml08/08164.html
[7] http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-07/23/content_6869002.htm

A Lengthy Analysis of China: The Communists' Response to China's Internal Problems

2008-08-01T18:16:00.007-04:00

Post 8 of an 11 part essay on how the recent unrest in Tibet is a barometer of the various internal issues and the international pressure that China is struggling to deal with.

China’s lingering internal issues would present significant challenges for even the most honest and able governments. The current Communist regime, though, as with other unpopular, unrepresentative governments, has put a priority on maintaining power in the short run, which has affected their handling of the various issues plaguing China and, in fact, has become another such hindrance to China’s development in the long run. Rather than confronting China’s problems objectively, the government has dealt with them in such a way to try to tighten its hold on power. Its response to the recent earthquake is a perfect example of this, with propaganda newsreels constantly replaying images of Chinese soldiers coming to the rescue[1] and of Premier Wen Jiabao consoling victims.[2]

The government’s handling of the Tibetan unrest and its causes is also consistent with this trend. Rather than to grant Tibet the kind of autonomy logically implied by its status as an autonomous region, the government has tightened its grip over the area to assert its own blunt authority over Tibet as well as China. Rather than to try to ease the ethnic tensions at the source of the Tibetans’ discontent, the government actively heightened such tensions to try to gain popular backing for its crackdown. Rather than to try to balance the growth that has brought poverty and stagnation to much of China, including Tibet, the government has not done enough to control the surging economic growth, afraid of stemming such growth altogether and alienating local officials and wealthy businessmen. Perhaps a more popular or representative government would be compelled to more objectively confront China’s internal problems for the good of the people, and for the good of China.

To be fair, though, the Chinese government has recognized the need to at least partially address the well-being of the nation itself, evident in its steady loosening of economic restraints. Such reforms, though, would not have been enacted if the government had not thought they would benefit in some way. Indeed, the increased economic activity generated as result of such actions has substantially increased the government’s tax revenue, and the growing international clout of China due to its economic rise has in turn translated into the Chinese government’s growing influence over the rest of the world. Such moves were also carried out with the hope of appeasing the public with greater economic freedom and prosperity while at the same time stopping short of allowing enough civil liberties, criticism, or opposition to threaten the government’s power.

In the wake of economic growth and modernization, though, the Communists are finding it harder and harder to maintain their grip on power. The economic reforms, although satisfying some people, have made others, such as minorities, more dissatisfied. As more and more people experience economic freedom, they in turn wonder about political freedom as well. As more and more international companies do business with China, the Western political ideals they bring further whet the appetite of democracy in many Chinese. In the face of such renewed pressure, the government, like it has in similar situations in the past, particularly the infamous Tiananmen Square incident, has clamped down ever harder on real and perceived threats to its rule. As the latest response to the Tibetan unrest shows, the government is resorting to more and more heavy-handed means of enforcing its power, from military deployment and propaganda to its inhumane tactics and the jailing of human rights activists that condemn them.[3] Indeed, it is likely that the Communists have put renewed emphasis on reigning in Tibet and Xinjiang in order to demonstrate the might of their authority to the rest of China.

Even as the central government’s grip on the people loosens, though, so does its grip over its own officials. The once centralized party apparatus has steadily become more and more decentralized since the death of Mao Zedong to the point where now the power and discretion exercised by local officials has grown significant, making it that much harder for the government to agree on and address domestic issues uniformly.

As the embattled Communist government struggles to stay afloat, it is becoming more and more of an obstacle to China’s development into a world power. Subjecting the handling of China’s problems to the desire to maintain power will doubtless leave them inadequately solved or worsened, allowing them to continue to distort and hinder China’s development. Subjecting the Chinese people to such authoritarian and self-serving measures will doubtless continue to cause more internal turmoil and popular dissatisfaction. Outside China’s borders, the government’s actions have and will continue to be the subject of international scrutiny and subsequent consequences. China’s poor human rights record has long been condemned by the rest of the world, particularly the West, damaging Chinese credibility. Restrictions on civil liberties, particularly freedom of expression, have made it harder for foreign companies to do business in China, since they are reluctant about having their businesses restricted or even used by the government as it tries to maintain its hold over the restless population.[4] Truly, the autocratic rule of the Chinese government is a hindrance for China, both internally and externally.

[1] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/2016887/China-earthquake-Beijing-seizes-on-rescue-for-Olympic-propaganda.html
[2] http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displayStory.cfm?source=hptextfeature&story_id=11541327
[3] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/04/world/asia/04china.html
[4] http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jan2006/nf20060113_6735_db053.htm

A Lengthy Analysis of China: Past and Present International Attitudes towards China

2008-08-01T18:14:00.004-04:00

Post 9 of an 11 part essay on how the recent unrest in Tibet is a barometer of the various internal issues and the international pressure that China is struggling to deal with.

With its economy continuing to experience rapid growth, China’s international presence and influence has become harder and harder to ignore, which has caused an increase in international action and attention directed towards the developing superpower. China’s burgeoning economy is creating huge influxes in the world markets – with cheap Chinese goods outselling those of previous providers and a sharp increase in Chinese consumption of oil and other resources significantly affecting the worldwide demand and price of such resources – that the rest of the world is having to adjust to. In addition to China’s prosperity, though, the rest of the world has also felt the affects of China’s lack of economic oversight that has caused global environmental damage and has allowed low quality, and even dangerous products to be produced and shipped to unsuspecting nations.

In addition to and, in a way, by virtue of its economy, China’s territorial issues have also had affects beyond China’s borders that the international community has had to react to. The disputes over Tibet and Xinjiang have been an obstacle to further Chinese stability and development that have affected Chinese production and, by extension, world markets. In addition, the Tibetan and Uyghur struggles have garnered popular sympathy around the world, particularly in countries such as India and Nepal that have significant Tibetan or Uyghur populations, which has encouraged the leaders of such nations to address the disputes over Tibet and Xinjiang. The harsh methods utilized by the Chinese in such regions and their neglect of human rights have generated further popular outrage around the world, which has compelled various nations, such as the United States, to denounce such actions and take them into consideration when dealing with the Chinese. Against the backdrop of China’s booming economy and growing clout, the stakes of such considerations are considerably raised.

In addition, the controversial status of Taiwan continues to be a sensitive issue that China and the rest of the world have to tread lightly around, and indeed continued fears of a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan coupled with its ruthless suppression of unrest in the infamous Tiananmen Square incident have led the European Union and the United States to ban the exportation of arms and high-tech equipment to China, hoping that China will not be so willing to flaunt its large military so long as it has outdated weaponry.

All things considered, the international community clearly has had good reason to respond to and apply pressure on China.

China is no stranger to international attention: indeed, for most of human history, China has attracted the notice and fascination of much of the world. As early as Roman times, Chinese commodities, such as silk and ceramics, were in high demand across the known world. In the time of the Mongol Empire, Chinese goods were spread more thoroughly than ever across the globe, with its prized merchandise and inventions, such as the compass and gunpowder, attracting particular interest from Europe: indeed, finding a direct trade route to such products (one that did not involve the Ottoman Empire as the middleman) was one of Western Europe’s key motives for sending out naval expeditions that were the precursor to the Western colonial empires.

For the most part, though, China has been relatively indifferent or oblivious to the attention it received and the progress of the rest of the world. In their arrogance, the Chinese saw no point in reaching out to other civilizations while they were scrambling to come to China itself to trade. Furthermore, the Chinese felt that there was no need to pay attention to developments in the rest of the world, since no civilization could match that of China’s (or so they believed). Therefore, the main goal was to repel invaders from Central Asia that sought to destroy China’s remarkable civilization; events outside Central Asia were of minimal importance.

The events of the 19th century would finally make the Chinese realize the importance of paying attention to and responding to the events and actions of the rest of the world. China’s rout at the hands of Britain in the Opium War and several subsequent conflicts with the West demonstrated just how far behind the Europeans China had fallen as a result of not keeping up with international activities and progress. These defeats would lead to the European and Japanese domination of China until the mid 20th century. The Chinese would not forget the price they paid for their ignorance and isolation, finally resolving to deal with and respond to other nations more seriously than before.

A Lengthy Analysis of China: How China Should Deal with Foreign Pressure

2008-08-01T18:09:00.002-04:00

Post 10 of an 11 part essay on how the recent unrest in Tibet is a barometer of the various internal issues and the international pressure that China is struggling to deal with.

In determining its response to the current pressure, China will have to carefully weigh its interests and its pride as well as the consequences of compliance or defiance of international demands. Cooperating with the rest of the world would likely make other countries more comfortable about associating with Chinese businesses and policies, and it would surely make China itself more credible to other nations, perhaps leading them to more readily acknowledge China’s viability. China has clearly taken some steps in this direction, agreeing to some concessions with regards to Taiwan (not invading it, allowing it to govern itself) and wooing the international community so as to become the host country of the upcoming 2008 Summer Olympics, the event that China hopes will signal its return to world prominence.

The government has become obsessed with performing well in the games, going so far as to order the Houston Rockets of the NBA to sideline star Chinese center Yao Ming for the season after his injury so that he would be well in time to play for Team China at the Olympics.[1] The government has been equally obsessed with ensuring that the rest of the world takes part in the Olympics, trying to act carefully so as not to alienate other nations and prompt them to boycott the games in retaliation. This may partially explain why the Chinese police initially hesitated to quell the Tibetan riots.[2] In addition, the government has taken drastic measures to embellish Beijing and the overall Olympic environment for the upcoming athletes. Among other things, in Beijing the government has closed several factories and prevented several streets from being driven on in a desperate attempt to limit the appalling amount of pollution hovering over the capital,[3] and in one extreme case the government walled off several houses so as to beautify the square for the upcoming games.[4]

While some cooperation is undoubtedly good, complying too much with international demands could cause unwanted interference in China’s domestic issues (although they do have international effects) and could hurt the aims of China given that their stances on certain situations, such as those regarding Taiwan and Africa, differ markedly from international stances on them. Equally critical, agreeing too much to international wishes would recall the dreadful memories of European imperialist control and Japanese occupation that China never wants to remotely experience again. Although the past European and Japanese incursions humbled the Chinese into dealing with the rest of the world, they did not cause the Chinese to relinquish their proud attitude. True to such pride, China wants to deal with its issues its way.

Ever since China was finally reunified under Communist rule, China has leaned far more towards defiance than compliance with the rest of the world. It countered the Americans during the Korean War, occupied part of disputed Kashmir, checked the power of and even skirmished with the Soviet Union, threatened Taiwan, and fought a border war with Vietnam, among other things, clearly demonstrating its willingness to use aggressive foreign policy actions with only secondary regard to the views of other countries. Such a trend has continued to the present day, with China increasingly undercutting American diplomatic actions towards Darfur and Iran and also selling arms to regimes such as those in Zimbabwe and Sudan whose actions are denounced by most of the rest of the world, to name a few examples.

Moreover, China continues to largely ignore the rest of the world when acting on its core issues, as the response to the latest Tibetan unrest shows. Even with outside influence at its zenith with the Olympics nearing, ultimately China did not hesitate to brutally suppress the unrest, sending a clear message that its internal issues, like Tibet, are more important than international aims or acceptance.

It may not be altogether wise, though, for China to take such a unilateral, defiant stance towards the rest of the world. Even as China affects the outside world, so do other countries influence China as well. China’s technological and weaponry deprivation due to the U.S. and European embargoes is a clear example of the direct impact that the outside world can have on China’s development and power. In addition, as dynamic as China’s economy is, it does rely heavily on foreign markets for the sale of its low cost products and the importation of several necessary resources, like oil, and it would not be inconceivable if countries like the United States stopped importing Chinese goods or if resource-rich countries stopped exporting their raw materials. Although this would have a recoil effect on the acting countries, it nevertheless is a possibility the Chinese would do well to be aware of. As international pressure continues to mount, China must seek to balance independence and cooperation, interests and pride, and the eventual formula may very well end up defining China’s role as a world power.

[1] http://shakedownsports.com/2008/02/27/yao-mings-stress-fracture-conspiracy/
[2] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/24/world/asia/24tibet.html?_r=2&oref=slogin&oref=slogin
[3] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/01/sports/olympics/01china.html?hp
[4] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/29/sports/olympics/29beijing.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss

A Lengthy Analysis of China: Conclusion

2008-08-01T18:06:00.003-04:00

Post 11 of an 11 part essay on how the recent unrest in Tibet is a barometer of the various internal issues and the international pressure that China is struggling to deal with.

The next few years, maybe even decades, will be very critical times for determining China’s future. As China finally starts to realize its full economic and international potential, it will become more and more of a force to be reckoned with. Various issues still remain, though, from the bitter regional disputes, the strong discriminatory currents, and the lack of economic balance and regulation to the self-serving government and the increasing international pressure. In handling the latest upheaval in Tibet, China moved in a distinct direction with regards to each of these issues. Subsequent incidents of some sort, whether in Tibet or elsewhere, will likely occur throughout the next few years where the government will again have to make decisions regarding China’s lingering issues. China’s eventual position on these issues will ultimately shape China’s internal development and, through its growing influence, global affairs as well.

Amidst involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of its preoccupation on its “war on terror,” the United States would do well not to forget that state to state politics still dominate and shape the international environment far more than a few extremists groups ever could. And with the 20th century fading into the past, China is showing the potential to have a far greater power and impact on the United States than any other state. The United States, then, would do well to place a priority on relations with China as well as to monitor the events within China, for China’s reaction to such events, more so than anything else, will determine just what kind of a reality China will bring to the 21st century.

Why Russia Will Remain Russia

2008-03-18T22:34:00.021-04:00

As Russia reemerges from the shadow of the iron curtain, many in America are disappointed by what they see as a lack of success in the former Soviet Republic. Although Communism has been eradicated, democracy and capitalism have still yet to find fertile ground in Russia’s harsh soil. In addition, despite the ultimate triumph of the United States over the USSR, Russia continues to profoundly shape international issues across the globe, often to the detriment of U.S. interests.

While the state of Russia may be frustrating, it should not be surprising. The traits Russia is exhibiting are continuations of not just the Soviet era, but also, in essence, of the entire history of Russia. Whether under the tsars, the Bolsheviks, or United Russia (Vladimir Putin’s political party), and whether operating an agrarian, socialist or free market economy, certain distinct Russian characteristics have persisted and continue to define a unique Russia.

This singular entity has, for most of its history, been dominated by the single, overarching authority of the state and its leader. Mr. Putin and his purported puppet, Dmitry Medvedev, are simply the latest examples of a long tradition of autocratic, central rulers in Russia, from the tsars, like infamous Ivan the Terrible and cunning Catherine the Great, to the Communists, like merciless Stalin. Throughout Russian history, these heavy-handed rulers, not surprisingly, have met any opposition or threat to their rule with brutal retaliation. Ivan the Terrible is called so for a reason: he executed any boyars (nobles) that he suspected of disloyalty. Peter the Great harshly suppressed an army mutiny and even put his own son to death. Catherine the Great violently crushed the Pugachev Rebellion, personally executing Pugachev. Nicholas I brutally put down the Decembrists. Nicholas II ordered the army to open fire on protesters during the infamous Bloody Sunday massacre of the 1905 Revolution. Stalin utterly annihilated any real, suspected, or imaginary threats to his absolute power. Through forced starvations and gulag labor camps, among other things, Stalin was responsible for the deaths of 20-40 million people. The emergence of "democracy" in post-Soviet Russia has yet to bring about any relief for opponents of the government. While not to the same degree as the tsars, and certainly not Stalin, over the past eight years Putin and his United Russia have degraded and dealt with any opponents to their dominance of Russian politics. Putin and his party were especially intrusive in the months leading up to the elections: according to a recent New York Times article, Putin’s party cowed factory workers to vote for the party, manipulated the media to discredit the opposition, broke up opposition demonstrations, and even forcefully peopled Kremlin rallies. Under the veil of “democracy,” opposition, in one form or another, is still being forcibly subjugated in Russia.

The ability of Russian rulers to maintain their hold on power has been possible in no small part due to Russia’s longtime military orientation. Ever since being reborn in a long war against the Mongols and ever expanding in all directions, Russia has been in an almost perpetual state of war. As the military grew and advanced to fuel the constant wars and expansion, they increasingly became an important component of the tsars’ hold on power. The increasingly able forces of the tsar were readily dispatched to suffocate internal unrest. Between the desire for empire and order, it is no wonder that Russia’s leaders geared Russian productivity towards the military. Peter the Great uprooted entire villages so that the people could staff the mines and factories that manufactured arms and ammunition (ironically enough, this was the most prominent example of any manufacturing in Russia for over 150 years). The Bolshevik revolution did not reverse this trend at all; indeed, the new regime put even more emphasis on the military and in particular armed the USSR with a formidable nuclear arsenal. Even today, the Russian military remains formidable – only four other countries have more active troops than Russia. Although no longer expanding Russia's border, this military has seen its fair share of action, particularly in Chechnya.

Even more potent than the important military has been the secret police. The brainchild of none other than Ivan the Terrible, some sort of secret police unit, from Ivan’s Oprichnina to the infamous KGB to Putin’s shady FSB, has stealthily eliminated enemies of the government, leaving in its wake an atmosphere of intense fear and distrust.

Abroad, due to in no small part to its military-centric society, Russia has wielded a heavy hand in foreign policy. As Russia steadily grew to become the largest land empire in modern times, it encountered a great many civilized nations and regions and soon began to interfere in their affairs. As it expanded into Eastern Europe to the coast of the Baltic Sea, Russia soon became a key European player, as European alliances and diplomacy increasingly factored in the growing power and influence of Russia. Inevitably, due to its growing intrusions into European affairs, Russia became involved in many of the major European wars, like the Napoleonic Wars and both World Wars, and even saw wars specifically directed at it, like the Crimean War. As the army pushed south, Russia repeatedly clashed with the Ottoman Empire, gaining a sizeable amount of land from the teetering Turkish state and eventually provoking the British to intervene to prevent Russia from extending its vast domains to the shores of the Mediterranean. As Russia expanded to the Pacific Ocean, Russia came in increasing contact with the Qing Empire and soon started to seize land and exert great control over the declining Chinese state. Later, Russia came in conflict with the newly emergent Japan, and openly clashed with it in the Russo-Japanese War. Following the overthrow of the tsars, the Soviet Union was one of the most heavy-handed, powerful entities in history with a vigorous foreign policy aimed at furthering territorial expansion, spreading Communism, and deterring its superpower rival, the United States. Even after the decline of the Soviet Union, Russia has yet to relinquish its aggressive foreign policy. Still mistrustful of the United States, Russia continues to antagonize America through actions such as shipping nuclear fuel to Iran, taking a half-hearted stance against Sudan's actions in Darfur, allegedly providing Sadaam Hussein with military intelligence reports on U.S. troop movements before the Iraq invasion, and claiming large sections of the polar ice cap. In addition, Russia continues to exert great influence over its former territorial domains, meddling in the affairs of Georgia and Ukraine as well as clamping down hard on Chechnya.

In addition to great social and political control, the Russian government has also historically had a significant role in the economy. Indeed, the state and boyar dominance over the enserfed Russians gave them almost absolute control over the largely agrarian economy in the pre-industrial years: they could control output through how brutally hard they pushed the peasants to farm the land and how many forced laborers they staffed the mines with. Peter the Great in particular was very adamant about this, forcing entire towns to become forced labor in the mines fueling Russia’s military industries. When it became clear that Russia needed to industrialize to keep pace with Europe, the state spearheaded the effort, since the tightly bound social hierarchy left little room for a middle class to emerge that could instigate economic activity. In this respect, Communism brought little drastic change, as the state took control over the few economic aspects that it had not already encompassed earlier. Even now, after the overthrow of the Communists, the state remains intimately involved in the economy. The oil and natural gas boom that has fueled the surge of Russia’s economy is almost completely under the oversight of the state. The largest natural gas provider, Gazprom, is state owned: in fact, the new President, Medvedev, used to be the head of Gazprom. One of the largest oil providers, Rosneft, is state owned, and its private competitors have little autonomy: Lukoil, a major oil provider, is closely supervised by the Kremlin, and one of the former oil giants, Yukos, was only a few years ago completely dismantled by the government and its owner thrown in jail. Clearly, as Russia moves into the 21st century, the economy will continue to be made or broken under the direction of the state.

Under such state dominance, Russia’s economy has been anchored on exporting raw materials. In the tsarist days, Russia, like many of the Eastern European nations, mainly exported food and raw materials, like iron, to the West in exchange for Western manufactured goods. Now, Russia has become one of the world’s largest oil and natural gas providers, and the rising cost of such resources has skyrocketed Russian revenues, sending their economy on a tear with 7% GDP growth.

Whatever the state of the economy throughout Russian history, there has historically been a large gap between a small rich elite and the poorer majority. Tsarist times saw one of the most polarized societies ever, with the majority of the population enserfed – and virtually enslaved – to the small ruling elite. The emancipation of the serfs did not make peasant fortunes rise very much, as redemption payments to the boyars kept most peasants indebted and mired in poverty. During the majority of the 20th century, Communist policies did little to bridge the gap between the rich and the poor despite the fact that their supposed aim was to make everyone equal. Equality, it seemed, meant poverty, as most of Russia remained poor while the state reaped the few economic rewards. The emergence of “capitalism” has yet to disperse wealth evenly amongst Russians. Although Russian incomes are on the rise, the economy is dominated by the state and the mega-rich oligarchs loyal to the state, a loyalty that the state, as the Yukos affair shows, goes to great lengths to ensure.

The extent of state control over the economy, among other factors, has historically stifled competition and motivation. During Tsarist Russia, the serfs had little self-instilled motivation whatsoever to work hard amidst the brutal treatment they were subject to by their boyar masters. Under Communist direction, Russians still had little will to work hard: the state supposedly tried to keep everyone equal, and so there was little room for someone to gain an edge over his neighbors and few luxury goods to indulge in. In addition, since the state controlled all faucets of the economy, there was no room or desire for competition. The lack of output from this system eventually helped cause Communism in Russia to implode. It is truly interesting, then, that the current leadership has retained much of their control over the economy so as to continue to discourage motivation and competition. As a recent Economist article highlighted, blatant corruption and state intervention have not only spawned a host of state-controlled and state-loyal monopolies, but have also encouraged Russians to appeal to the state to get rid of competition rather than to work harder. As Andrei Sharonov, the former deputy economic minister, put it, “It is easier to get a competitor into a jail than to compete with him.”

Russia is by no means an old civilization. Many regions had had many different societies over the course of hundreds – even thousands – of years at the time of Russia’s humble beginnings. Still, a lot changed in the world during the 600 years of Russia’s existence, and some regions look profoundly different from their older selves. In the midst of change, Russia has, remarkably, retained its fundamental elements and has continued to be shaped by them.

Perhaps those in America and elsewhere should not be so surprised by what they see in Russia, considering that it has been happening there in some form for over half a millennium. Given that Russia’s central leaders have historically actively asserted their hold on power, the shady election of Mr. Medvedev earlier this month should hardly raise an eyebrow. Given Russia’s past position in world affairs, it should seem intuitive that Russia continues to assert itself in the world, often opposing the powerful United States, like in their recent opposition of the independence of Kosovo from their Slavic cousin, Serbia (Russian support of which also helped to trigger WWI). Given Russia’s past economic role and makeup, it should seem rather predictable that a small handful of elites control the vast amount of wealth achieved from, once again, exporting raw materials.

For whatever reason, Russia’s fundamental traits have endured and continue to fundamentally define Russia. And the events of the last two decades, if not the last 600 years, should reconfirm that Russia will remain Russia. That is the reality that the United States and the world must accept, and deal with, for years to come.

ICJ Case: The Malaysia-Singapore Dispute over Pedra Branca and its Maritime Implications

2008-02-23T17:12:00.004-05:00

The following is a description and analysis of one of two potentially groundbreaking cases concerning maritime delimitation and island sovereignty pending in the International Court of Justice in 2008. It was resolved in favor of Singapore on May 23, 2008 (updated 2/13/09).

For much of its existence, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the primary judicial wing of the United Nations, has had minimal practical significance. The scope of the ICJ is decidedly narrow, limited to ruling on international disputes jointly agreed upon by both parties involved and basing its rulings solely on international laws and treaties. Moreover, the decisions of the ICJ carry little weight and are usually not readily implemented. As is the case with many of the UN’s organs, the consequences for defying ICJ rulings are implemented – or more often times repealed – by the Security Council, reinforcing the impression of the UN being merely an arbitrary organization at the whim of the five permanent, veto-able members of the Security Council: England, France, Russia, the United States, and China.

At this moment, though, the ICJ has a rare opportunity to have a profound impact. Currently, the ICJ is hearing several landmark cases that could set drastic precedents concerning international law and maritime delimitation. The results could change borders, solidify or discredit international law, and increase or decrease levels of compliance with international law on the part of nations, from the smallest country to one of the P-5. The potential is so great, in fact, that it may be better to leave it untapped.

One of these cases concerns a small, uninhabited island at the mouth of the South China Sea known as Pedra Branca (or Pulau Batu Puteh in Malay). The only manmade structures on the people-less island are the British-built Horsburgh Lighthouse and several support buildings. The dispute over Pedra Branca officially began in 1979 when Singapore contested a newly drawn Malaysian map that recognized the island as part of Malaysia. After several rounds of negotiations, Singapore and Malaysia agreed to submit the matter to the ICJ and to abide by its ruling.

Malaysia claims that there should be no question of ownership because the island is outside the range of islands that were allotted to Singapore after it became a separate entity. In the Crawfurd Treaty of 1827, the Sultanate of Johor, a predecessor of modern-day Malaysia, ceded Singapore and all islands in a 10 mile radius around it to the British East India Company. Pedra Branca, however, lies over 25 miles away from Singapore, and so, Malaysia argues, the British, and subsequently Singapore, never had any legal ownership claims to the island. The fact that the British specifically asked Johor’s permission to build the lighthouse on the island, Malaysia claims, implies that the British recognized Johor sovereignty over the island. By virtue of succession, then, Malaysia asserts that the island, along with the other Johor domains, passed on to Malaysian ownership.

Singapore contends that by constructing and maintaining the lighthouse it and its former British rulers have exerted sovereignty over the island. Since neither Malaysia nor its predecessor, the Sultanate of Johor, ever contested these acts or exerted any sovereignty of their own over the island, Singapore claims that the island effectively belongs to it. In addition, although the British sought permission from Johor to construct the lighthouse, Singapore claims that the British rejected several other locations for the lighthouse specifically because the sites were part of Johor’s territory. The British, Singapore contends, eventually chose Pedra Branca specifically because it was uninhabited and unclaimed by Johor. Therefore, Singapore argues, Malysia has no valid claim to the island, and that, since it took over maintenance of the lighthouse after the British, it remains the only state exercising sovereignty over the island, and thus is the exclusive owner of the island.

Ironically enough, the question of the island’s sovereignty should probably not be a current issue. Malaysia’s constant failure to clear up its vague claims to the island (until now) ensured that the matter would be prolonged and eventually disputed in court. If, at the onset, Malaysia had asserted some sort of authority over Pedra Branca or had at least more openly recognized it as part of its alleged domain, it probably could have determined once and for all the legitimacy of the assumptions regarding Johor’s territory that it so vigorously flaunts today. The answer to that question would have settled the ownership question of the island once and for all (in fact, if that answer were attainable today, it could probably still settle this issue). It is also worth noting that if Malaysia had not expelled Singapore 35 years ago, there would be no need for border disputes between the two parties (as they would have been part of the same country).

With the matter finally being settled in court, neither nation has taken an overly compelling stance. Singapore’s argument is centered on the rather dubious claim that building and maintaining a lighthouse is a sovereign enough act to claim ownership of an entire island while Malaysia’s rests on its unconfirmed, disputable assumptions regarding the extent of Johor’s reign. Both parties invoke British intentions and assumptions in their arguments, neither of which can be definitively proven since the letters exchanged between the British and Johor specifically regarding Pedra Branca have never been recovered.

These British assumptions and opinions can be inferred, though, from the surviving relevant documents, whose interpretation may very well determine the outcome of the case. The interpretation of the intent of the Crawfurd Treaty could solidify or discredit Malaysia’s claim to de facto possession over the island. The treaty definitively states that Singapore and all islands within a 10 mile radius of it were to be granted to the British. However, the treaty does not directly state whether this is a limit on British expansion or simply a base amount from where the British could perhaps expand later. Malaysia has contended that the treaty put a cap on British expansion, but this is an odd interpretation to make when one considers that the treaty rewarded the British with land it had not previously owned. Besides, given the overall expansionist trend of the British Empire, it seems logical to contemplate that the British may very well had every intention of expanding farther into Southeast Asia.

Although the letters specifically pertaining to Pedra Branca have been lost, letters exchanged on the issue of the construction of the lighthouse (without specifying an exact location) have survived. After examining the surviving letters exchanged between the British and Johor, it seems apparent that the British never had any expansionist motives for building the lighthouse. The lighthouse seemed to have been built to further trade and make the seas safer, not to settle and claim ownership over an obscure, uninhabited island. Indeed, the Sultan and the Temenggong in several letters granted permission for the construction of the lighthouse on the basis that it would help foster trade and not British expansion. According to these letters, Singapore is trying to distort the original intent of the British maintenance of the lighthouse.

Even after examining all the available evidence (and also in light of what evidence is unavailable), there still seems to be no clear victor. However, there is also a much more profound factor that transcends the Malaysia-Singapore dispute that the ICJ should consider with utmost sincerity in its ruling: the potential precedents involving maritime delimitation and island sovereignty. After all the debate and the deliberations in the ICJ, in the final vote Singapore may very well emerge victorious. Ruling in favor of Singapore, though, particularly on the basis of its maintenance of the lighthouse, could set a groundbreaking precedent. To do so would in effect reward Singapore for building a structure on a neglected, yet legitimately disputed island. Pedra Branca is by no means the only neglected island that is the territory of a nation; many such islands dot the Pacific, Atlantic, and, for that matter, the entire globe. Other nations may be emboldened by this ruling to start building and maintaining structures on sparsely maintained islands around the world, heightening tensions between the various nations that have claimed islands and potentially wreaking havoc on the existing maritime boundaries and exclusive economic zones. Such aggressive action would not be a good thing for the ICJ – and by extension the UN – to support, given that the very nature of the UN is to try to facilitate peace and international cooperation. A precedent such as this would likely further discredit the UN and international law itself and might call into question other UN statutes. The ICJ has a chance to make a very big impact indeed with this case for better or, more likely, for worse, if it rules in favor of Singapore.

What about Iraq?

2008-02-04T20:55:00.003-05:00

Just a few months ago, and during the three preceding years, Iraq was the hot-button issue in America, cutting a swath between Americans of all ages and backgrounds. It seemed that each day Iraq updates made the top stories of nearly every major news corporation. Not since Vietnam did a war influence an election as much as Iraq did the 2006 elections. The war infiltrated the halls of Congress, causing much debate and setting off a showdown between the Democratic majority in Congress and the embattled President and his supporters. Politicians from every corner of the land did their best to avoid scrutiny from their positions on Iraq.

Then, the surge was instituted and soon started boasting a stark reduction of violence in Iraq and a growing sense of security in the minds of Iraqis. As a result, Iraq has rather suddenly disappeared from the limelight. Recent attacks and their body counts no longer litter the front pages of the news. As the 2008 elections loom, the economy has displaced Iraq as the most important issue for voters. Congress now predominantly buzzes with other topics, and people whose support of the war had just a few months earlier made them tread lightly are now trumpeting the success of the surge. The surge’s acclaim has particularly helped the revival of Senator John McCain’s Presidential chances.

Doubtlessly, conditions in Iraq have improved somewhat over the last few months, but don’t be fooled by the so-called “success” of the surge. The improvements that the surge has supposedly brought have been dramatically exaggerated.

Supporters of the surge claim that the influx of troops has sizably decreased the violence in Iraq. While it is true that combat deaths have gone down since the surge, conditions in Iraq remain anything but peaceful. Soldiers continue to die at a troubling rate: over 30 U.S. troops died this past month, back to the same level they were during the height of summer 2006. Despite the recent “stemming” of violence, Iraqi security forces and citizens are still dying in the hundreds and thousands every month. These are hardly the characteristics of a peaceful nation. Those Iraqis lucky enough to survive continue to suffer greatly in Iraq: many are still without basic utilities, services, good nutrition, or good sanitation.

Worse yet, the regional, ethnic, and religious divisions that are the source of the violence tearing apart Iraq have not been reconciled during this slight dip in bloodshed. The fervent inter-Muslim Sunni-Shiite rivalry persists and continues to be a source of division and instability in Iraq. Indeed, this religious rift has increasingly come to define the nature of the insurgent in-fighting in Iraq, with Sunni and Shiite factions battling each other, the Iraqi government, and the U.S. military to try to gain the upper hand. The differences between the Arabs and the Kurds constitute a slightly different animosity. The Kurds, who have lived in Northern Iraq for centuries more than the Arabs have in the South, have a different ethnicity and culture from their Arab counterparts. Rarely have ethnic differences been a unifying factor, and Iraq is no exception.

These tensions, formidable enough by their very nature, have been magnified even more by the historical winner-take-all nature of the Iraqi political system. From Saddam Hussein and his predecessors to the current Iraqi parliament, the Iraq government has favored the faction in power at the expense of the others. Hussein in particular benefited his Sunni kinsman even as he ruthlessly repressed and murdered many Shiites and the Kurds, even forcibly resettling Kurdish villages with Arabs. Unfortunately, this trend was not reversed after Hussein’s regime was toppled by the U.S. led coalition forces in 2003: the current Constitution does little to thwart majority rule or protect the rights of the minority. As a result, the Shiite majority in parliament has been able to favor the Shiites over their rivals. In fact, an interim Congressional report on Iraq in July 2007 admitted that there was sectarian Shiite bias in the appointment of military commanders and with regards to military and police intelligence. While not as skewed or as ruthless as Hussein, these measures have nevertheless been enough to convince the Iraqi factions that any government, whether democratic or authoritarian, that is not headed by them will make life hard for them. The accumulative effect of these high political stakes and the existing religious and ethnic tensions has caused the Iraqi factions to plunge the country into civil war as they fight for supremacy – for control of the country after the inevitable day that the U.S. military withdraws.

The best possible chance for the U.S. military to avert this impending civil war is to somehow change the nature of Iraqi politics. For U.S. forces, this recent dip in violence is as good a chance as they will ever get to initiate some sort of political reconciliation to lower the high political stakes. But no adequate political reconciliation has taken place during the surge. The closest thing to reconciliation has been a law allowing former Baath party members to apply for their former minor government posts. With Iraq in chaos, the potential practical significance of such a measure has been greatly reduced: getting a boost to the administration of Iraq would have been useful after the overthrow of Hussein’s regime, but at this point it is too little too late. No other Congressional benchmark has been met, nor any other form of political reconciliation been reached. If the Iraqi parliament manages to agree on some checks on government power and some minority rights, perhaps the Iraqi factions would be willing to give this government a chance. But, as of now, the different Iraqi groups have not been willing to risk compromising their interests by adequately supporting any of these measures. In doing so, they doom themselves to a constant struggle for total power where in the long run, nobody truly wins.

Even as the surge fruitlessly tries to unify the country and bring about stability, some of its methods do exactly the opposite. In an attempt to bring about greater security in the wide-open areas of Iraq, particularly Anbar province, the U.S. military armed and supported several local militias to fight Al Qaeda militants and keep order. While this strategy has reduced Al Qaeda activity and has brought about more peace in some regions, it has also had some unintended consequences. By arming and supporting local militias, the U.S. military has increased the power of such militias and warlords and has actively encouraged the formation of new militias. In doing so, the U.S. military has effectively undermined the Iraqi security forces that it has placed such an emphasis on training and bolstering. Moreover, by increasing the power of local militias and warlords, the U.S. military has deepened the regional divides in Iraq that may soon cause it to erupt in full-fledged civil war.

It is true that conditions in Iraq have improved, if ever so slightly, since the surge. Unfortunately for Iraq, none of the critical elements plaguing Iraq were dealt with during the slight window of opportunity afforded by the surge. As troop levels start dropping to pre-surge levels, the tensions that were to some degree held in suspended animation will be in full violent swing once again. What little improvement the surge has brought will be undone by these forces consuming Iraq. Such is the destiny of any benefits that U.S. military might could bring to Iraq. As long as the Iraqis are unable to reconcile their differences, the divisions will remain strong, leading to violence or dictatorship. As violence reemerges, Iraq will reemerge on the front pages of the news, and it will be a long time before Iraq is absent from them again.

Images From Rafah

2008-01-27T21:58:00.001-05:00

In a brilliant display of defiance, Hamas bombs toppled several sections of the Israeli-built barrier between Gaza and Egypt last week, and in doing so ended, if only momentarily, Israel’s six-month long isolation of Gaza. The images from this incident vividly depict the fallout of this latest Israeli policy debacle.

The bright explosions that pierced the darkness of last Wednesday night were the latest and most visible examples of Hamas’ growing power and boldness, despite Israel’s efforts to undermine it. From the outset, Hamas has gained much of its popularity by providing services to the Gazans. When Hamas overthrew the Palestinian Authority in Gaza last June, Israel thought that if it isolated Gaza as long as Hamas was in charge, the Gazans would be motivated to overthrow Hamas in favor of Fatah or another, more “moderate” faction. As economic conditions worsened, though, Gazans directed their hate towards Israel instead of Hamas. In fact, they actually turned to Hamas for more help, making Hamas that much more influential and popular. The sabotage of the border wall was Hamas’ most recent move to defy the latest Israeli measures against Gaza.

The sea of Gazans that flowed through the breach in the Gaza-Egypt barrier showed the growing desperation of the Gazans. The Gazan economy has taken a turn for the worst since Hamas’ coup last June. The Western-imposed economic isolation has stifled economic activity and has caused scarcity. The Israeli military strikes against Hamas militants have damaged the infrastructure, further stagnating economic activity. Already impoverished and desperate, the Israel’s recent move to cut off several basic utilities has made conditions for the Gazans even worse. With supplies running low and desperation mounting, the Gazans made the most of the one sliver of an opportunity afforded them last week, swarming out of their quasi-imprisonment to stock up for the hardships to come.

The vanguard of Egyptian troops that stood aside and let the mass of Gazans file past them was a visible snapshot into the complex motives of the Egyptian government. Egypt’s unsteady relationship with Israel has had its advantages, but it has brought Egypt under fire from much of its people and from radical groups and radical countries, such as Iran. Letting the Gazans pass carries its risks. It is hard to physically provide for the needs of tens of thousands of people and even harder to police them. Egypt in particular has a vested interest in preventing arms smuggling into Gaza, afraid that Hamas may incite the Egyptian-based Muslim Brotherhood to radical action or pressure on the government. The Gazans themselves still have some ill feelings towards the Egyptian government because of its harsh rule of Gaza from 1948-1967. And of course the Israelis certainly do not want the Gazans out. As the Egyptian public grew more and more dissatisfied with Israel, though, Egypt felt more comfortable listening to the demands of the public than those of Israel. Besides, physically forcing back a tide of tens of thousands of people would not be an easy task in itself, and hardly worth the trouble simply on the behalf of the fragile, unpopular Israeli alliance. So, after weighing all the parameters, Egypt took a step away from Israel and let the Gazans pass.

Not only has Israel’s policy not achieved its intended goals, but it has also not been adequately enforced, as last week’s sabotage showed. But, to be fair, Israel’s actions were not irrational. Few would contend that Israel has an easy security situation. All too often Israel has been confronted by an incessant barrage of attacks from radical groups seeking its total destruction or at least the reduction of its controversial domain. Israel, a nation that has frequently had to fight for its very existence, has historically retaliated fairly strongly against its adversaries. In the wake of the recent bombardment by Hamas, then, last week’s Israeli response that cut off electrical power and other key supplies from Gaza was not totally unreasonable.

It is pretty safe to say, though, that Israel’s heavy handed approaches have not significantly curtailed the violence directed against it. Last week’s collective punishment, the apex of a nearly six month long strategy of isolating Gaza, is the latest Israeli action that has served to compromise its security even as it seeks to enforce it.

The uncomfortable reality is that Israel has no easy road to long-term security. But clearly, its current road is leading it in the wrong direction. Last week’s explosion should be a vivid reality check to Israel that it is time to change course. Perhaps a less heavy-handed approach would work better and would not cause such dramatic retribution. If Israel were to reach out to the Gazans rather than isolate them, maybe they would not rely on Hamas so much. If Israel were to bolster Gaza's economy rather than deflate it, maybe the Gazans would have too much to lose to risk being radical. Perhaps then Israel and Gaza would move towards a lasting peace instead of towards a constant struggle.

Tribalism: Kenya's Ticking Timebomb

2008-01-21T09:54:00.004-05:00

A few months ago, few would have predicted that scenes of violence and chaos would unfold in Kenya. Although throughout much of Africa such violence and suffering has become commonplace, Kenya was always perceived in a different light from the rest of the continent. Kenya, whose economy and stability easily trump those of its neighbors, did not seem as susceptible to violence and chaos as the rest of Africa.

This prosperity and peace, though, masked a stark premonition of the violence to come. Although different on the surface from much of Africa, Kenya shared one essential trait with the rest of the continent: tribal animosities. These ethnic divisions, long suppressed by economic wealth and enforced order, were unbound in the aftermath of last December’s disputed elections. Now, the wave of violence initiated by Opposition Leader Ralia Odinga’s Luo tribe against President Mwai Kibaki’s Kikuyu tribe, the largest ethnic group, is putting Kenya on the verge of internal collapse.

While violence on this scale is unusual for Kenya, the effect of tribal divisions on politics is not. Indeed, the political parties of Kenya are predominantly tribal based, and governmental policies have often benefited the tribe in power at the expense of the others. The relative power of certain tribes over time has greatly impacted the economic and political gaps in Kenya. The elite status that the Kikuyu enjoy in business and politics is a result of their favoritism under the rule of the first President, Founding Father Jomo Kenyatta, and under current President Kibaki. The Kalenjin, seen as somewhat subordinate to the Kikuyu and the Luo, got a taste of power and wealth that they have yet to fully relinquish under the authoritative rule of Daniel Arap Moi. The Luo, although the second largest tribe, have never had one of their own as President. They have been at the wrong end of all the tribal enrichment policies, particularly Kikuyu ones, leaving a bitter taste in their mouth. Indeed, far from toning down ethnic differences, Kenya’s leaders during its time of peace have intensified tribal differences.

Only the strong authority of such leaders prevented an earlier ethnic implosion of Kenya. The fact that, since independence, Kenya has had only three leaders in nearly 45 years should be a testament to the powerful hold that Kenyan leaders have had over their country. Some leaders have been so formidable that the major tribes were forced to put aside their differences and ally against the encroaching government. As colonial rule floundered in the 1950s, the British tried to play off the Luo against their historical (and current) enemies, the Kikuyu. The Luo, though, judged the British presence to be so imposing that they allied with their adversary Kikuyu against the British, forcing the British to relinquish Kenya as its colony. After leading the ousting of the British and becoming the first ruler of modern Kenya, Kenyatta ruled assertively and effectively. With the aid of his popularity and savvy, Kenyatta was strong enough to maintain order. After Kenyatta’s death in 1978, Moi wielded a heavy hand of power for nearly 25 years, crushing all unrest and any opposition to his rule. Moi’s chokehold on the country once again spawned an alliance between the Luo and the Kikuyu. When Moi finally stepped down, the Kikuyu and Luo backed Kibaki, who defeated Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Jomo Kenyatta and Moi’s handpicked successor, in the 2002 election.

The power of Kibaki, though, did not amount to anything close to what his predecessors possessed. Kibaki used a hands-off approach, letting his ministers perform most functions of government (his old age may have left him with no other option). Kibaki’s passive rule resulted in inefficient, uncoordinated rule that allowed the long-brewing tribal animosities to emerge from the shadows. These revived tensions would greatly impact the December elections. The Luo, led by Odinga, played on the resentment towards the wealthy Kikuyu to build up a coalition strong enough to challenge Kibaki. The close election laden with allegations of fraud on Kibaki’s part became the spark that set off these mounting tribal tensions into full-fledged violence.

Kenya could not have been engulfed by violence at a worse time. The 2002 elections marked the end of a ruthless regime that heightened the tribal tensions even as it suppressed them. If these elections had led Kenya down the path of democracy, then, as long as the government was strong, effective, and fair, perhaps people would have started to participate based on economic and personal motives rather than tribal ones. If this happened, tribal differences would have steadily decreased in meaning over the years. Unfortunately, Kibaki’s style of government was neither strong nor effective nor fair. If he had accepted defeat, though, perhaps the democratic current would have endured. But by cheating his way to victory, Kibaki ruined the best chance for lasting democracy – and the steady eradication of tribal differences.

Aside from obvious political and security consequences, the reemergence of tribal fighting has had and will continue to hurt the economies of Kenya and the rest of the Horn of Africa. Although Kenya’s past stability was somewhat misleading, it nevertheless enabled Kenya’s economy to become one of the most dynamic in all of Africa. Now, the recent tribal violence has disrupted Kenya’s sources of wealth. Kenya’s reputation as a popular tourist destination is dwindling. Many Western tourists who booked safaris and other attractions for the summer are making new travel plans, dealing a blow to the hotels, wildlife parks, and other accommodating businesses that revolve around tourism. Trade has suffered as well. Kenya’s infrastructure has been vandalized by the raging tribal gangs, hurting the flow of goods and decreasing domestic and foreign confidence in the Kenyan market. Mombasa, the main port of Kenya, has been engulfed in violence even as fewer ships sail into its harbor. The impact of this disruption of trade is not confined to Kenya. Mombasa has long been a source of goods and wealth for the rest of the Horn of Africa, particularly landlocked countries such as Uganda. With Mombasa in disarray, the Kenyan infrastructure damaged, and overall economic activity declining, the Horn economies would do well to brace for a recession.

While the economic situation is foreboding indeed, the recent chaos in Kenya may end up having a far worse long term effect. No matter how important tribal identity is, peace and prosperity invariably have some effect on population, particularly future generations. As tribal differences were muted, whole new generations of Kenyans started to buy into the fact that they were different from the rest of Africa. They felt that Kenya had succeeded in finding peace and prosperity where others had failed. In younger generations, confidence started to grow in the institutions and economy of Kenya. Now, with this onset of chaos, these perceptions are losing hold. Kenyans are starting to think that maybe they are not so special after all; that maybe the past success was a lie; that maybe tribal differences have doomed Kenya like they have the rest of Africa. Mindset can be so crucial to the success of an individual and a nation. As Kenya descends into chaos, the mindset of future generations will turn from a motivation for prosperity and peace and revert back to one strictly based on tribal loyalty. Should the instability continue, Kenya may very well continue down this path to the point where the people may have the same one-sided ethnic mindset that thrives in much of Africa. Should that happen, Kenya would indeed cease to be different and would become another African failure. And then Africa would have lost perhaps its brightest silver lining.

The NIE Iran Report: a Warning in Disguise

2008-01-10T17:47:00.001-05:00

In the wake of disturbing international situations and trends, particularly the growing troubles arising in the Middle East, some people were quick to embrace the idea that Iran was no longer a nuclear threat. The support for such a theory came from the first paragraph of the National Intelligence Estimate’s November 2007 report on Iran’s nuclear intentions and capabilities, which began by saying “We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program.” Better yet, the paragraph went on to say that “we judge with high confidence that the halt… was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure.” Such words were a welcome change from the flurry of news stories on the more daunting Middle East scenarios in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere. The words of the rest of the report, though, depict a situation just as daunting, if not more so, than the rest of the Middle East picture. In short, the subsequent sections of the report show that Tehran remains very capable of obtaining nuclear weapons, despite its so-called halt, and is in fact still getting closer to becoming a nuclear power.

The people that interpreted the report’s first paragraph as meaning that Iran had halted its entire nuclear operation misunderstood the scope of that paragraph. When the report says Iran halted its “nuclear weapons program,” it is referring to “Iran’s nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work; we do not mean Iran’s declared civil work related to uranium conversion and enrichment.”

The definition does not refer to the entire nuclear weapons process, and so the statement about the “nuclear weapons program” being halted does not extend to the entire nuclear operation. Ironically enough, the part of the nuclear program defined is one that does not require any sensitive, directly nuclear aspects. Any nation with sufficient engineering capabilities could very well design a nuclear missile. Of course, designing such a weapon would mean little if the country did not possess enough enriched uranium or other fissile material to build it. Therefore, a nation’s level of proficiency in nuclear weapon design does not serve as an accurate barometer of such a nation’s nuclear program.

A more accurate indicator would be if a county possessed or tried to obtain the necessary fissile material. According to the following paragraphs of the report, this indicator is present in Iran, as “Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so.” The report not only warns that “Iran’s civilian uranium enrichment program is continuing,” but also that “Iran resumed its declared centrifuge enrichment activities in January 2006,” and made “significant progress in 2007 installing centrifuges at Natanz.”

Iran’s continued enrichment of uranium along with its upgrading of its nuclear facilities should raise suspicions of a potential Iranian military nuclear objective. While this evidence alone cannot rule out the possibility that Iran has a civilian objective in mind, an examination of Iran’s interests can. For Iran, a civilian nuclear program does not make a whole lot of sense. With a large supply of domestic oil, it would not seem that Iran would have an immediate need for another source of wealth or energy, particularly one that is so costly and requires importing the fuel. A nuclear weapon, though, would likely be in their interests, allowing, among other things, for greater influence over their Middle Eastern neighbors, particularly over nuclear Israel, where the passionate issue of religion comes into play. Between this logic and the evidence amassed throughout the entire report, it seems most likely that Iran is furthering its nuclear weapons operation.

In fact, a closer examination of Iran’s strategy should cause even more foreboding thoughts. Suspending the design of nuclear weapons while continuing to enrich uranium is a way for Iran to not only further its nuclear ambitions, but also to lessen the diplomatic pressure levied against it. Ever since 2003, when satellite images were taken of several large and fortified nuclear facilities, Iran has faced the brunt of nuclear non-proliferation sanctions and has become increasingly isolated. The economic sanctions, although not applied by everyone, have nonetheless hampered Iran’s fragile oil-centric economy. The effects have certainly been felt by much of the Iranian population, sparking more internal pressure on a government already embattled by diplomatic pressure and isolation. While these measures have not been sufficient to cause Iran to change course or ideology, they have certainly made life much harder for Iran.

Iran’s suspension of its weapons design program, as depicted in this report, has changed all that. The latest wave of UN pressure has subsided, in large part because China, which was close to compromising with U.S. demands in the UN, has used the report as an excuse to withdraw its support for the U.S. backed measures. Indeed many in the United States now question whether taking such measures is still necessary or appropriate. In addition, Russia began supplying Iran’s Bushehr reactor with nuclear fuel following the report’s release. In one deft stroke, Iran had reversed its fortunes, appeasing enough of the world to lay off pressure while still gathering all the parts necessary for a nuclear bomb, waiting for the opportune moment to construct a nuclear arsenal.

In light of Iraq and similar debacles, the U.S. intelligence community has become increasingly restrained in its actions and reports, striving not to provoke anyone by being as careful as possible. How ironic, then, that such a report crafted to be as specific and comprehensible as possible has been so broadly misinterpreted. Worse yet, such misunderstandings have set the wrong events in motion. The report, in its entirety, does not describe a country bowing to international pressure but one that has modified its strategy in order to appease the aggressors while achieving the same goal. For a time, it seemed that North Korea was cooperating with international demands as well. Then, as international pressure eased, the nation quietly continued its rise to nuclear status. According to this report, Iran has made a similar impression. Unfortunately, this same report caused international pressure to once again ease off in the face of supposed success. One can only hope that Iran’s fate will not be the same as Pakistan’s or North Korea’s. Or this report may very well have drastic implications for years to come.

Pakistan: A Solution for the Long Run

2007-12-12T17:44:00.001-05:00

Pakistan’s President, Pervez Musharraf, has always had a great knack for staying in power, having to cling to his rule from the beginning. For the first few years, he ruled as an outright dictator, staying afloat due to his command of the military and his periodic promises of democracy. When the moment came for “democracy” to ensue, Musharraf rigged both the Presidential and Parliamentary elections to effectively prolong his authority. Whenever pressure mounted from the United States to help in the “war on terror,” Musharraf’s army mounted modest operations in the Northwestern borderlands; whenever pressure mounted from the locals and Muslims, Musharraf eased back on such operations.

And, as international pressure mounted in the face of the latest wave of riots, Musharraf removed his uniform, becoming an official citizen. This is not as surprising as it may seem; Musharraf would not have made such a move if he knew it would spell the immediate end of his power. Doubtless he still has considerable influence over the army. Doubtless still more, though, his influence will never be as strong as it was. Indeed his generalship provided the base of his power, and so the loss of his uniform will most likely start the slow, yet sure passing of Musharraf’s authority.

As Musharraf fades away, a new authority will rise in Pakistan. Who or what replaces him, though, and under what circumstances they do, will be long in the making. Anyone with any power will likely be in the mix. Amidst this uncertainty, the United States could use its considerable influence over Pakistan to try to shape what becomes of post-Musharraf Pakistan. At best, the United States could help point Pakistan towards an era of relative lasting peace in Pakistan while also furthering vital U.S. interests in Pakistan. At worst, the window of opportunity will close for awhile, and Pakistan will, at best, continue to live on the edge of chaos, with the conflict against the jihadists and the fate of the nuclear arsenal hanging in the balance.

A balanced formula that would accomplish a majority of U.S. interests in Pakistan remains elusive, given all the variables in Pakistan that influence U.S interests. Stability, so crucial for a nuclear nation like Pakistan, has been hard to come by in Pakistan’s modern history, and its brief reigns have come at terrible prices, almost always in the form of military dictators or corrupt nominal democracies. Intra-Muslim splits and class divides have made ultimate stability especially elusive. Regardless of the security situation, no Pakistani government has ever exercised adequate authority over all regions. In particular, the determined Pashtuns of Waziristan have resisted outside control for centuries. Unluckily enough, for the last few years these proud and hospitable people have given refuge to Al Qaeda and the Taliban. In their new home, these organizations have remade themselves into the potent threats that they were in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has been a nuclear proliferation nightmare ever since its creation. One of its operators, A.Q. Khan, ran a kind of nuclear black market, with nuclear technology originating from him turning up from Libya to North Korea. Pakistan itself could be the setting of nuclear disasters, given the instability in the country containing the warheads. The proximity of such dangerous groups like Al Qaeda and the Taliban to such devastating weapons creates even more disaster potential should Pakistan descend into chaos.

The current policy directs a disproportionate share of focus towards stability, which has made it both ineffective and self-wounding. Since Musharraf has long been viewed as the only perceivable option for stability, the United States has supported him rather unilaterally, meeting virtually whatever concessions he offered, even as many of them came at the expense of other U.S. interests in Pakistan, so that a stable Pakistan could keep a tab on its nuclear arsenal. Ironically, what Musharraf brought to Pakistan was far from stability. It brought, at most, fragile lapses of violence, often punctuated by riots, most recently last month’s lawyer protests. Like his predecessors, Musharraf’s rule did not extend through all of Pakistan, including volatile Waziristan where the extremists are hiding out.

Now that Musharraf’s end looms, the United States should start to formulate a new policy. This policy should, among other things, demand more of the Pakistani authority than just stability. The United States cannot let other national security interests suffer because of the fear of chaos and its ramifications. The United States should have learned from the Cold War that propping up an unpopular leader only works up to a point. Granting these leaders such drastic diplomatic leverage as Musharraf enjoyed only wounds the United States for the sake of a stability that would likely not last. If the United States stops negotiating against itself, maybe then it would have enough leverage of its own to further more of its interests, such as gaining custody of A. Q. Khan.

Achieving each of these policy goals separately would require a sizeable amount of brain and manpower. On the other hand, a Pakistan that remains stable in the long-term would make furthering U.S. interests a great deal easier. The United States would do well to help encourage Pakistani leaders to create a framework that would maintain long-term stability. The power void caused by Musharraf’s decline provides the perfect opportunity for this.

Modern Pakistan has never been very successful under centralized rule, but historically the Indian subcontinent has done fairly well under decentralized rule. Indeed, the subcontinent reached the peak of its prosperity nearly 2000 years ago under the decentralized Gupta Empire. Perhaps a return to a decentralized framework would facilitate a similar stability and peace. In modern political terms, perhaps a federal framework would thrive. Powerful regional authorities could not only help to check the power of the central government, but could also help to ensure that the central government would not distort the democracy or deny the population of their rights. If activists truly feel their country can accomplish democracy, they should be more than willing to give a federal framework a shot. In addition, a more decentralized rule over the provinces would be appealing to the quasi-independent fringe provinces like Waziristan. Under a federal framework, they could retain their independence through the system rather than in spite of the system. They may be more likely to cooperate with U.S. demands for Al Qaeda and the Taliban if the possibility of such a plan were at stake. If such a plan succeeds in facilitating some sort of lasting stability, then perhaps the nuclear arsenal would be secure for awhile and Pakistan could become more prosperous.

Getting such a plan through power-consolidating figures and institutions, especially the army, would be challenging. However, soon Pakistan will not have a sole figure or institution with unquestioned power. Musharraf was once, but he has sealed his decline. A few people could potentially succeed him, but that would take several years, leaving Pakistan without an insurmountable authority figure. During this lapse, the United States, with its influences over various groups and its economic clout, could have an opportunity to encourage the formulation of this idea. The results may not be ideal, but considering what the reality is, it sure seems worth a try.

The Armenian Genocide Resolution: An Unlikely Source for Congress’ Potential Legacy

2007-10-21T18:37:00.006-04:00

The Democratic majority that stormed to power in the election of the 110th Congress had great expectations to put an end to the tide of President Bush’s controversial policies.

Nearly a year later, though, all the Democrats have to show for their promise is a minimum wage increase, fiery partisan rhetoric, and potentially landmark Iraq policy bills squashed by Bush’s veto.

Now Congress threatens to finally make a real difference, and even they themselves are surprised by it.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee had a largely symbolic objective in mind when it voted to send a resolution to the floor that labeled Turkey’s killing of 1.5 million Armenians as genocide. In light of recent events, though, it appears that this decision will have a lot more practical impact than intended – or sought.

Within a day the Turkish ambassador was recalled from Washington, and within a week the Turkish parliament authorized a potential invasion of Northern Iraq, in defiance of the United States, to round up Kurdish rebels stationed there. Even so, this may only be the beginning: Turkey has the potential to immediately affect U.S. policy, European policy, and the long term stability of the Middle East.

In an America where Iraq remains such a heated issue, it seems astonishing that U.S. politicians would tread so heedlessly on a nation that plays such a critical role in Iraq. For the military, no country plays a more important part than Turkey, which has become the logistical keystone for the U.S. military. Around 70% of air shipments to Iraq are flown across Turkey and that an array of supplies, particularly fuel, passes through Turkey en route to Iraq. Should Turkey stop providing logistical support, the U.S. military would have to resort to longer, less efficient, and costlier routes (as if Americans weren’t paying enough for the war already!)
Another, more destabilizing Turkish action regarding Iraq, though, would soon dwarf any fuss over logistics. The recent vote by the Turkish parliament could precede a move that many in Turkey have deemed necessary in the wake of the growing chaos in Iraq: an invasion of Kurdish Northern Iraq. The fallout of this move could fundamentally alter the stability and geopolitical landscape of the Middle East.

In an essence, though, the current boundaries in the Middle East are somewhat arbitrary, which is the underlying cause of the tensions leading up to this drama. Although, some thought was given to ethnic differences, the post-World War I borders, carved out of the domains of the former Ottoman Empire, were designed primarily to further the colonial ambitions of Britain and France in the region. In fact, such reckless boundary making led to meshing of a Kurdish bloc, a Sunni bloc, and a Shiite bloc together into a single country: present day Iraq. U.S. troops are currently witnessing the latest melee in the perpetual cycle of violence/authoritarianism in Iraq.

The Kurds trapped inside the Iraq border were formerly part of a distinctly Kurdish region in the Northern Middle East. The rest of the Kurdish population were encased by the borders of modern Turkey, Iran, and a little bit of Syria. Many Kurds long for a country of their own, in their ancient homeland, free from the oppression they have faced in the countries they were forced into. As the Iraqi Arab sects have engaged in the latest civil war there, the Kurds of Northern Iraq have grown ever more independent from the rest of Iraq, only loosely governed (as if any part of Iraq really isn’t at this point) by the Maliki government. It would seem that the possibility of Northern Iraq attempting to secede from the rest of Iraq to form Kurdistan does not seem so farfetched or far off. Such secession would send shivers up the spine of the Turkish government, since an independent Kurdistan would likely hold great appeal for the Kurds of Turkey, who have long been at the mercy of their Turkish rulers. Indeed, Turkey fears that Southeastern, Kurdish Turkey would in turn try to secede as well and become part of the new Kurdistan. To prevent this security nightmare scenario, Turkey would invade Northern Iraq with the goal of quelling the Kurdish Separatist movement (PKK) and demonstrating the futility of trying to form a Kurdish state.

An invasion of Northern Iraq would burst the security bubbles of the surrounding countries. The Kurdish regions of Iran and Syria would likely try to secede from their respective states and join up with the new Kurdistan, causing great unrest and massive oppression. The Turkish military would be stretched to the limit occupying Northern Iraq while simultaneously trying to prevent the secession of the Kurdish region of Turkey. In the chaos, the remainder of Iraq could split into Sunni and Shiite states that might try to invade Northern Iraq for themselves to capture the oil fields there. The conflict between these new states could spill over into neighboring countries already reeling from the Kurdish shockwaves. Or, neighboring countries could join in on the fray to try to annex the Sunni and Shiite states and to even make a foray into the oil fields of the North as well. Meanwhile, the U.S. military would find itself in a quagmire many times as thick as now, attempting to reunify the shattered elements of Iraq, as they are presently, but with increased intervention by Turkey and potentially other nations. Indeed the U.S. and Turkish militaries might engage each other, causing ugly diplomatic repercussions. The inevitable abuses of Kurds by the Turkish military would most likely lead to Turkey’s expulsion from NATO and may bring about an end to any remaining positive Euro-Turkish relations.

Such diplomatic consequences could ultimately make Turkey the biggest loser of the invasion. Fear of such repercussions have managed to check the Turkish military so far, but should incidents like the Armenian genocide resolution continue to pile up, and should the situation in Iraq continue to spiral out of control, Turkey may feel that it has no choice but to invade.

Even still, it remains relatively unlikely that such a catastrophic scenario will unfold solely as a result of the genocide resolution. Nevertheless, the genocide resolution is the latest source of ever growing tension between Turkey and the West that threatens to fundamentally alter the role of Turkey in the world.

Though Turkey has long had one of the largest Muslim populations and, as the Ottoman Empire, was once the champion of the Muslim world, since the 1920s it has had a tradition of state-enforced secularism, dating back to the rule of Ataturk. Such secular administration and society has made Europeans more willing to work with Turkey. Even as the Muslims of Turkey felt an allure to the political and cultural trends of the nearby Middle East, the policies of the Turkish government would often partially reflect the influences of Europe. Ataturk decided long ago that Turkey would be better off as a secular caterer to Europe, and that continuing trend has arguably been his greatest legacy.

Turkey, as a result, became something of a Western island in the Middle East. Europe and America have generally been able to present enough incentives to maintain a fair degree of such influence in Turkey. Most recently, Europe has considered Turkey as a candidate to join the European Union, and Turkey has taken several Euro-friendly steps necessary to fulfill the requirements for EU membership and to appeal to leaders of the EU, such as France and Germany, to admit it. America, along with its superpower status, sends annual economic and military aid to Turkey, and in turn Turkey has long been a supporter of Israel.

However, tension has started to mount between Turkey and the West. U.S. policy debacles with regards to Iraq, torture, and the “war on terror” as well as the unilateral fashion with which such policies were executed have worked to isolate America from everyone, and Turkey is no exception. In fact, Turkey is feeling particular pressure from the tide of anti-U.S. sentiment in the Middle East from its large Muslim population. Try as they might to distance themselves from America, Europe has been tarred with the same brush nevertheless (they call it the West for a reason). As a result, association with the West has lost some of its allure of old, and Turkey wonders, for good reason, whether to continue to defy its disgruntled Muslim base to be in league with an increasingly unpopular West.

One resolution condemning genocide will probably not dismantle U.S.-Turkey relations, but it will add to the trend that has been a recent source of tension between the nations. Eventually, should the trend continue, Turkey may distance itself from Western objectives in favor of the objectives of Middle Eastern powerhouses, such as Iran. To be fair, such a shift would not be without consequence for Turkey: they would doubtless lose countless economic and political benefits from the West. But as this trend continues, it becomes ever more likely that Turkey will slowly, but surely cease to be in the sphere of the West.

That being said, it should be reaffirmed that genocide should not be tolerated: there is no greater crime than to wipe a population off the face of the Earth. However, there is a time and a place for everything, and now is not the time to further antagonize Turkey.